

The Perspective of the Community in the Medan Kota Sub-District on the Open and Closed Proportional Representation Electoral System

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Abstract

Open and closed proportional electoral systems have a significant impact on voter participation in 2024, especially in the Medan Kota area. This is in line with the level of public understanding of the electoral system that has just been decided by the Constitutional Court No. 114/PUU-XX/2022. This study endeavors to ascertain the extent of the voting public's comprehension regarding the proportional electoral system. This research method uses normative juridical and is presented in a descriptive analysis by providing an overview of the object under study and linking it to legal literature both primary. Additionally, this study relies on secondary data. The findings revealed that public participation in the proportional election system within Medan city remained at a relatively low level, specifically at 46.5%. Of the 30.8% early voters, those aged 20 to 60 years increased from 37 to 54%. This is due to the voters' lack of understanding of the proportional system, both directly and indirectly.

I. Introduction

Elections play a pivotal role in upholding the sovereignty of the people and safeguarding the democratic foundations of the Indonesian state. A well-conducted election necessitates a careful consideration of the chosen system and its ensuing implications.¹ Indonesia, as a nation, has been employing a proportional electoral system. This system, which has been in use since 1955, takes two distinct forms: In a closed-list proportional representation system, citizens cast their votes exclusively for political parties, while in an open-list proportional representation system, voters have the option to select individual candidates within a party's list.

In this system's operation, voters express their preferences solely by selecting party symbols, with the party's initial votes allocated to the highest-ranking candidate on the party's list. Voters have no role in determining who candidates are nominated from political parties; Distancing the relationship between voters and representatives of the people after the election; Potential strengthening of oligarchy within political parties; The emergence of potential space for money politics within political parties in terms of buying and selling serial numbers. Second, the open-list PR system, where voters directly elect the people's representatives in the form of legislative elections, It has the potential to reduce the prevalence of money-driven politics, increase the role of political parties in the cadre of the representative system and encourage the institutionalisation of political parties.²

According to the historical data, electoral processes in Indonesia commenced in 1955, followed by subsequent elections in 1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997. After the conclusion of President Soeharto's era, elections resumed in 1999, and were subsequently held in 2004, 2009, 2014, and most recently in 2019. Notably, from 1971 to 1999, Indonesia employed a closed proportional electoral system. Following the period of political reform, there was a notable shift in the electoral system. Significantly, a notable shift occurred in 2004 when the open-list proportional representation system was introduced. This marked the official implementation of the open-rate system in the 2009 electio, following the decision of the Constitutional Court, as stipulated in Case 22-24/PUU-VI/2008.³

¹ Mega Putri Rahayu, Lita Tyesta ALW, and Ratna Herawati, "Proportional System in Legislatif Elections in Indonesia," *Diponegoro Law Journal* 6, no. 2 (2017): 1–11.

² Novance Silitonga, "The Potential for the Electoral System to Lead to Corrupt Behaviour in Indonesia" *Jurnal Communitarian* 4, no. 1 (2022): 613–24, <https://doi.org/10.56985/jc.v4i1.231>.

³ Diah Ayu Pratiwi, "Indonesia's Open List Proportional Election System: Giving Birth to Political Corruption," *Jurnal Trias Politika* 2, no. 1 (2018): 13, <https://doi.org/10.33373/jtp.v2i1.1235>.

Constitutional Court Decisions 22 and 24/PUU-VI/2008 brought about a transformation in Indonesia's electoral system, transitioning it into an open proportional electoral system with majority voting. This decision, however, raised issues because the Constitutional Court did not specify whether the term "majority vote" referred to a simple majority or an absolute majority. This became a point of contention, considering the significant changes in the electoral system since the 2004 reforms and the issuance of the Constitutional Court's ruling. The open proportional system has now established its legal foundation in Indonesia through Law No. 7/2017 on Elections, specifically articulated in Article 168 Paragraph (2), which states that "Elections to choose members of the DPR (People's Consultative Assembly), Provincial DPRD (Regional Legislative Council), and District/City DPRD (Regional Legislative Council) will be conducted using an open proportional system."⁴

The open proportional system is expected to be a fair system, so that elected candidates are more representative and their legitimacy is much stronger because it is appropriate that the candidates Those eligible to secure seats are the candidates who command the highest degree of popular support. However, after the implementation of this system from 2009 to 2019, it is not free from various problems and criticisms. Campaign costs have become expensive, the integrity of candidates and voters is at stake with the rise of money politics, political polarization, identity politics, coupled with the substantial expenses borne by the state, constitutes a noteworthy concern.⁵ Under this system, it becomes feasible for candidates with substantial financial resources to be competitive in elections. Moreover, even if they lack close ties to a political party, as long as they possess significant capital, they can actively participate in the electoral process.⁶

Meanwhile, the 2014 election was much more expensive to campaign than the 2009 election because of the open proportionality system. So in 2009 it was assumed to be about 3.3 billion, increasing to 4.5 billion in 2014, and only for the rich. People can afford to compete with so many capitals. The Centre for Political Science at the University of Indonesia (PUSKAPOL UI) discovered that a majority, specifically 58.86%, of the candidates in the 2014 elections hailed from business or professional backgrounds. In the 2019 elections, the campaign expenditures of candidates, which account for tens of billions, are aimed at winning the hearts and

⁴ Ibid..

⁵ Muhammad Muhammad, "Evaluation of the Election Law," *Jurnal Arajang* 3, no. 1 (2020): 60–72, <https://doi.org/10.31605/arajang.v3i1.586>.

⁶ Rahmatiah, "Attitudes and Knowledge of the Public towards Money Politics in the 2014 Legislative Election Kabupaten Gowa," *Al-Daulah* 4, no. 2 (2014): 375–90.

minds of the public, including the budget for election equipment.⁷

The open proportional electoral system is indeed a system that has developed in Indonesia, but the community will experience a burden (social conflict) if the system is applied in the 2024 general election as in 2019. For the participants, this is also a heavy burden for election organisers. Looking at what happened in 2019, based on data from the Ministry of Health until 16 May 2019, KPPS who were sick reached 11,239 with 527 fatalities.⁸

In contrast, if you look at the closed proportional system that came out of the old system, it can be said that the scale is much smaller than the open proportional system found on the ballot paper. In 2019, a portrait format measuring 51 cm x 82 cm was used for the election of DPR and DPRD members through ballot papers. This is approximately one and a half times the dimensions of a standard newspaper. The presidential election ballot paper measures 22cm x 31cm, which is slightly larger than the typical A4 paper size when oriented in landscape format. The substantial size of the ballot paper is a direct consequence of the extensive participation of numerous The political parties that participated in the 2019 election. If the 2024 election features more than 16 parties, the ballot paper size may need to be further increased. However, if the electoral system, originally utilizing a general list, shifts to a closed list system exclusively displaying party symbols, and assuming the participation of 16 political parties, the format of the ballots for the DPR (People's Consultative Assembly), state, and district/city elections would undergo significant transformation. For instance, the DPRD (Regional People's Representative Council) elections could see a remarkable reduction of around 600%. For instance, if the eligible voter list (DPT) comprises approximately 190 million voters, the total number of printed ballots, including reserves, would be reduced to 970 billion under this adjusted format. It's worth noting that the budget allocated for producing ballots in the 2019 General Election exceeded Rp 603.34 billion. This resizing of the legislative election (Pileg) ballots to approximately match the dimensions of the presidential ballots could yield notable cost savings and logistical efficiencies., you save 38% of the cost of acquiring all ballot papers for the simultaneous election. The closed-list proportionality system contributes to the efficiency of vote acquisition by a difference of IDR

⁷ Hendra Budi Setiawan, "The Impact of Indonesia's Open or Closed Proportional Election System on Voter Participation" 7 (2023): 633–38.

⁸ Markus H Simarmata, "Finding Solutions to Doubts about the Right Election System in Indonesia" Jurnal Legislasi Indonesia, no. Vol 14, No 3 (2017): Jurnal Legislasi Indonesia-September 2017 (2017): 285–99, <http://e-jurnal.peraturan.go.id/index.php/jli/article/view/106>.

407,222,250,000.-.⁹

Regarding the two electoral systems, each faction in the DPR has a different view on the electoral system. The differences in views occur between political parties and NGOs. NGOs such as CETRO and Perludem stated that the 2004 electoral system was not yet accountable because the people's representatives were still largely determined by political parties, Pursuant to Article 6, Clause 1 of Law No. 12/2003, which limited elected candidates who obtained the most votes to other requirements given by political parties. Legislative candidates were only elected if they obtained votes in accordance with the Electoral Divider Numbers (BPP).¹⁰ Both parties felt disadvantaged by the election formula or the way to calculate the seat acquisition using the largest remainder quota method. The 2004 electoral system did not reflect an accountable system, because the people's representatives were still determined by political parties. 2009 was different from 2004 in that it still used open proportional representation and the determination of the majority vote winner, the difference was seen from the parliamentary threshold of 2.5%, while in 2014 there was a very significant increase of 3.5%. The electoral system in 2014 prioritised openness, that is, people could choose their own legislative candidates (caleg) that they supported.¹¹

This difference was also evident from the fact that the five major parties agreed that a proportional representation electoral system was still appropriate for Indonesia, with improvements to the political party cadre recruitment system. Law No. 12/2003 pertains to the general elections of members of the DPR (People's Consultative Assembly), DPRD (Regional Legislative Council), and DPD (Regional Representative Council), was subsequently enacted as the foundational legal framework for the 2004 elections, implementing an open proportional electoral system for DPR and DPD members, and a multi-member electoral system for DPRD members. In the 2004 elections, 24 parties participated and Golkar won, while PDIP came second.¹²

After the 2004 elections, there was a debate about the electoral system between political parties and NGOs. Several political parties, including PKB and PDIP, felt disadvantaged by the electoral formula using the largest remainder quota

⁹ Silitonga, "The Potential for the Electoral System to Lead to Corrupt Behaviour in Indonesia."

¹⁰ Setiawan, "The Potential for the Electoral System to Lead to Corrupt Behaviour in Indonesia.."

¹¹ Muhamad Doni Ramdani and Fahmi Arisandi, "The Effect of Using an Open List Proportional House of Representatives Electoral System," *Jurnal Rechts Vinding: Media Pembinaan Hukum Nasional* 3, no. 1 (2014): 101, <https://doi.org/10.33331/rechtsvinding.v3i1.59>.

¹² Calon Kepala Daerah, "Kata Kunci : Oligarki, Rekrument Politik, Partai Politik, Demokrasi Lokal." 1 (2018): 59–84.

method. Under this system, a political party's significant votes in an electoral district can become meaningless when converted into seats as a result of being categorised as the remainder of the losing votes. This view has led to debate among political parties and NGOs. NGOs such as CETRO and Perludem argued that the 2004 electoral system was not accountable because the people's representatives were still largely determined by political parties, in accordance with Article 6 paragraph 1 of Law No. 12/2003, which limited elected candidates who obtained the most votes to other requirements given by political parties. Legislative candidates were only elected if they obtained votes in accordance with the Electoral Divider Numbers (BPP).¹³

In the 2009 elections, the methodology for choosing legislative candidates remained consistent with that of the 2004 elections, employing a proportional system with open lists. Elected candidates were determined by their ability to amass the highest number of votes, while still adhering to a parliamentary threshold of 2.5%. Notably, this electoral endeavor witnessed the involvement of 34 national parties, as well as 6 local parties in Aceh. The Democratic Party emerged as the victor, securing both the highest share of votes at 20.85% and the most parliamentary seats with a total of 148. Following closely behind, the Golkar Party achieved a 14.45% vote share and secured 106 seats.¹⁴

In the 2014 legislative elections, the format used was almost the same as the 2009 elections, which used an open-list proportional system with a majority vote. However, there was an increase in the parliamentary threshold to 3.5%. The election system in 2014 provided access to openness, so that the public could choose the candidates they supported. Law No. 8/2012 deals with the General Election of People's Council Deputies, Regional Representative Council, and Regional People's Representative Council was used as the legal basis for the implementation of the election.

In 2019, the adoption of the open-list proportional representation system coincided with the presidential and vice-presidential elections. The execution of this electoral system, as stipulated by law, had far-reaching implications for the technical aspects of every election phase, encompassing administrative prerequisites, procedural protocols, scheduling, workforce requirements, infrastructure, financial allocations, and collaboration with other institutions.

¹³ Gusti M Ardi Abdussamad, Ergina Faralita, and Sulastri, "Political Corruption Born from the Open Proportional Election System in Indonesia" *Jurnal Wasaka Hukum* 11, no. 1 (2023): 73–76.

¹⁴ Akbar Nugraha, KPU: 2019 Presidential Election Results With Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin Winning 55.50%, Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno 44.50% Vote" 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-48329211>.

Regrettably, the 2019 election bore witness to a significant tragedy directly related to the fundamental right to life. Tragically, Tragically, in 2019, over 527 individuals lost their lives due to extreme stress while fulfilling their responsibilities in organizing the elections, often enduring grueling working hours ranging from 16 to 24 hours. Furthermore, the financial expenditure associated with conducting elections under the open proportional system was substantial, amounting to approximately Rp. 722,912,000,000.¹⁵

The Constitutional Court is currently examining the open proportional system in a Judicial Review, with plans to replace it with a closed proportional system in legislative elections. However, this is controversial as the closed proportional system is considered a sign of regression as it dates back to the New Order era. If the Constitutional Court approves the use of this system in the 2024 election, it will be a heated debate.¹⁶

The electoral system plays a pivotal role in shaping the democratic landscape of a nation. In Indonesia, the electoral system employed is a proportional one, offering two distinct options: the open and closed proportional systems. Nonetheless, each of these systems exerts a unique influence on voter engagement and participation in elections. In this case, voter participation is an important factor that determines the legitimacy of elections and also the success of a democratic system. This research aims to understand voter participation in open and closed proportional electoral systems in Medan City. This article will outline the definitions and differences between open and closed proportional Electoral systems are the fundamental frameworks governing how elections are conducted, and they have a profound influence on voter turnout.

2. Research Method

This research falls within the realm of normative legal research ¹⁷, This type of legal research is conducted through the examination of library materials or secondary data. This research primarily concentrates on the examination of legal materials encompassing laws, regulations, and official documents, including court

¹⁵ Mokhammad Samsul Arif, "Reformulation of Electoral Balloting for Post-Concurrent Elections 2019: An Evaluation Study of Proportional Representatif System (Open List)," Jurnal Wacana Politik 4, no. 2 (2019): 157–71, <http://jurnal.unpad.ac.id/wacanapolitik/article/view/25269>.

¹⁶ Evaluation of the 2015 Simultaneous Regional Elections and the 2019 General Elections: A Brief Note," Public Discourse (Jakarta, 2019).

¹⁷ Soerjono dan Sri Mamudji Sukanto, "Normative Legal Research A Brief Review" (Jakarta: PT Raja Grafindo Persada, 2009).

decisions, about the electoral system in Indonesia.¹⁸ This research is presented in the form of descriptive analysis, namely to give an overview of the events that occur in describing the object of research based on existing facts chronologically and systematically to then be associated with certain legal principles in solving problems.¹⁹ The data utilized in this research is of a secondary nature, derived from a literature study that encompasses:

- a) Primary legal material refers to normative legal rules and statutes that constitute the foundational elements of legal materials.²⁰
- b) Secondary legal materials are literature that writes about theories, opinions of experts and matters related to the subject matter used as a theoretical basis of thought.
- c) Tertiary legal materials encompass resources that offer guidance and explanations pertaining to both primary and secondary legal materials. In this research, the focus is primarily on secondary legal materials.

The data analysis technique employed is descriptive analysis, which involves the examination and interpretation of the data following its collection and processed into information that is easy to understand and then analysed based on the applicable statutory provisions and then conclusions are made that apply generally.

3. Results and Discussion

Open and Closed Proportional Systems

Elections in Indonesia are conducted using two distinct systems. The first is a closed proportional system featuring a popular vote mechanism solely for political parties. In this system, voters cast their ballots exclusively by selecting party symbols. Additionally, in this system, the initial party votes are assigned to the candidate with the highest serial number. The second system is an open proportional system, allowing voters to directly elect representatives to the parliament.²¹

In 1995, Indonesia conducted its first elections under a proportional system. A proportional electoral system distributes the available seats in the House of Representatives among participating political parties in accordance with the number of votes they garner in the given election. Fundamentally, this system, Indonesia has employed both open and closed proportional system models within its electoral system. The closed proportional system was put into practice

¹⁸ Kenneth D Baily, "Methods of Social Research, Second Edition" (New York: The Free Press-Devision of MacMillan Publishing Co. Inc, 1982).

¹⁹ Ronny Hanitjo Soemitro, "Legal and Juridical Research Methodology" Cetakan Ke (Jakarta: Ghalia Indonesia, 1988).

²⁰ Peter Mahmud, "Legal Research" (Jakarta: Kencana Prenada Media Group, 2005).

²¹ Sodikin, "Election Law: Elections as an Administrative Practice" (Jakarta: Gramata Publishing, 2014).

during the 1999 and 2004 elections, while the open proportional system was embraced in the 2009, 2014, and 2019 elections.²²

From its inception, Indonesia has consistently employed a closed-list variation of the proportional electoral system. In this system, The role of political parties is pivotal when it comes to candidate placement, and candidate selection is determined by serial numbers. However, during the initial Reform election in 1999, elements of the New Order legacy electoral system were still in place, with the primary change being the method of selecting elected candidates. This change introduced the stubus agreement model, involving an agreement among political parties when there were surplus candidates. Votes were required to be redirected to candidates from political parties with specific serial numbers, based on the consensus among political party leaders.²³

The 2004 elections continued to utilize the closed proportional system, much like the 1999 elections. However, there were variations in the model used to allocate seats based on the performance of political parties within electoral districts (Dapil) and the selection of elected candidates based on the voter's preference number (BPP).

In this system, if a candidate achieved 100% of the BPP, they were automatically designated as the elected candidate. If no candidate met this threshold, the elected candidate was determined based on the list number pre-established by the ruling political party's authority on the ballot paper. If seats remained unallocated, they were then distributed to the political party with the largest remainder of votes (a process known as the "large remainder") until all seats within the electoral district (Dapil) were apportioned.²⁴

Thus, in 2009, the closed electoral system was abolished and an open proportional (open-list) electoral system was adopted based on The candidate who receives the greatest number of votes. One of the aims was to make the candidates elected more representative and their legitimacy stronger, as naturally those who were entitled to seats were those who had the most support. This model is also more democratic, as the winner is the one with the most votes, absolute and simple.

In a closed proportional system, the party has full power, Following the conversion of party votes into parliamentary seats, it is the party that determines which candidates will occupy those seats. The closed proportional electoral system is often viewed as having the capacity to mitigate the influence of money in politics, as it can narrow the scope for costly campaigning and electioneering, which tends to be expensive. Implementing an open tier system makes elections expensive. A closed proportional system employs a distinct ballot model that

²² Syamsuddin, "Partai, Pemilu, Dan Parlemen Era Reformasi" (Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, 2014).

²³ Topo Santoso, "Parties, Elections, and Parliaments in the Reform Era" (Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 2019).

²⁴ Titony Tanjung, "Getting to Know Indonesia's Open Proportional System Towards General Elections in 2024," BULLET : Jurnal Multidisiplin Ilmu 2, no. 1 (2023): 125–33, <https://journal.mediapublikasi.id/index.php/bullet>.

includes only the images of political parties. This alteration has a significant impact on the vote-counting process at polling stations, reducing the time required from the previous 16 to 24 hours to a more streamlined 5 to 7.5 hours. simply saying that the vote counting is done and summarising each voting entity takes 1-1.5 hours. In this case, counting and summarising activities may end up until 9pm.²⁵

Unlike the Spanish system of electing the Prime Minister,²⁶ The electoral formula differs significantly between the electoral steering system and the closed proportional system. In the electoral steering system, In the proportional allocation (PA) system, seats are awarded to individual candidates based on a plurality of votes, with those receiving the highest number of votes securing seats. Conversely, in the closed proportional system, seats or candidates are allocated to parties utilizing the D'Hondt system, which considers party-level performance. The changes in the electoral formula and the expansion of the number of councillors from five to seven imply that the PA system achieves a greater level of balance at the party level.²⁷ On the contrary, an open vote system enables voters to express their preferences for individual candidates, encouraging competition both between and within political parties. In this context, I emphasize that distinctions in voting structure play a more significant and outcome-determining role.²⁸

Firstly, Despite being officially classified as a proportional representation system, the proportional representation system, in practice, often exhibits only a slightly higher degree of proportionality compared to the executive system.²⁹ In the CV (Closed-List Proportional Representation) system, it is noteworthy that in a mere 3.5% of elections, In some instances, the political party that garners the highest number of votes may still fall short of attaining an absolute majority, which typically requires three-fifths or more of the total seats. This majority status carries significant political influence, including the authority to appoint may.

²⁵ Pakaya, Risan, Yusril Katili, Firman Latuda, " Closed Proportional Election System in 2024 Election Analysis", Jurnal Analisis Sosial Politik, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2022.

²⁶ Carlos Sanz, "The Effect of Electoral Systems on Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Political Science Research and Methods 5, no. 4 (2017): 689–710, <https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2015.54>.

²⁷ Luthfi Dwi Yoga, "How to Handle the Administrative Violations in the Election? A Discourse of Characteristic of Bawaslu Verdict," Journal of Law and Legal Reform 3, no. 3 (2022): 349–78, <https://doi.org/10.15294/jllr.v3i3.55058>.

²⁸ Michael U. Rivera, D. Alex Hughes, and Micah Gell-Redman, "Email Mobilization Messages Suppress Turnout Among Black and Latino Voters: Experimental Evidence From the 2016 General Election – ADDENDUM," Journal of Experimental Political Science 10, no. 2 (2023): 310–310, <https://doi.org/10.1017/xps.2023.19>.

²⁹ Robert Urbatsch, "Gendered Electoral Systems in the French Sénat," West European Politics 39, no. 4 (2016): 859–69, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2016.1140516>.

*Compare Open And Closed Proportional Voting Systems*³⁰

The following table explains the comparison between open and closed proportional systems:

Table 1. Comparison of Open and Closed Proportional Electoral Systems

No	Election Instruments	Open Proportional System	Closed Proportional System
1.	Nominating Mechanism ³¹	Nominated by political parties, open lists. Parties are considered important only during the nomination process, after which legislative candidates tend to move independently, feeling that they are not bound by the control of political parties. Candidates do not feel that they have to participate in political education because they rely on personal interests.	Nominated by political parties, closed list. Parties can control the candidates that will be nominated from the registration, campaign period, and after the election. Parties conduct political education to their cadres from the time of membership recruitment, regeneration, and will be able to determine who is worthy of becoming a party representative in the DPR/DPRD.

³⁰ "Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi No. 114/PUU-XX/2022" (n.d.).

³¹ Dian Fitri Sabrina and Brett Inder, "Concentration of Power in Nomination of Presidential Candidates in Indonesia," *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, 2023, 1–13, <https://doi.org/10.1177/20578911231199530>.

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No	Election Instruments	Open Proportional System	Closed Proportional System
	Technical ease of voting ³²	Organising elections is more tiring and causes many election officials to get sick and even die.	Elections are simpler and make it easier for election organisers to run the process
2.	Voting Method	Voting for one political party and / or one candidate. Voters directly elect candidates, but cannot assess in detail the candidates they choose, candidates only rely on popularity alone, without having to understand the programmes, ideologies and ideals of political parties.	Choosing a political party. Voters vote through the party, which will select candidates selectively and in accordance with the political party's programme, ideology and ideals..
3.	Formula for seat acquisition and candidate determination	Proportionalism and popular vote. Individualised populism as people become selfish to gain support. The	Proportionality and serial numbers. Political parties can direct their party cadres who will participate in

³² Irwan Budiana, Agus Supinganto, and Dewi Nur Sukma Purqoti, "Implementation of Health Examination in the Recruitment Process of Organising Elections in NTB Province," Electoral Research, no. 1 (2019): 1–21, <https://journal.kpu.go.id/index.php/ERE/article/view/139/48>.

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No	Election Instruments	Open Proportional System	Closed Proportional System
		common good is no longer the goal of political parties as competition takes place within parties	the elections so that everyone works together to win the party's programme.
4.	Campaign	Campaigns are run by individual legislative candidates. Therefore, political parties cannot control campaign materials. Because when a legislative candidate is identified by a political party, the legislative candidate acts independently by all means to mobilise the masses to vote for him.	Campaigns are organised by political parties. For political parties, controlling the material and content of the election campaign is the party's main goal and must be disseminated to the public as the party's main programme.
5.	Government Control of Political Party Funding and Finance. ³³	The government has difficulty controlling political party funds and election costs. This is because the costs of each candidate have never been	The government will have a more streamlined mechanism for overseeing the financial resources of political parties engaged in

³³ Hanspeter Kriesi, "The Role of European Integration in National Election Campaigns," *European Union Politics* 8, no. 1 (2007): 83–108, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116507073288>.

No	Election Instruments	Open Proportional System	Closed Proportional System
		reported to the KPU and have never been disclosed honestly or unaccountably.	elections, as specified in the Election Law. This is explicitly outlined in legislation pertaining to political party finances, which includes provisions for sanctions against parties that fail to disclose their financial information
6.	Political Party Control in Campaign Financing	Political parties are unable to control campaign costs, resulting in massive vote buying from voters. This results in corrupt legislators who do not fulfil the main purpose of being a legislator.	Political parties will be better able to control campaign costs and there will be no massive vote buying.
7.	Women's Representation	Female candidates do not get enough seats. Due to the 30% quota for women on the candidate list remains on the ballot paper and	Female candidates get more seats. Due to the 30% quota for women on the candidate list remains on the ballot paper and

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No	Election Instruments	Open Proportional System	Closed Proportional System
		every 3 lists of candidates has 1 female candidate (zipper system) is useless. Because candidates are elected based on the highest number of votes not serial number.	every 3 lists of candidates have 1 female candidate (zipper system) is useful because candidates are elected based on serial numbers.
8.	Money Politics Practices. ³⁴	High Money Politics. Because candidates are prioritised with big money and popularity. Candidates are required to spend money on campaigns. So that only candidates who are rich and have large capital can be elected.	Low Money Politics. Because candidates are not required to have funds for the campaign because the organisation of the campaign is the responsibility of the party. This provides a fair opportunity for candidates who have limited financial capabilities but are able to fight for the interests of political parties.

³⁴ Dirk Tomsa, "Electoral Democracy in a Divided Society," South East Asia Research 17, no. 2 (2009): 229–59, <https://doi.org/10.5367/000000009788745877>.

No	Election Instruments	Open Proportional System	Closed Proportional System
9.	Election fraud. ³⁵	Vote transfer fraud between candidates in internal political parties is rampant. It does not only occur between candidates and voters, but also to the organisers, such as the transfer of party votes to candidate votes. This is certainly done in return/corruption between the organisers and the candidates.	Vote transfer fraud between candidates within political parties can be avoided because it is the political parties that are elected.
10.	Election Dispute	The rising incidence of electoral fraud has resulted in a significant upsurge in disputes brought before the Constitutional Court, primarily stemming from the substantial instances of fraudulent activities	Election disputes can be minimised as they are limited to party votes.

³⁵ Joseph Deckert, Mikhail Myagkov, and Peter C. Ordeshook, "Benford's Law and the Detection of Election Fraud," *Political Analysis* 19, no. 3 (2011): 245–68, <https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpr014>.

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No	Election Instruments	Open Proportional System	Closed Proportional System
		throughout the .electoral proces	
11.	Party System. ³⁶	Weak Party Role. Open proportionality will avoid political party oligarchy in the electoral process. However, it creates oligarchies that rely on the power of capital and personal family networks. This can be seen from the fact that officials will appoint family members to run for the DPR/DPRD. Similarly, the oligarchy of capital means that only those with large funds can run as candidates and be elected.	Strong Party Role. With closed proportional representation, the power of the party elite will be strengthened along with the dominant role of political parties in elections, as parties will filter and determine the direction of elected DPR/DPRD members in implementing party policy programmes.
12.	Political Party Ideology. ³⁷	Weak political party ideology. The election of candidates is	Strong political party ideology. The election of candidates is

³⁶ Karen E. Ferree, G. Bingham Powell, and Ethan Scheiner, "Context, Electoral Rules, and Party Systems," Annual Review of Political Science 17 (2014): 421–39, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-102512-195419>.

³⁷ Katharina Natter, Mathias Czaika, and Hein de Haas, "Political Party Ideology and Immigration Policy Reform: An Empirical Enquiry," Political Research Exchange 2, no. 1 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.1080/2474736X.2020.1735255>.

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No	Election Instruments	Open Proportional System	Closed Proportional System
		primarily driven by popularity and financial resources rather than being guided by political party programs and ideologies.	primarily driven by popularity and financial resources rather than being guided by political party programs and ideologies.
13.	Party-ID. ³⁸	Party Identity/party-ID is weak. Voters are not psychologically attached to political parties. Because voters in choosing candidates do not consider the logo and image of the political party, but are more likely to choose the photo and name of the candidate.	Party identity is weak. Voters are psychologically tied to political parties. Because voters in choosing candidates do not consider the photo and name of the candidate, but are forced to choose the logo and image of the political party.
14.	election costs	It is expensive because the KPU has to print different ballot papers for each	It is cheap because the KPU only prints ballot papers for one electoral district for the whole Indonesia.

³⁸ A.B. Barrul Fuad, "Political Identity and Election in Indonesian Democracy: A Case Study in Karang Pandan Village – Malang, Indonesia," *Procedia Environmental Sciences* 20 (2014): 477–85, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.proenv.2014.03.060>.

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No	Election Instruments	Open Proportional System	Closed Proportional System
		electoral district (Dapil). ³⁹	
15.	Internal Political Party Conflict	Internal conflicts among party members are rampant, starting from the stage of determining serial numbers, the campaign stage, the voting stage, vote counting, and even during the determination of elected candidates at the KPU and disputes at the Constitutional Court. ⁴⁰	Conflict can be minimised because it is likely to occur only during the determination of serial numbers within political parties, which can be done with strict control within political parties and the public in encouraging internal democratisation of political parties.

Medan Kota Community's View on Open and Closed Proportional System

The majority of respondents in Medan City chose the answers "disagree and disagree" in the answer options provided. Although for the answer "strongly agree and agree" also does not have a small number. This can also be described as a form of public view of the open and closed electoral system that will be implemented in 2024. The factors causing the difference in people's views on the implementation of a closed general election system are that respondents have the view that a closed system has the potential to practice money politics, because the system is not transparent, which

³⁹ Hamdan Kurniawan, "Re-voting: Questioning the Time Limit and Causal Factors," Electoral Research, 2019, 1–20.

⁴⁰ Dedy Suhendi, "Potency of Disturbance of Public Order and Peace in Village Head Elections and Regional Head Elections (Direct Election Trinkets)," Jurnal Tatapamong 2, no. September (2020): 51–70, <https://doi.org/10.33701/jurnaltatapamong.v2i2.1246>.

will create candidates who have money who are very popular in the community; very expensive costs; an open proportional system does not weaken political parties; the relationship between voters Furthermore, the connection between elected officials and the representation of the people in the People's Representative Council appears to be less intimate or robust, because in general elections voters choose political parties, so sometimes voters do not know who the real representatives of their regions are. The open proportional system is more in line with the 1945 Constitution; the open system encourages legislative candidates to compete in a healthy manner; openly direct participation to the community; the proportional system is more open; the closed proportional election system has the opportunity to become political nepotism; therefore the community prefers the current system, namely the community that determines or chooses directly by voting directly on the candidate's picture. Community participation is very important to support democracy in a safe and peaceful manner in accordance with the ideals of the people, Namely, the authority vested in the hands of the people and executed in adherence to the constitution.

The second question focused more on the views of the public, especially first-time voters who are 17 years old in Medan Kota, towards an open electoral system. During the questionnaire, the majority of respondents chose the answer "agree" which can be said as an illustration of the involvement of the parties to support the open proportional system, and it is clear that respondents prefer this system with an open system because: it is more democratic; the realisation of equality of candidates; building closeness between voters and reducing money politics, so young people who are 17 years old and above are still low to participate in the implementation of the election.

In general, the sentiment of the people in Medan City regarding the open and closed proportional electoral systems stands at 46.5%. In terms of age, the views of first-time voters in Medan Kota are still very low, at 30.8%. The views of voters aged 20 to 60 years, in addition, also only range from 37 to 54%. Recapitulation of Voter Data by Age in Medan Kota Sub-district, Medan City is based on the table below.

Tabel 2. Voter Data Recapitulation by Age

No	Voter Age Diversity	Voting by Voter Age		Total
		Male	Women	
1.	15-19 year	30.8%	69.2%	100.0%
2.	20-24 year	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
3.	25-29 year	37.0%	63.0%	100.0%

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4.	30-34 year	45.2%	54.8%	100.0%
5.	35-39 year	41.5%	58.5%	100.0%
6.	40-44 year	51.0%	49.0%	100.0%
7.	45-49 year	53.7%	46.3%	100.0%
8.	50-54 year	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
9.	55-59 year	40.0%	60.0%	100.0%
10.	60-64 year	61.5%	38.5%	100.0%
11.	65-69 year	35.0%	65.0%	100.0%
12.	70-74 year	71.4%	28.6%	100.0%
13.	>75 year	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
Total		46.5%	53.5%	100.0%

Source: Voter Recapitulation Results by Age Managed by Researchers

First-Time Voters’ Opinions On Open And Closed Proportional Voting Systems

Based on the theory used, researchers set questions related to the discussion of the views of novice voters who have just turned 17 years old on the electoral system implemented by the government by looking at comparisons ranging from open systems or closed systems as the results below with reference to the level of understanding of the electoral system to be implemented as follows:

Question	Respondent Choice												
1. What do you think about the open and closed election system that will be implemented by the Government in the upcoming simultaneous elections in 2024? Do you agree that the	<table border="1"> <caption>Data for Question 1: Respondent Choice</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Choice</th> <th>Percentage</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>SS</td> <td>11%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>S</td> <td>26%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Other 1 (Green)</td> <td>28%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Other 2 (Purple)</td> <td>28%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Other 3 (Light Blue)</td> <td>7%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Choice	Percentage	SS	11%	S	26%	Other 1 (Green)	28%	Other 2 (Purple)	28%	Other 3 (Light Blue)	7%
Choice	Percentage												
SS	11%												
S	26%												
Other 1 (Green)	28%												
Other 2 (Purple)	28%												
Other 3 (Light Blue)	7%												

proportional system should be implemented?													
2. At the age of 17, do you know and understand the open and closed system that will be adopted by the government in the next simultaneous elections in 2024?	<table border="1"> <caption>Survey Results Data</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Response</th> <th>Percentage</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Strongly Agree (SS)</td> <td>7%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Agree (S)</td> <td>26%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Disagree (SS)</td> <td>28%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Strongly Disagree</td> <td>11%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Don't Know / Other</td> <td>28%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Response	Percentage	Strongly Agree (SS)	7%	Agree (S)	26%	Disagree (SS)	28%	Strongly Disagree	11%	Don't Know / Other	28%
Response	Percentage												
Strongly Agree (SS)	7%												
Agree (S)	26%												
Disagree (SS)	28%												
Strongly Disagree	11%												
Don't Know / Other	28%												

Source: Interview Results organised by the author

From the results of interviews conducted to several respondents whose views on the proportional system implemented by the government were found among novice voters aged 17 years in the figure found to still lack confidence in the electoral system with proportional and as much as 28% agree with the proportional system implemented and 28% also novice voters disagree, 11% agree to be implemented and 7% strongly agree, this is all because the age of novice voters do not fully know about what is meant by the election with an open proportional system, so that when associated with the age diversity of voters in the top table in line that the age of novice 17 years is still low understanding of the proportional system either open or closed.


However, the second table indicates that a significant percentage of the population supports the implementation of the proportional electoral system in Indonesia. Specifically, 70% "agree" and 21% "strongly agree" with this system, while only 2% "disagree" and 6% "strongly disagree." This data underscores the belief that the proportional electoral system aligns with the democratic values in Indonesia. Some of the key advantages of the proportional system, as mentioned, include its representativeness, absence of distortion, inclusivity of all societal groups, the absence of wasted votes, and the potential for smaller political parties to gain

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
representation. It is evident that this system enjoys substantial support, especially among those who see it as a means to ensure that every vote cast is effectively represented in the People's Representative Council, thus contributing to a more national and democratic legislative body.

High And Low Active Participation Of The Medan City Community In Understanding The Open And Closed Proportional Election System

In this case, researchers have leveraged social media platforms (medsos) as a means to gauge the extent of the Medan City community's knowledge regarding both the open and closed proportional election systems. This survey is anticipated to wield a substantial influence on enhancing the comprehension of the city's residents concerning the evolving electoral system. Through this approach to political education, people are expected to gain a better understanding of the candidates who will be vying for positions in upcoming elections, including members of the House of Representatives (DPR) at the national level, Regional House of Representatives (DPRD), President, Vice President, Governors, Regents, and Mayors at the provincial and city district levels. The efficacy of surveys employing social media for the dissemination of information related to the electoral system can be assessed by examining the feedback provided by the community and the degree of comprehension regarding the conveyed information. The level of understanding of this information serves as an indicator of the success in effectively conveying messages to the public, as illustrated in the table below:

Question	Respondent Choice												
1. Do you believe that the implementation of a proportionally open electoral system will result in a noteworthy influence on the extent of active public engagement in endorsing the government's commitment to conducting elections that are open, transparent, honest, and equitable?	 <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Choice</th> <th>Percentage</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>S</td> <td>67%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>KS</td> <td>20%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>SS</td> <td>9%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>TS</td> <td>4%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>STS</td> <td>0%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Choice	Percentage	S	67%	KS	20%	SS	9%	TS	4%	STS	0%
Choice	Percentage												
S	67%												
KS	20%												
SS	9%												
TS	4%												
STS	0%												

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Source: Interview Results organised by the author

From a survey conducted through social media by making questions to the people of Medan City, it was found that active community participation in the electoral system is around 67% who "agree" compared to 20% who "disagree" with the electoral system and 95% "strongly agree" with the current electoral system, this shows that community participation is very supportive of the efforts made by the government is very high and 14% disagree this is because the community considers that the proportional system has many shortcomings so that among them are:

- Lack of encouragement for parties to integrate or co-operate with each other and utilise existing similarities, but tend to sharpen differences. This results in an increase in the number of parties;⁴¹
- Gives party leaders a strong position in determining the list of candidates;;
- Due to the substantial proliferation of competing political parties, it becomes challenging for any single party to secure an outright majority of votes, which typically requires more than 50% of the total vote share.;
- In terms of financing, it will be very expensive;;⁴²
- The connection between voters and their elected representatives in the People's Representative Council appears less intimate because, in the general election, voters cast their ballots for political parties, often leading to a situation where voters may not be fully aware of the specific representatives from their region who serve in the People's Representative Council;
- Political parties wield substantial power, as it is ultimately the central leadership of each political party that decides which candidates will occupy seats in the House of Representatives;

⁴¹ Lili Romli, "Political Party Reform and the Party System in Indonesia," *Politica* 2, no. 2 (2011): 199–220.

⁴² Rudi Hermanto, "Problematics of Campaign Fund Reporting in the 2019 Legislative Elections," *Electoral Governance Jurnal Tata Kelola Pemilu Indonesia* 1, no. 2 (2020): 1–23, <https://doi.org/10.46874/tkp.v1i2.85>.

- g. The sheer quantity of political parties makes it difficult to form a stable government, because in general it must be based on a coalition of two or more parties.⁴³


Medan City Community Passive Participation in Open and Closed Proportional Voting System⁴⁴

Based on the results of the questionnaire distributed, the majority of respondents chose the answers "disagree and disagree" in the answer options provided. Although for the answer "strongly agree and agree" also does not have a small number. This can also be described as a form of diverse community views in accordance with their understanding of the proportional system to be implemented. The factor responsible for the divergence in people's opinions regarding the adoption of an open or closed proportional system is because the community/respondents do not understand in detail how the closed proportional system is said to be and what are the advantages and disadvantages according to the table below.

Question	Respondent Choice												
1. Do you understand the general election system that will take place in the upcoming 2024 election? and what do you understand by open and closed proportional electoral systems?	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Choice</th> <th>Percentage</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>S</td> <td>22%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>TS</td> <td>51%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>KS</td> <td>21%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>SS</td> <td>4%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>STS</td> <td>2%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Choice	Percentage	S	22%	TS	51%	KS	21%	SS	4%	STS	2%
Choice	Percentage												
S	22%												
TS	51%												
KS	21%												
SS	4%												
STS	2%												
2. Are you inclined towards a closed proportional system in which the selection of the president, vice president, governor, regent, mayor, and candidates for members of the DPR and regents/municipalities of	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Choice</th> <th>Percentage</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>S</td> <td>21%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>TS</td> <td>61%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>KS</td> <td>14%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>SS</td> <td>3%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>STS</td> <td>1%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Choice	Percentage	S	21%	TS	61%	KS	14%	SS	3%	STS	1%
Choice	Percentage												
S	21%												
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⁴³ Agun Gunandjar Sudarsa, "Indonesia's Multi Party System," Jurnal Legislasi Indonesia Vol. 5, no. No.1 (2008): 1–12.

⁴⁴ Kharisma Aulia Firdausy and Agus Riswanto, "Implementation of Law No. 7/2017 on Limited Open Proportional Elections in the 2019 Legislative Elections in Salatiga City," Res Publica 3, no. 1 (2019): 91–101.

the DPRD are determined by political parties ?													
3. Do you agree to vote for a party photo and not a candidate photo on the ballot so that the political party determines the winning candidate ?	 <table border="1"> <caption>Data for Question 3: Do you agree to vote for a party photo and not a candidate photo on the ballot so that the political party determines the winning candidate ?</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Category</th> <th>Percentage</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>S</td> <td>29%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>TS</td> <td>60%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>KS</td> <td>9%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>SS</td> <td>1%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>STS</td> <td>1%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Category	Percentage	S	29%	TS	60%	KS	9%	SS	1%	STS	1%
Category	Percentage												
S	29%												
TS	60%												
KS	9%												
SS	1%												
STS	1%												

From the results of data processing conducted by researchers in accordance with The degree of civic engagement in the electoral system, it was found that the view of the Medan City community is still a lot of disbelief as much as 61% and even "less agree" as much as 14% do not believe at all about the closed proportional electoral system 3%, it means that the city's understanding of the system with proportional is still lacking and limited, The people's understanding is that the election with the system as usual is by voting for the pictures of party member candidates with a note to find out who is being voted for in accordance with the people's conscience, so when compared to permanent voters in the party picture it indicates that the people's power has shifted to the hands of the ruler whose notabenenya is the policy maker In contributing to the functioning of the government.

4. Conclusion

The understanding of the people of Medan City towards the open and closed proportional electoral system is still reaping the pros and cons of what system is best to be applied in the elections in 2024, because the level of understanding of the voting public is still many who do not understand what is an open system and a closed system and its advantages and disadvantages. From the questions asked about the level of understanding of voters, it was found that election participation was around 67% who "agreed" compared to 20% who "disagreed" with the electoral system and 95% who "strongly agreed" with the current electoral system, this shows that community participation is very supportive of the efforts made by the government, especially with the open system because the people of the city field believe that voting directly is more open, fair and familiar with the future leaders compared to the closed election system because 61% of the people chose "disagree" due to the assumption that the closed system will increase oligarchy and party nepotism, there is no closeness of voters with candidates, candidates are less aspirational.

5. Acknowledgment

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The researcher would like to thank the Rector of Medan Area University, who has provided the widest possible opportunity for researchers to be able to conduct research with the title: "Community Perspectives of Medan Kota Sub-district towards Open and Closed Proportional General Election System", based on the Rector Decree No. 1050/UMA.09/IV/2023 and Contract Decree No. 1765/LP2M/03.4.1/V/2023. The researcher would also like to thank all those who have supported the research process and the writing of this scientific article. Hopefully the results of this research can be useful for the development of science, especially legal science in the fields of constitutional law and electoral law.

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