

Understanding Voting Behavior Models: A Critical Review

Ali Nurdin

alinurdin@unmabanten.ac.id

Mathla'ul Anwar University, Banten

Article Info

Received: 2023-02-17

Revised: 2023-05-21

Accepted: 2023-06-29

Keywords:

Legal protection;

Traditional Knowledge;

Copyrights

Abstract

This research aims to explore the impact of money politics on voting behavior, compliance and voter loyalty in Indonesia using literature study and desk research methods. Money politics, which involves providing material incentives to voters, has become a widespread and influential phenomenon in the electoral system in Indonesia. This study analyzes various literature and secondary data to understand how money politics influences voters' preferences, their level of compliance with candidates who provide incentives, and their loyalty to political parties or candidates.

The research results show that money politics has a significant influence on voting behavior, where voters who receive incentives tend to choose candidates or parties that provide these incentives. However, this influence is often temporary and does not guarantee long-term loyalty. Voter loyalty to candidates who provide incentives is also influenced by economic motivations, and voter loyalty tends to weaken due to the practice of money politics, causing them to more easily change their support in the next election if there is a more profitable offer.

To reduce the negative impact of money politics, this research recommends increasing political education, stricter law enforcement, and strengthening electoral institutions. A holistic approach involving the government, electoral institutions, civil society organizations and the wider community is needed to overcome this problem and strengthen democracy in Indonesia. This research provides in-depth insight into the phenomenon of money politics and offers

recommendations for improving the quality of elections in Indonesia.

1. Introduction

The 2024 general election in Indonesia reveals a phenomenon that is increasingly emerging, namely pragmatic voting behavior which is strongly influenced by material incentives. The practice of money politics, where candidates give cash or basic necessities to voters in exchange for their votes, has become an integral part of the reality of elections in Indonesia. Various studies and reports on election results show that material incentives have a significant influence on voting decisions, both in legislative elections and presidential and vice presidential elections. This phenomenon reflects the increasingly complex dynamics of electoral politics and indicates a shift in voter behavior that needs further analysis.

Voting behavior is an important aspect in the study of political science, especially in the context of democracy. According to Evans (2004: 3-4), voting behavior can be analyzed from two different levels, namely the micro level (individual) and the macro level (society). Analysis at the micro level focuses on factors that influence individual decisions in choosing, while analysis at the macro level looks at patterns of voting behavior in a broader context, such as regional or national trends. The study of voting behavior has been a major focus since the early 20th century, with early research by Siegfried (1913) exploring voting patterns in Western France before World War I.

Indonesia, as the third largest democracy in the world, has unique political dynamics. The practice of money politics is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia, but this trend has become stronger in the last few decades. This raises fundamental questions about the integrity of the electoral process and the quality of democracy itself. In this context, it is important to understand the existing models of voting behavior and their relevance to the widespread phenomenon of money politics.

Various studies have identified that voting behavior is influenced by a number of complex and interrelated factors. From the existing literature, studies on voting behavior can be divided into four main aspects, namely:

Voter compliance - how voters respond to material incentives;

Voter loyalty (voter loyalty) - the tendency of voters to remain loyal to a particular party or candidate;

Voting decision - the decision-making process by voters in determining their choice;

Factors that determine voting behavior (voting determinants) - various variables that influence voting behavior.

A deep understanding of these aspects is very important in analyzing voting behavior in Indonesia, especially in the context of money politics. Thus, this study aims to explore more deeply the model of voting behavior, the factors that influence it, and how money politics influences the preferences and decisions of voters in Indonesia.

2. Research Method

This research uses a library study and desk research approach by utilizing reference sources in the form of hardcopy and digital files. Thus, it is hoped that this study can make a significant contribution to the understanding of voting behavior in Indonesia and provide insight into the development of fairer and more democratic election policies.

3. Results and Discussion

The 2024 general election that has just passed in Indonesia increasingly shows a tendency to strengthen the pragmatic model of voting behavior that really takes material incentives into account. Various publications of study results and candidate testimonies conclude that incentives in the form of cash or basic necessities have a significant influence on candidates' vote acquisition in legislative elections and presidential and vice presidential elections. The increasingly strengthening trend of the phenomenon of money politics encourages the author to look again at the models of voting behavior that are currently known and their relevance to the development of electoral politics in Indonesia. This study is based on library research and desk research using reference sources in the form of hardcopy and digital files.

Voting behavior is the process of determining a person's decision to vote (or not vote) for a particular party or candidate in a general election. According to Evans (2004: 3-4), voting behavior can be seen from two different levels of analysis, namely the micro level (individual) and the macro level (society). Studies of voter behavior at the micro level carried out in aggregate can produce aggregate data at the regional or national level. The term election or voting has actually been known in political science terminology for a long time. Starting from Aristotle to De Tocqueville, they include the term voting in their works. However, the study

of voting behavior in a more specific and focused manner was only carried out at the beginning of the 20th century. One of them was Siegfried (1913) who conducted research on voting patterns in Western France before World War I (Evans, 2004: 21).

From various available references, studies on voting behavior can be seen from at least four different aspects, namely: (1) voter compliance (Schaffer, 2005: 3-4; Schaffer, 2007: 17-29); (2) voter loyalty (Hirschman, 1970; Anderson and Srinivasan, 2003; Evans, 2004; Bratton, 2008: 15; Bartels, 2008: 14; Schaffer, 2007: 185); (3) the decision to choose or voting choice (see Lau and Redlawsk, 2006: 3-8; Evans, 2004: 4; Vicente, 2007: 18; Woshinsky, 2008: 102-132; Zukerman, 2005: 229); and (4) factors that determine voting behavior (voting determinants) or often referred to as models of voting behavior (see Niemi, 2008: 13-15; Evans, 2004: 6-89; Heywood, 2007: 265-269; Liddle and Mujani, 2007).

1. Voter Compliance and Loyalty

According to Schaffer in his book "Election for Sale: the Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying" (2008), the purpose of vote-buying is for voters to decide their choice in accordance with the wishes of the party who provides money or materials. The willingness of voters to follow the wishes of money politics actors is called voter compliance. In offering money, goods or services to voters, in general there are three forms of compliance that the giver expects from the recipient in terms of choosing or not choosing a particular candidate. First, instrumental compliance, where recipients change or do not change their voting behavior voluntarily because they receive material rewards. Second, normative compliance, where the recipient changes or does not change their voting behavior because they feel they have a moral obligation or a sense of indebtedness to the goodness or worthiness of the candidate providing the incentive. Third, coercive compliance, where providing material becomes a kind of bullying to change or not change voting behavior. The recipient feels afraid if they refuse the gift or afraid if they do not choose with instructions after the offer has been accepted (Schaffer, 2005: 9).

By introducing the concept of voter compliance, Schaffer implicitly acknowledges that vote-buying can change political preferences and voting behavior. However, he admits that in the practice of vote buying there is no certainty (uncertain compliance) that the recipient of money or material will follow the wishes of the giver (Schaffer, 2007: 19). In this case, Schaffer agrees with Kramon (2009), Bratton (2008), and Stokes (2005).

The practice of vote buying is considered not to be the same as economic transactions between sellers and buyers, because vote buying transactions are illegal and in themselves are not protected by applicable law. There is no obligation for the recipient of money or material to carry out what was promised by the person giving the material. Schaffer (2005: 6) calls this the "problem of coercion" that exists in every vote buying transaction.

Apart from that, the party giving the money or materials also does not have a means of control to ensure whether the vote buying "transaction" entered into with the recipient of the money is carried out or not by the recipient of the money on election day. Because election regulations in many democratic countries generally state that voting must be done in secret. Apart from that, in the practice of vote buying, both the giver and recipient of funds or materials can be threatened with legal sanctions.

Meanwhile, voter loyalty is the tendency of voters' behavior towards a particular party or candidate, resulting in repeated voting behavior. "Voter loyalty is defined as the voters' favorable attitude towards a party resulting in repeat voting behavior" (Anderson and Srinivasan, 2003:16). According to Norris, loyalty (to the party) is one of the most important aspects of voting behavior – apart from the form of party competition and the level of voter participation in elections. "The most important aspects of voting behavior concern patterns of party competition, the strength of party loyalties, and levels of electoral turnout" (Norris, 2004: 6).

Economist Albert O. Hirschman wrote the book *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (1970) which is widely used as a reference regarding the concept of loyalty. According to Hirschman, members of an organization, whether a business, a nation or any other form of human grouping, have essentially two possible responses when they perceive that this organization is showing a decline in quality or benefits for members: they can leave or exit (withdraw from the relationship) , or, they may voice or voice (attempt to repair or improve the relationship through the communication of complaints, grievances or proposals for change). For example, citizens may respond to increasing political repression in two ways: emigrate or protest. Likewise, employees may choose to quit a job they are unhappy with, or express their concerns in an attempt to improve the situation. Dissatisfied customers can convey it to managers, or they choose to shop elsewhere (Hirschman, 1970: 14). Loyalty is a situation where there is loyalty to the organization (as evidenced by politically strong patriotism, or brand loyalty for consumers), so that exit options can be reduced, especially where the option to leave is not very attractive (Hirschman, 1970: 21) .

In the context of general elections, loyalty or allegiance will result in repeated behavior where voters will vote for the same candidate or party. One indicator that forms loyalty is partisanship or a sense of closeness to a particular party. This concept originates from the general election tradition in the United States since the 1950s, where voting behavior tendencies were measured, among other things, by their sense of closeness to the Republican Party, Democratic Party, or Independent. The standard question usually used by the American National Election Study (NES) is, "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what" (Norris, 2004: 131).

In this research, the concept of voter loyalty is used to determine how strong material incentive factors (money politics) can change voters' decisions in casting their votes for certain candidates. Voters who say they will turn away if they

don't get material incentives are considered disloyal voters or have low loyalty. On the other hand, voters who remain loyal to their choice even though they do not receive material incentives are considered voters who have high loyalty. A study in the Philippines showed that one fifth of the 38 percent of voters who accepted money politics said they would still vote for the same candidate even though they did not receive money or other gifts from the candidate in question (Schaffer, 2005: 6).

2. Voting Decisions and Voting Behavior Models

Viewed based on the main factors that influence voters, Heywood (2007: 266) groups voter behavior into four models, namely: the sociological model, the party identifications model, and the rational choice model. choice model), and the dominant ideology model.

The Sociological Model was developed by Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) from Columbia University, Lipset and Rokkan (1967), and Butler and Stokes (1971). This model believes that a person's voting behavior is determined by their character and sociological background such as class, religion, level of education, type of work, race, language and region of residence.

The Party Identification Model or Social-Psychological Model developed by Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960) from Michigan University. According to this model, a person's political preferences in general elections are not only determined by the social characteristics of voters, but are also influenced by psychological factors. Campbell and his friends came up with the concept of party identification (party identification or partisanship), namely a feeling of closeness to a particular political party. This concept has become a reference for many researchers who study voting behavior issues to this day.

The Rational Choice Model originates from the work of Anthony Downs (1956) and was later developed, among others, by Lewis-Beck (1998). According to this third model, voting behavior is determined by an assessment of economic-socio-political conditions at the individual level (egocentric) and at the local-regional-national level (sociotropic).

The dominant ideology model believes that the process of manipulation and ideological control will greatly influence voter preferences in general elections (Heywood, 2007: 268). This model originates from socialist countries which have a very limited number of political choices. Compared with the other three models, the dominant ideology model is relatively less developed.

The Sociological Model was developed based on research in Erie County, Ohio, United States, in the early 1940s. Paul Lazarsfeld and his friends conducted at least seven panel surveys of 600 respondents, both with the same and different questions. The main aim of the survey was to find out how voter behavior changed during the presidential election campaign (Bartels, 2009: 3). Because it was carried out by researchers from Columbia University, this model is often also called the Columbia Model. The main conclusion of their research is that voting behavior is determined by a person's sociological background. The sociological

background referred to includes, among other things, a person's age, region of origin (for example: Java, Outside Java), where a person lives (for example: city, village), gender, race and ethnicity, employment status, socio-economic status, and orientation. religious. According to the Columbia School, "a person thinks, politically, as he is, socially. Social characteristics determine political preference" (in Goodin and Klingemann, 1998: 228).

Figure 2.2. Columbia Sociological Model

This model also states that the campaign process and mass media coverage have little influence on a person's voting preferences, because when the campaign is carried out most voters already have a decision regarding the candidate or party they will choose. The initial publication of the sociological model can be seen in *The People's Choice* written by Lazarsfeld, Berelson, Gaudet (1944); and *Voting* by Berelson, Lazarsfeld, McPhee (1954). The process of determining choices in the Sociological Model is depicted in Figure 2.2.

Several years after the research in Erie County, researchers from Michigan University conducted a national survey leading up to the 1948 United States presidential election. The survey was initially conducted not specifically to determine voter behavior, but rather to determine public opinion on foreign political policy. United States of America. However, "at the end of these interviews, in order to determine the degree of political interest of the respondents and their general political orientation, had asked respondents whether they planned to vote in the upcoming presidential election and for which party - at the end of the interview ", with the aim of knowing the general level of interest and political orientation of respondents, respondents were asked whether they planned to vote in the upcoming presidential election and which party they would vote for" (Campbell et. all., in Bartels, 2000: 35-50).

Immediately after the 1948 presidential election - partly driven by the failure of the Gallup Poll to predict President Harry Truman's victory over Thomas Dewey - Campbell and his friends re-interviewed respondents to find out: (1) the process of crystallization of voters' votes; (2) collect data on the personal characteristics, attitudes and demographics of voters and non-voters; and (3) assessing the influence of a number of political, social and psychological factors on voting behavior (Campbell et. all., in Bartels, 2000: 35).

One of the findings of the Michigan School based on three surveys leading up to the US presidential elections in 1948, 1952 and 1956 is that a person's political preferences in general elections are largely determined by their sense of closeness to a particular party or ideology that is stable. "The principal motivation behind voting in the US is party identification, being a long-term stable psychological affinity for one of the two major parties - the main motivation behind voting in the United States is party identification, being a long-term stable psychological affinity for one one of two parties" (Campbell, et. all., in Evans, 2004: 24).

In contrast to researchers from Columbia University, the Michigan School strongly believes that the campaign process has a significant influence on a person's voting behavior. "In terms of the Michigan model's voting 'equation', then, the socialization process and individuals' social context provide the psychological predisposition towards a certain party" (Evans, 2004: 25). Through the socialization or campaign process, voters are introduced to personalities, leadership and important issues that will be fought for by the parties and candidates competing in the election. Campbell and his friends' research was published in *The American Voter* (1960) which is still an important reference in studies of voting behavior to this day. The process of determining voice in the Socio-Psychological Model is depicted in Figure 2.3 below.

Figure 2.3. Michigan Socio-Psychological Model
(Harrop and Miller, in Evans, 2004: 26)

Meanwhile, the Rational Choice Model was first introduced by Anthony Downs in his work *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957) and developed, among others, by Mancur Olson in *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965). The basic assumption of the rational choice model is that citizens will act rationally in political activities. "Each citizen casts his vote for the party he believes will provide him with more benefits than any other" (Downs, 1957: 36).

The rational choice model believes that a person's voting behavior is determined based on subjective evaluations of various conditions (economic-political-social) at the individual and societal levels. Usually the principle of reward and punishment applies, especially to incumbent candidates. If economic and social conditions are considered good, voters tend to reward them by re-electing the candidate or party in power. On the other hand, if economic and social conditions are deemed to be unfavorable, voters will punish the candidate or party in power by giving their vote to another candidate or party.

The voter's subjective evaluation can be egocentric (from the perspective directly experienced by the voter) or sociotropic (an assessment of regional and national macro conditions). The rational choice model believes that economic factors have a determining role in a person's voting behavior. Because of this, this model is often also called the economic model or economic voting model (Dorussen and Taylor, 2002).

According to Evans (2005: 5), voters tend to choose parties and candidates based on the benefits obtained or promised. The expected benefits of voting will vary depending on the voter's background. However, some of the factors that motivate voters can be: benefits for groups (for example certain policies for the working class); material benefits (e.g. reduced taxes); managerial competence (eg improving the quality of public services); focus on relevant issues (e.g.

environmental policies to reduce pollution); and the defeat of the other party (e.g. voting for a Conservative party to hold off a Socialist party that voters hate).

Down defines rationality as "engaging in the pursuit of goals in the most reasonable way possible" or efforts to achieve goals in the most reasonable way possible. Taking the example of economic activity, Downs gives an example of "the most reasonable way possible" as a person who pursues his goals through the best means according to his knowledge, using the least amount of input or resource input to obtain a high-value output (Downs, 1957: 5). In other words, rational voters will consider the most cost-effective means of maximizing the profits they obtain or the most cost-effective means of maximizing his/her gains. Downs (1957: 6) then added five criteria that must be met for the principle of rationality as he explained to work. The five criteria are:

- (1) Individuals are able to make a decision when faced with various alternatives.
- (2) Individuals are able to rank their preferences based on order.
- (3) The ranking preferences made by individuals are transitive (for example: if the individual believes that alternative 1 is better than alternative 2 and alternative 2 is better than alternative 3, then the consequence is that alternative 1 must be better than alternative 3).
- (4) Individuals will always choose the alternative they like best.
- (5) If these alternatives are presented at different times but in the same situation, then the individual will always choose the same alternative.

Downs introduced the concept of utility income which he defined as "a measure of benefits from government activities" or a measure of the benefits from activities carried out by the government. Utility income will be a consideration for voters when faced with the choice of choosing the government party (incumbent) and the party opposing the government (opposition). The benefits that voters will consider from government activities, for example, could be: government performance in repairing and cleaning roads, providing clean water facilities, preserving beaches, handling waste, weather forecasting, and so on (Downs, 1957: 37).

Downs views politics as a public arena, where rational individual decisions in the political realm will always consider the benefits for the public, not individual interests alone. However, at this point Downs' view is not agreed with by the successors of economic voting theory such as Buchanan and Tullock (1999) and Olson (2002). According to Buchanan and Tullock (1999: 16), in all aspects of life including politics, rational individual action "is motivated solely by individual self-interest in all aspects of his behavior."

Common or group interests will only be effectively fought for in small groups where the members know each other and all group members are guaranteed to benefit from the group's interests (Olson, 2002: 35). However, in large groups, rational individuals will move or act based on their own self-interest. Thus, in a political context, rational voters are very likely to make the material benefits they

have obtained or will obtain as one of the considerations in determining their choice in a general election when there is more than one option.

3. Model of Voting Behavior in Indonesia

Attention to voting behavior in Indonesia has increased for at least the last ten years, in line with the era of democratic transition which, among other things, was marked by the presence of free and fair elections. The legislative elections in 1999 and the presidential elections in 2004 were seen by some parties as historical milestones that marked Indonesia's entry into the ranks of democratic countries (Bunte and Ufen, 2009: 5; Freedman, 2006: 88).

Free general elections make voters more independent in determining their political choices. Voters are no longer associated with certain parties or groups (Bartels, 2009: 226). In this free situation, the results of general elections become more difficult to predict. This is different from the elections during the New Order era, where the government's role and intervention in mobilizing the masses ahead of the elections was very visible. With a limited number of parties, where there was one dominant party, the results of the New Order elections were relatively easy to predict (Ghaffar, 1992: 16). Therefore, general elections during the New Order were never categorized as "free and honest general elections".

The presence of independent public opinion survey institutions has contributed to increasing attention to voting behavior in Indonesia. Free general elections require a more scientific approach to determine public opinion and voting behavior tendencies. Even though it is mostly used for the purposes of winning elections and post-conflict regional elections, the presence of public opinion survey institutions has made the concept of voting behavior better known in the realm of Indonesian politics. The terms popularity and electability have now become vocabulary that is often heard in the context of political contestation in Indonesia.

Mulkan (1989) mapped changes in the voting behavior of Indonesian Muslims based on the socio-religious categorization introduced by Clifford Gertz, namely Santri, Abangan and Priyayi - known as sect politics. In research on voting behavior in a village in South Sulawesi, Taqwa and Usman (2004) concluded that religious figures and local political elites had a very determining influence on voting behavior among the Muslim community. Mulkan and Taqwa and Usman use the Sociological Model to explain voter behavior in Indonesia.

Ghaffar (1992) also used the perspective of political sect and social class coupled with party identification and leadership to examine the consistency and changes in voter behavior in the New Order elections. Ghaffar combined the concepts introduced by the Columbia Model and the Michigan Model together. Meanwhile, Kristiadi's (1996) study places more emphasis on a socio-cultural approach as an explanation of voting behavior by referring to patterns of behavior in a paternalistic culture.

More comprehensive research on voting behavior in Indonesia was conducted by William Liddle and Saiful Mujani (2007) based on the results of several

national voting behavior surveys. The two researchers concluded that voting behavior in Indonesia in the 1999 and 2004 elections was strongly influenced by the leadership of the candidates running and party identification. Meanwhile, sociological, demographic and religious orientation factors have an insignificant influence on voting behavior (Liddle and Mujani, 2007: 850). In other research, the two researchers confirmed the decreasing role of sociological, demographic and religious orientation factors on voting behavior. In the 2009 elections voters considered factors such as economic growth and government policies, especially in the fields of education and health (Liddle and Mujani, 2010: 46). Even though it uses the concept introduced by the Michigan Model, the study conducted by Liddle and Mujani indicates that Indonesian voters tend to be increasingly rational.

The model developed by the Comparative National Election Project (CNEP) in the 2004 Election includes a number of elements of rationality, where voters carry out an assessment (evaluation) of a number of aspects such as leadership, government performance, party performance, as well as the issues and programs promised by candidates. CSIS research (2008) concluded that Indonesian voters are increasingly able to assess government performance consistently in accordance with the realities of their lives.

Figure 2.4. Rational Choice Model
(CNEP, 2004)

The model above does not at all consider monetary or other material incentive factors as a possibility that influences voter behavior. In fact, the symptoms and indications of money politics in every general election in Indonesia, both national and local elections, have increasingly surfaced. Therefore, an alternative model is needed to explain the factors that influence voters' political decisions in Indonesia.

The terminology that is often used to describe Indonesian voters today includes: traditional voters, loyal voters, and rational voters. The term traditional voter which is often used in Indonesia actually refers to the sociological voter model initiated by experts from Columbia University (Berelson, et al., 1954) because of the factors commonly used to explain traditional voters such as regional origin, ethnicity, age, gender. and so on are largely the same as the factors used in sociological models. This traditional term emerged because traditionally, from election to election, the voters in question always give the same political choice to a particular party. However, with the increasing diversity of political choices faced by voters, both political parties and candidates changing from time to time, this traditional claim needs to be re-evaluated.

The term loyal voter is closer to the social-psychological model of voting behavior introduced by University of Michigan researchers (Campbell, et al., 1960). Voter

loyalty in this case is directed towards a certain sect, political party, or family breed that is consistently present on the political stage. This understanding is similar to the meaning of party identification which is an important finding of the Michigan School. The term rational voter clearly takes the term from the findings of Anthony Downs (1957) as previously explained. Some of the indicators commonly used to describe rational voters in Indonesia are also the same as those initiated by Downs and his successors.

In the Indonesian context, where the number and composition of political parties continues to change from election to election, and the boundaries of denomination and ideology between competing political parties are increasingly blurred, the relevance of using sociological and social-psychological models in Indonesia needs to be re-evaluated. At least, the parameters used to explain the two models are adapted to Indonesia's social conditions which have experienced rapid changes in the last three decades since the 1998 reforms. A number of recent surveys show that loyalty to certain political sects or parties is now decreasing (LSI Institut, October 2010). It is believed that the pattern of Indonesian voter behavior is moving in a more rational direction, both rationality driven by objective-qualitative factors and based on subjective-pragmatic considerations.

4. Conclusion

Voter loyalty in Indonesia, by utilizing a literature study and desk research approach. Based on the analysis carried out, the following are the main conclusions of this research:

Money politics is proven to have a significant influence on voting behavior in Indonesia. The studies analyzed show that giving money or goods to voters can increase the voter's probability of voting for a particular candidate or party. However, this influence tends to be temporary and does not guarantee long-term loyalty.

Money politics can influence the level of voter compliance with the instructions or preferences of candidates who provide incentives. However, this compliance is often driven by economic motivations rather than deep political convictions. Voters who receive money or goods tend to feel morally bound to fulfill their promises, although this attachment may change if there are greater incentives from other parties.

Money politics tends to damage voter loyalty to political parties or candidates in the long term. Voters who are accustomed to receiving material incentives may become more pragmatic and less loyal, making them more susceptible to switching support in the next election if a more favorable offer is presented. This indicates that money politics not only weakens the integrity of elections but also reduces the quality of democracy.

The practice of money politics raises a number of serious problems for the democratization process in Indonesia. Apart from creating injustice in political competition, money politics also weakens democratic institutions and damages public trust in the electoral system. The tendency of voters to vote based on material incentives rather than the vision and mission of a candidate or party indicates a deficit in political education and democratic awareness.

Several key factors that influence the effectiveness of money politics in Indonesia include the socio-economic conditions of voters, education level, and political awareness. Voters with lower economic conditions tend to be more susceptible to money politics. On the other hand, increasing education and political awareness can reduce the influence of money politics on voting behavior.

To reduce the negative impact of money politics, there is a need for a holistic approach that includes increasing political education, stricter law enforcement against perpetrators of money politics, and strengthening electoral institutions. Political education programs should focus on increasing voter awareness of the importance of voting based on the candidate's vision, mission and competence rather than material incentives. Apart from that, strengthening regulations and supervision by institutions such as the KPU and Bawaslu is very important to prevent and crack down on money politics practices.

References

- Adetula, Victor AO (ed). 2008. *Money and Politics in Nigeria* . Abuja: IFES-Nigeria
- Alvarez, R. Michael, et al. (eds.). 2008. *Election Fraud: Detecting and Deterring Electoral Manipulation* . Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Ambardi, Kuskrido. 2009. *Revealing Cartel Politics: A Study of the Party System in Indonesia in the Reformation Era* . Jakarta: Gramedia Popular Literature (KPG).
- Anand, Paul, et al. (eds.). 2009. *The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice* . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ananta, Aris, et al. 2004. *Indonesian Electoral Behavior: A Statistical Perspective* . Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- , et al. 2005. *Emerging Democracy in Indonesia* . Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Austin, Reginald and Tjernström, Maja (eds). 2004. *Handbook of Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns* . Stockholm: International IDEA
- Pandeglang Regency Central Statistics Agency. 2010. *Pandeglang in Figures 2010*. BPS Pandeglang.
- Baldini, Gianfranco and Pappalardo, Andriano. 2009. *Elections, Electoral Systems, and Volatile Voters* . New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bartels, Larry M. "The Study of Electoral Behavior" in Leighley, Jan E. (ed). 2009. *The Oxford Handbook of American Elections and Political Behavior* . Oxford: Oxford University Press

- Bermunez, Jose Luis. 2009. *Decision Theory and Rationality* . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Birch, Anthony H. 2007. *The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy. Third Edition*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Boix, Charles and Stokes, Susan C (eds). 2007. *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bogdan, Robert C and Biklen, Kopp Sari. 1982. *Qualitative Research For Education: An Introduction to Theory and Methods* . Boston, London: Allyn and Bacon. Inc
- Bollen, Kenneth A. 1989. *Structural Equation with Latent Variables* . New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc.
- Bradburn, Norman, et al. 2004. *Asking Questions: The Definitive Guide to Questionnaire Design* . Revised Edition. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Brams, Steven J., and Fishburn, Pieter C. 2007. *Approval Voting* . Second Edition. New York: Springer.
- Brannen, Julia. 2005. *Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods* . Translation: Nuktah Arfawie Kurde, et al. Sixth Printing. Yogyakarta: Student Library.
- Brown, Timothy A. 2006. *Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Applied Research* . New York: Guilford Press
- Bryan, Shari and Baer, Denise. 2005. *Money in Politics: A Study of Party Financing Practices in 22 Countries*. Washington: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI).
- Buchanan, James M and Tullock, Gordon. 1999. *The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy* . Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
- Bunte, Marco and Ufen, Andreas (eds). 2009. *Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia* . London: Routledge.
- Burnell, Peter. 2007. *Evaluating Democracy Support Methods and Experiences* . Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).
- Caplan, Bryan. 2006. *The Myth of Rational Voters: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies* . Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Clawson, Dan, et al. 1998. *Dollars Voting: How Business Campaign Contributions Subvert Democracy*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Coleman, James S., and Fararo, Thomas J. (eds). 1992. *Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Critique* . London: Sage Publications.
- Colomer, Josep M. and Grofman, Bernard (eds). 2004. *Handbook of Electoral System Choice* . New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Crano, William D and Brewer, Marilyn B. 2002. *Principles and Methods of Social Research* . Second Edition. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Creswell, John W. 2007. *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*. Second Edition. London: Sage Publications.
- Creswell, John W. 2010. *Research Design Quantitative and Mixed Qualitative Approaches* . Third Edition. Translation Achmad Fawaid. Yogyakarta: Student Library.

- Dahl, Robert A. 2001. *Concerning Democracy* , trans. A. Rahman Zainuddin. Jakarta: Indonesian Obor Foundation.
- Davidson, Donald. 2004. *Problems of Rationality* . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Denzin, Norman K. 1978. *The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods* . New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Diamond, Larry. "Defining and Developing Democracy" in Dahl, Robert A., et al. (eds.). 2003. *The Democracy Sourcebook* . Pages 29-39. Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Dorussen, Han and Taylor, Michael (eds). 2002. *Economic Voting* . London: Routledge.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy* . New York: Harper and Brothers.
- Dryzek, John S, et al (eds). 2006. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory* . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Election . 2010. Encyclopedia Britannica. *Encyclopedia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite*. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica.
- Erb, Maribeth and Sulistiyanto, Priyambudi (eds). 2005. *Regionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia* . New York: Routledge Curzon.
- Eriyanto. 1999. *Polling Methodology: Empowering the People's Voice* . Bandung: Rosdakarya Youth.
- Etzioni-Halevy, Eva. "Exchange Material Benefits for Political Support: A Comparative Analysis", in Heidenheimer, et al (eds). 1989. *Political Corruption: A Handbook* . Matter. 287-304. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.
- Eulau, Heinz and Lewis-Beck, Michael (eds). 1985. *Economic Conditions and Electoral Outcomes: United States and Western Europe* . New York: Agathon Press.
- Eusepi, Giuseppe and Hamlin, Alan (eds). 2006. *Beyond Conventional Economics: The Limits of Rational Behavior in Political Decision Making* . Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Evans, Geoffrey (ed). 1999. *The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Context*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Evans, Jocelyn A. 2004. *Voters and Voting: An Introduction* . London: Sage Publications.
- Firmanzah. 2010. *Competition, Legitimacy of Power, and Political Marketing: Political Lessons from the 2009 Election* . Jakarta: Indonesian Obor Foundation.
- Forest, Liacco and Teresita Dy. 2000. *Controlling Illegal Influence of Money Politics* . Washington DC: IFES.
- Francisco, Ronald A. 2010. *Collective Action Theory and Empirical Evidence* . New York: Springer.
- Freedman, Amy L. 2006. *Political Change and Consolidation: Democracy's Rocky Road in Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, and Malaysia* . New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Fuller, Wayne A. 2009. *Sampling Statistics: Wiley Series in Survey Methodology* . New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons Inc.
- Gaetano, Mosca. 1969. *The Ruling Elite* . London: Penguin Books.

- Ghaffar, Affan. 1992. *Javanese Voters: A Case Study of Election Under Hegemonic Party System*. Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press.
- Ghozali, Imam and Fuad. 2008. *Structural Equation Modeling: Concept Theory and Applications with LISREL 8.80*. Second Edition. Semarang: Diponegoro University Publishing Agency.
- Grafstein, Robert. 1999. *Choice-Free Rationality: A Positive Theory of Political Behavior*. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press.
- Grofman, Bernard and Lijphart, Arend (eds). 2003. *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences*. New York: Agathon Press Inc.
- Goodin, Robert E and Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (eds). 1998. *A New Handbook of Political Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gueorguieva, Vassia and Simon, Rita J. 2009. *Voting and Elections The World Over*. New York: Lexington Books.
- Hadiz, Vedi R. 2010. *Localizing Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspective*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- [Hancock, G.R., and Mueller, R.O. \(eds.\). 2006. Structural Equation Modeling: A Second Course. Greenwich: Information Age Publishing, Inc.](#)
- Harrington, Donna. 2009. *Confirmatory Factor Analysis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harris, Syamsuddin (ed). 2007. *Local Parties and Parliaments in the Democratic Transition Era in Indonesia*. Jakarta: Indonesian Institute of Sciences.
- Harriss, John, et al. 2005. *Politicizing Democracy: The New Local Politics of Democratization*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Hesse-Biber, Sharlene N. 2010. *Mixed Methods Research: Merging Theory with Practice*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Heywood, Andrew. 2007. *Politics*. Third Edition. New York: Palgrave Foundations.
- Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hodess, Robin, et al. (eds.). 2004. *Global Corruption Report 2004: Special Focus Political Corruption*. London: Transparency International.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1992. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Ibana, Rainier. 1996. "Epilogue: Ordinary People in Everyday Life" in Alejo, Myrna J. et al. *Describing Elections: A Study of Elections in the Lifeworld of San Isidro*. Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy.
- Ichimura, Shinichi and Bahl, Roy. 2009. *Decentralization Policies in Asian Development*. New Jersey: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
- IFES Report. 2005. *The 2004 General Elections in the Republic of Indonesia Priorities for Democratic Renewal*. Jakarta: USAID.