

## Political Corruption as a Real Threat to the Sustainability of Constitutional Democracy

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### Abstract

*This study aims to examine the impact of political corruption on citizens' capacity to participate in government, the efficacy of anti-corruption laws, and the role of the Corruption Eradication Commission in the fight against corruption and the strengthening of constitutional democracies in Indonesia. Examining applicable legal standards, legislation, rules, doctrine, and judicial decisions is part of the normative research strategy. This examination also included a literature review of relevant studies, articles, and government publications. The research found that corruption discourages citizens of Indonesia from becoming active in politics. The public has lost interest in politics and has become wary of the corrupt system as a result. When it comes to creating a transparent and honest political system, there are doubts about how successful anti-corruption laws and the Corruption Eradication Commission have been in eradicating political corruption.*

## 1. Introduction

Political corruption is one of the key threats to democracies that are based on the constitution (Wangga et al., 2019). People have lost faith in democracies worldwide due to unscrupulous activities by politicians and public authorities, and Indonesia is no exception. The quality of governance is diminished and democratic norms like openness, accountability, and citizen engagement are thwarted by political corruption (Amer et al., 2024).

When public officials and politicians abuse their positions of power for personal gain or the benefit of their organizations, this is known as political corruption (Shashkova, 2018). This behaviour may manifest in a variety of ways, including inappropriate use of funds, corrupt practices, favouritism, and other types of corruption (Yin & Zhang, 2019). Corruption of this kind causes public funds that ought to serve the public interest to be diverted for private gain, which hurts society as a whole.

Corruption in politics poses a significant risk in constitutional democracies, because democratic norms and regulations form the backbone of governmental operations.(Yudhanegara et al., 2024) The rule of law and the distinct division of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches are essential to constitutional democracies (Pujayanti et al., 2024). The system of checks and balances meant to keep democracies stable becomes ineffectual, however, when corruption is widespread and these roles overlap.

The extent to which people take actively in society's political processes is another effect of the phenomena of political corruption. Apathy and reluctance to engage in politics are common responses to the widespread corruption in the political and governmental systems. The dismal turnout at the polls, citizens' disillusionment with government, and dwindling faith in our democratic institutions are all indicators of this (Fukuyama, 2018).

There are a number of laws and regulations in place in Indonesia that aim to combat political corruption and ensure the long-term viability of constitutional democracy. The goal of these rules is to maintain a free and fair democratic process, and they include topics such as criminal corruption legislation and election restrictions.

Amendments to Law No. 20 of 2001 to Law No. 31 of 1999 for the Eradication of Corruption Crimes are among the primary statutes regulating corrupt crimes. Enforcement of criminal actions of corruption in Indonesia is mostly based on this statute. Criminal penalties are outlined in Articles 2 and 3 for those who conduct actions of illicit enrichment that affect public finances, whether it be themselves or others. Separately, Article 12 establishes penalties for public officials who take bribes, and Article 13 specifies

penalties for anybody who offers or promises anything to a public official or state administrator in order to influence that official's decision (Muhtar, 2019).

Additionally, Law 19 of 2019 pertaining to the Corruption Eradication Commission's Second Amendment to Law 30 of 2002 is significant. With the newfound power to investigate, investigate, and prosecute corruption cases, this legislation enhances the Corruption Eradication Commission's role in the fight against corruption.

When discussing elections, the primary source is Law No. 7 of 2017 pertaining to General Elections. From the election of the president and vice president to members of the People's Representative Council, Regional Representative Council, and the Regional People's Representative Council, this legislation governs every aspect of the execution of elections in Indonesia (Wartoyo, 2019). If an election participant uses money or offers anything to sway votes, they are in violation of Article 280 and may face penalties. The Election Supervisory Body is responsible for overseeing the execution of elections, as outlined in Article 285. Crimes involving the use of money in politics before to, during, or after an election are defined in Article 523.

Although these two laws serve as a foundation for constitutional democracy in Indonesia, the public has become more indifferent due to many instances of political corruption. The first case is a corruption scandal involving Setya Novanto, a former chairman of the Republic of Indonesia's People's Representative Council. The state spent IDR 2.3 trillion on the e-KTP (electronic Resident Identification Card) project in 2017, and Setya Novanto was implicated in the corruption controversy surrounding this project. Not only did this scandal engulf a senior official of the nation, but it also exposed a web of corruption spanning many government agencies and lawmakers, shocking the public (Halomoan et al., 2023). The public's faith in government and its legislative branches is severely damaged as a result of this (merdeka.com, 2017). With fewer people becoming involved in politics and more people just not caring, constitutional democracies are in danger of collapsing under the weight of popular mistrust of leaders' promises to root out corruption.

Juliari Batubara, a former minister of social affairs, is implicated in a corruption case as an example of the second kind of case. Juliari was apprehended by the Corruption Eradication Commission in 2020, at the height of the COVID-19 outbreak, on charges of embezzling money meant for communities hit by the virus. Allegedly, 109 of the firms chosen to supply the project paid Juliari IDR 32.2 billion (Asa & Tawang, 2023).

Because the stolen monies were meant to aid communities in extreme need, this case highlights the seriousness of executive-level power abuse. Since this case shows that the government is unconcerned about the people's suffering, it has sparked widespread outrage and sadness. This led to a precipitous decline in public faith in government, which in turn undermines constitutional democracy and casts doubt on the efficacy of the police

in rooting out systemic corruption (antaranews.com, 2021).

The long-term viability of constitutional democracies is jeopardized by political corruption. People lose faith in our democratic institutions and our political system when corruption becomes commonplace among politicians and public officials. The outcome is indifference, distrust of elections, and poor political engagement, all of which damage the legitimacy of government. Furthermore, corruption leads to ineffective distribution of resources, which impedes progress and intensifies socioeconomic disparities.

Therefore, the primary objective of this study is to investigate how corruption in Indonesian politics affects the level of public engagement in governance. Second, the efficacy of anti-corruption legislation and the function of organizations like the Corruption Eradication Commission in eliminating corrupt practices in politics is the primary objective of this study. The goal of this research is to help shed light on the inner workings of political corruption in Indonesia and provide practical ways to fortify the country's constitutional democracy.

The issue statement is based on the following explanation: (1) How does corruption in Indonesian politics affect the amount of political participation? (2) How successful have anti-corruption measures been in eliminating political corruption and bolstering constitutional democracy in Indonesia? What role has the Corruption Eradication Commission played in this effort?

A normative research approach was used in this study. The study of relevant legal norms, as expressed in statutes, legal theory, and judicial judgments, is the primary goal of normative research (Amiruddin & Asikin, 2012). This study will undertake a literature review to address the first problem formulation by looking at prior research, scholarly articles, and official reports that have addressed the topic of political corruption and its impact on Indonesians' levels of political participation. We will examine patterns and trends in community political engagement within the framework of political corruption by analyzing secondary data from various sources.

## **2. Research Method**

This research will examine statutory regulations pertaining to criminal acts of corruption, particularly Law Number 31 of 1999 concerning the Eradication of Corruption Crimes and Law Number 19 of 2019 concerning the Second Amendment to Law Number 30 of 2002 concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission, in order to address the second problem formulation regarding the effectiveness of anti-corruption laws and the role of the Corruption Eradication Commission. The performance reports of the Corruption Eradication Commission and major court rulings in instances involving political corruption will also be investigated in this study. This research seeks to assess the level of achievement in decreasing political corruption practices and improving constitutional democracy via the implementation of legislation and law enforcement

operations.

Researchers were able to assess the current legal framework's merits and shortcomings and make useful suggestions for improving its efficacy in combating political corruption by using a normative approach in this study. The goal of this study is to help understand and solve the issue of political corruption in Indonesia by conducting a thorough examination of standards.

### **3. Results and Discussion**

#### **The Influence of Political Corruption on the Level of Community Political Participation in Indonesia**

More and more studies in recent years have looked at how corruption affects people's willingness to become involved in politics. Despite the fact that the vast majority of discussions in sociology and political science have focused on the negative societal effects of corruption (Školník, 2020).

The effects of corruption on Indonesia's democratic system and politics are well-documented, and the problem seems to be getting worse every year. Both the quantity and quality of corruption crimes have grown in recent years, with the former becoming more systemic and the latter reaching into every facet of society. This is evident in the rising number of cases and the large sums of money lost by states as a result of corruption (Mietzner, 2015).

Governments and community leaders who rise to prominence by corruption will be seen by the public as untrustworthy. In such a scenario, citizens would lose faith in their government and its leaders, making it very unlikely that they will respect and adhere to their authority (Ford & Pepinsky, 2014). Corrupt leaders that want to stay in power may resort to authoritarianism or ramp up corruption if they can't control their corrupt constituents, which is bad for democracy. Other examples of widespread corruption include violent elections, money in politics, and fraudulent elections (Indrayana, 2017). Beyond that, the circumstance will generate social integration and socio-political instability due to the resulting confrontation between the people and the state. As was the case in Indonesia, this is a common cause of the shameful collapse of governmental authority.

The Corruption Eradication Commission has been increasing the number of high-ranking politicians arrested in Indonesia, although the country's political corruption remains rampant. The ineffectiveness of Indonesia's system for financing political parties and campaigns is the primary factor responsible for this conundrum. This systemic failure is not coincidental; rather, it is the result of a small but persistent elite group's preference for clandestine money gathering over the constraints that may be imposed by more regular and systematic fundraising systems. Consequently, oligarchy has infiltrated parties and the state budget has been used for political gain, and corruption in politics

persists.

The public's faith in the democratic process dwindles when widespread corruption makes it seem inaccessible. This causes them to become skeptical and disengage from politically charged spaces that they see as exclusive (Dalton & Klingemann, 2007). A dramatic decrease in political collective activity was the end outcome of this. The electoral process is a glaring example. Elections play a crucial role in democratic decision-making because they allow voters to choose their leaders and have a say in how their nation is run.

The fundamental idea is that when there are trustworthy leaders who listen to their constituents and do what they say, more people will cast ballots. People typically skip voting if they think their political leaders are corrupt; they reason that their vote won't make a difference in an atmosphere where corruption is rampant (Vries & Solaz, 2017). They avoid becoming involved in politics by doing this. One way in which corruption discourages people from casting ballots is by fueling their wrath, which in turn leads to political indifference.

Even when people don't cast ballots due to corruption, it doesn't imply they don't participate in politics via other means, like marches, where they may voice their ideas. From the most basic, like voting, to the most extreme, like protesting, there are many ways to get involved in politics (Ecker et al., 2016). The scientific literature often classifies forms of political engagement as either institutionalized or non-institutionalized. Elected officials often oversee more formalized ways of becoming politically involved, such as running for office, attending party conventions, becoming a member of a political party, and contacting elected officials. Petition signing, political product and service boycotts, and direct involvement in political protests are examples of non-institutionalized forms of political engagement (Bowers & Preuhs, 2009). The goal of this kind of engagement is to either obtain access to the political agenda or to oppose the political elites.

Conversely, corruption may set off political mobilization, according to many theoretical theories. There are two possible outcomes here. To start with, citizens have the power to unseat corrupt leaders by casting their ballots for other candidates. In contrast to the political indifference already mentioned, this kind of mobilization is a potential consequence of corruption. Furthermore, in systems with high levels of electoral clientelism—where politicians exchange their votes for personal gain—voters may knowingly choose corrupt candidates (Umagapi, 2021).

On the other hand, some research provide conflicting theoretical perspectives on how corruption affects political mobilization. Corruption, according to certain claims, may in fact set off political mobilization in two primary ways. For starters, citizens have the power to unseat corrupt leaders by casting their ballots for other candidates. Corruption, in this view, encourages people to take an active role in politics, as opposed to the passivity that often results from mistrust of the system (Xezonakis et al., 2016).

Furthermore, people may choose corrupt politicians in regimes where electoral clientelism is rampant. This occurs because unscrupulous politicians often provide voters with direct incentives or private advantages. When this happens, it's common for politicians to use their positions for personal advantage, which may make some people feel more connected to the politician and lead them to re-elect them despite their knowledge of the corruption (Manzetti & Wilson, 2007). According to this line of thinking, corrupt practices might endure because they cement the bond between politicians and certain voters.

The New Order period was the height of political corruption in Indonesia, and the practice has persisted until the present day. Because of this, Indonesia's already low democracy ranking takes a hit. According to research done by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). A dismal 6.71 out of 10 on the 2022 Democracy Index indicates that Indonesia's democracy is far from perfect. Indonesia is ranked 54th out of 167 nations evaluated, with this score being unchanged from last year. This evaluation primarily takes five factors into account: pluralism and the election process, civil freedoms, the role of government, political engagement, and political culture. With a score of just 4.38 in the political culture category, Indonesia is clearly lacking in this area (Satriawan & Angela, 2024).

From regular citizens to high-ranking government officials, corruption has permeated every level of Indonesian society and become an entrenched issue. This occurrence demonstrates that corruption has permeated several facets of national and state life, and is not limited to individuals. The number of corruption cases in Indonesia increased by 8.63% to 579 in 2022, according to the 2022 Corruption Enforcement Trend Monitoring Report by Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW). Additionally, there was a 19.01% rise from 2021 to 2022 in the number of individuals suspected of corruption, reaching 1,396. According to these numbers, corruption is on the rise in Indonesia and may make democracy even more precarious (Indonesia Corruption Watch, Indonesia Corruption Watch).

A major contributor to the deterioration of Indonesia's democracy is the prevalence of political corruption. In addition to weakening political institutions, this phenomena may make society more susceptible to corruption and threaten democracy's very bedrock. In a perfect democracy, every person would have an equal chance to engage in politics, but corruption makes it even less likely. Furthermore, public monies and resources that ought to be used for the benefit of the people are squandered due to corrupt practices, which hinders national progress. Public policies that aren't successful end up helping unscrupulous people at the expense of society as a whole.

The high volume of corruption charges involving Indonesian public officials and state administrators is indicative of the pervasive political corruption in the country. Such unethical behavior develops when powerful people use their positions to amass more money, power, and influence for themselves. Some people may break the rules or willfully

disobey the laws in order to further their own interests, which can lead to penalties and the loss of power and riches.

This trend influences the people who vote for these parties, shifting their perception of the high principles upon which they stand and sometimes casting doubt on the moral principles they uphold. Political parties often become vehicles for elite groups seeking to gratify their desire for power, as stated by Jimly Asshiddiqie. Politicians' newfound focus on pragmatics and money betrays their failure to uphold democratic principles (Arliman, 2016).

Nico Harjanto argues that political parties play an essential role in democracies by connecting citizens with their government. But political parties are usually full of people who care solely about their connections to the leadership and power, rather than about implementing a meritocracy or career path system. Political party structure, finance, and accountability are all made more complicated by the fact that political parties are both public and private entities, with a dual function (Wafa et al., 2021).

The uncertainty in this situation affects the organization of political parties and may cause phenomena like the Golput (white group), in which individuals are hesitant to vote in opposition to corrupt politicians and parties. One way to protest a corrupt political system is to abstain from voting altogether, which may be as simple as not going to the polls or as extreme as burning vote papers on purpose. The public's pessimism and mistrust of the political system and its parties, which ought to serve as the driving forces behind a robust democracy, is on full display in this occurrence.

The first general election after reforms took place in 1999, when 6.70 percent of voters chose not to participate. The early popular excitement for the new democratic system is shown by the comparatively low number when compared to succeeding elections (Subanda, 2009). Nevertheless, the 2004 elections saw a rise in the abstention rate to 15.93 percent, suggesting that voters were becoming more dissatisfied or indifferent with politics (Marijan, 2019).

The number of people who chose not to vote rose dramatically to 29.01% in the 2009 elections. A growing number of people are losing faith in government and its leaders, as seen by this sharp increase. Efforts to boost public trust or maybe engagement in politics may have contributed to a small drop in the number of those who chose not to vote in the 2014 elections, which came out at 24.89 percent (Evelina & Angeline, 2015). Having said that, the percentage of voters who chose not to participate rose to 18.31% in the 2019 elections, which is still lower than in 2009. This variation demonstrates that voters' discontent with politics continues to impact their choices not to participate, despite improvements in certain areas (Lestari, 2021).

In the context of the first presidential election conducted in 1999 using the MPR vote

representation method, the percentage of people who chose not to vote in the 2004 election was 20.24 percent. In the 2009 presidential election, this number rose to 25.19%, and it continued to grow to 30.22% in the 2014 election. This dramatic uptick shows how disillusioned and uninterested people are with the political system and its presidential contenders.

The number of people who chose not to vote in the 2019 presidential election dropped to 18.03 percent, suggesting either a better system or more interest in the individuals running for office. As an interesting aside, 40 million individuals chose not to vote in the 2024 presidential election, even though the total number of voters was 204,807,200. This indicates that around 19.5% of eligible voters will choose not to cast a ballot in the 2024 presidential election (Republika Online, 2024).

Indonesia has to implement a number of strategic measures to counteract the effects of political corruption, which are reducing the number of people who actively participate in politics. A reduction in reliance on illicit financing and a restoration of faith in the political process may begin with changes to the current system of party and campaign finance. One way to combat corrupt practices that threaten democracies is to make political money more transparent and subject to stronger scrutiny. Beyond that, a critical element in restoring public confidence is the constant and indiscriminate implementation of laws against corrupt individuals. In order for every vote to really effect political change, the election process has to be more transparent and equitable.

Furthermore, it is critical to empower the people and educate them about politics in order to increase community political engagement. Corruption is a common source of discontent and indifference, which this initiative seeks to alleviate. We think that the people will be more encouraged to participate in general elections and other political processes if we work to improve the quality of prospective leaders and make public policies more responsive. The goal of these strategies is to enhance the quality of democracy in Indonesia by removing corruption as a barrier to constructive political involvement. In order to build the foundations of democracy and ensure the durability of clean and responsible government, system reforms and efficient law enforcement may boost voter engagement and restore faith in the political system.

### **Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Laws and Role Corruption Eradication Commission in Overcoming Political Corruption and Its Impact on Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia**

In the fight against corruption, the fourth branch institution outside of the political trias is the Corruption Eradication Commission. In response to widespread mistrust of law enforcement, the prosecution, and the court system, this reform initiative came into being. Corruption is a monumental crime, and the establishment of the Corruption Eradication Commission was a structural reaction to it. It was modeled after the

Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong, which was established to combat corruption as an independent body, unfettered by any branch of government (Arifin et al., 2019).

Passage of the most recent Corruption Eradication Commission Law in 2019 marked a watershed moment in Indonesia's battle against corruption and other forms of lawlessness. The Corruption Eradication Commission underwent many major structural and authority changes with the enactment of Law no. 19 of 2019, which supersedes Law no. 30 of 2002. A Supervisory Board has been established, new rules have been promulgated about the need for a warrant for eavesdropping, and staff of the Corruption Eradication Commission have been transferred to the State Civil Apparatus.

In order to make anti-corruption initiatives more efficient and successful, the Corruption Eradication Commission was established under the Corruption Eradication Commission Law. Corruption Eradication Commission responsibilities include overseeing state government management, coordinating and directing efforts to prevent and detect corruption, and enforcing laws against corruption.

**Table 1**  
**Comparison of the Duties of the Corruption Eradication Commission (Before and After Revision)**

| Article 6 Law Number 30 of 2002 (pre-amendment) Article 6 Law Number 19 of 2019 (post-amendment)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Article 6 Law Number 30 of 2002 (pre-amendment) Article 6 Law Number 19 of 2019 (post-amendment)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Coordination with agencies authorized to eradicate criminal acts of corruption;</li> <li>b. Supervision of agencies authorized to eradicate criminal acts of corruption;</li> <li>c. Carrying out inquiries, investigations and prosecutions of criminal acts of corruption;</li> <li>d. Carry out measures to prevent criminal acts of corruption; And</li> <li>e. Monitoring the administration of state government.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Preventive measures so that Corruption Crimes do not occur;</li> <li>b. Coordination with agencies authorized to carry out the Eradication of Corruption Crimes and agencies tasked with implementing public services;</li> <li>c. Monitor the administration of state government;</li> <li>d. Supervision of agencies authorized to carry out the Eradication of Corruption Crimes;</li> <li>e. Investigating, investigating and prosecuting Corruption Crimes; And</li> <li>f. Actions to implement the judge's determination and court decisions that have obtained permanent legal force.</li> </ul> |

Law number. 19 of 2019 marks a substantial change in the responsibilities and power of the Corruption Eradication Commission, as compared to Law no. 30 of 2002. Article 6 of Law no. 30 of 2002 outlines the primary responsibilities of the Corruption Eradication Commission. These include working in tandem with other state agencies designated to combat corruption, overseeing the work of these agencies, conducting investigations into and prosecutions of corruption-related crimes, developing and implementing anti-corruption policies, and keeping tabs on how the state's government is carrying out its mandate. These responsibilities are indicative of the fact that the Corruption Eradication Commission is primarily responsible for taking decisive action in instances of corruption and closely monitoring relevant authorities.

The Corruption Eradication Commission's responsibilities were expanded and reorganized in Article 6 after its modification by Law no. 19 of 2019. In addition to upholding the responsibilities of inquiry, investigation, and prosecution, as well as supervision and monitoring, this new legislation emphasizes anti-corruption measures to ensure that no corrupt crimes are committed (Santika, 2020). The emphasis has shifted from reactive enforcement to proactive prevention, as seen above. Cooperation between anti-corruption authorities and those responsible for providing public services is one of these preventative strategies.

The execution of judge-determined and court-decided matters that have acquired permanent legal force is an additional duty of the Corruption Eradication Commission as added to its responsibilities by Law no. 19 of 2019. The Corruption Eradication Commission is tasked with this obligation, which aims to enhance law enforcement and compliance with court rulings by ensuring the effective implementation of legally binding decisions.

Given the high volume of corruption cases involving lawmakers and government officials, the Corruption Eradication Commission plays an essential role in combating political corruption. The Corruption Eradication Commission has been instrumental in exposing several high-profile scandals involving Indonesia's political elite since its inception, illuminating the pervasiveness and systemic nature of corruption in the country. Through its anti-corruption efforts and educational initiatives, the Corruption Eradication Commission works to both prevent and punish corrupt individuals (Simbolon, 2020).

For instance, in "The Morality of Law," a book by Lon L. Fuller that lays out his philosophy of law, one of the eight requirements for an effective legal system is that it be clear, consistent, and enforceable (Kreide, 2016). As part of Law no. 19 of 2019, the Corruption Eradication Commission is now tasked with carrying out the determination of judges and legally binding court decisions. This shows that efforts are being made to make the law more effective by making sure that decisions can be put into practice. The goal of Fuller's idea of the law's enforceability is to make sure that laws aren't only words

on paper but really affect people's lives. This aligns with that notion.

Legal theory, which stresses the significance of law enforcement organizations' autonomy, may also be used to examine the Corruption Eradication Commission's success in combating political corruption (Albertson Fineman, 2017). One of the main reasons the Corruption Eradication Commission has been so effective in sweeping corruption to its knees, so goes this belief, is because it is completely autonomous. Due to its wide-ranging and autonomous powers, the Corruption Eradication Commission is free from political interference that may impede its investigations and convictions. Corruption cases involving high-ranking officials and members of the legislature are only two examples of the many big scandals that the Corruption Eradication Commission has unearthed. Here, the Corruption Eradication Commission is crucial in preserving the honesty and faith of the people in the judicial and governmental systems.

The constitutional democracy of Indonesia is profoundly affected by the changes to the Corruption Eradication Commission's responsibilities and powers outlined in Law no. 19 of 2019. The success of anti-corruption agencies like the Corruption Eradication Commission has a significant impact on the accountability of public officials, the fairness and transparency of law enforcement, and the maintenance of constitutional democracies.

The Corruption Eradication Commission was granted extensive powers to oversee entities authorized to combat corruption and conduct investigations into and prosecutions of corruption cases under Law no. 30 of 2002. With this power comes the ability for the Corruption Eradication Commission to vigorously and independently investigate allegations of corruption, including involving prominent political figures and government officials (Schütte, 2011). As the bedrock of constitutional democracy, this autonomy is critical for preventing political meddling in the criminal justice system.

But the Corruption Eradication Commission's autonomy and adaptability have been altered by a number of amendments to Law No. 19 of 2019. As an instance, the establishment of a Supervisory Board with the power to authorize wiretapping licenses might be seen as a measure to rein in the activities of the Corruption Eradication Commission, increasing the likelihood of political interference (Tauda et al., 2023). In addition, this shift might be seen as a move to dampen the aggressiveness with which the Corruption Eradication Commission pursues prosecution of high-profile corruption cases.

Another major obstacle that the Corruption Eradication Commission is having to overcome is the public's deteriorating perception of it. The public's deteriorating perception of the Corruption Eradication Commission provides an explanation for some of these past occurrences. Kompas R&D's face-to-face survey data from December 2023 shows that the Corruption Eradication Commission's reputation has been deteriorating. Nearly half of respondents (47.5 percent) had a positive impression of the anti-corruption body. Based on 22 polls conducted since January 2015, this is the lowest figure. There has

been a drop before this. The Corruption Eradication Commission's once-great reputation took a nosedive in the October 2019 poll period, after the passage of the revised law establishing the commission in September 2019. When comparing the survey periods of March 2019 (at 77.3% positive image) and October 2019, the former showed a decline of 76.5%. Out of 22 Kompas R&D polls, the January 2015 survey had the greatest favorable image of the Corruption Eradication Commission at 88.5% (*Transparency International Indonesia*, n.d.)

Part of the reason the Corruption Eradication Commission has been so effective in rooting out systemic corruption is because it is completely autonomous. Due to its wide-ranging and autonomous powers, the Corruption Eradication Commission is free from political interference that may impede its investigations and convictions. The many high-profile scandals that the Corruption Eradication Commission has unearthed—including instances involving legislators and high-ranking government officials—prove this point (Syahuri et al., 2022) Here, the Corruption Eradication Commission is crucial in preserving the honesty and faith of the people in the judicial and governmental systems.

There are worries that the independence of the Corruption Eradication Commission might be jeopardized due to amendments in Law no. 19 of 2019, which formed a Supervisory Board and reduced parts of the Commission's functions. A potential interference that diminishes the Corruption Eradication Commission's autonomy is the presence of a Supervisory Board with the power to authorize eavesdropping and other investigative measures.

The Corruption Eradication Commission encounters very intricate societal obstacles in addition to legal hurdles. The opposition from inside political and bureaucratic circles is one of the most significant societal issues. The Corruption Eradication Commission is a source of anxiety for many public servants and politicians due to the frequency with which it exposes their involvement in corruption scandals. Political pressure, efforts to obstruct investigations, and even media campaigns against the Corruption Eradication Commission are all examples of the ways in which this opposition manifests (Sosiawan, 2019). An example of this is the prevalence of narratives casting doubt on the credibility of the Corruption Eradication Commission and its members.

Low public understanding and involvement in supporting anti-corruption initiatives is another societal concern. Despite the Corruption Eradication Commission's best efforts, many individuals remain indifferent or fail to grasp the significance of their part in bolstering the commission's anti-corruption initiatives (Soegiono, 2017). Some people may be indifferent because they don't know how corruption affects their lives, while others may be pessimistic that corruption can be effectively eradicated given the growing number of instances involving high-ranking officials.

Establishing an anti-corruption and integrity-oriented culture among the

bureaucracy and society is another obstacle the Corruption Eradication Commission must overcome. Many see corruption as a "lubricant" that keeps bureaucracies running well despite their inherent slowness and complexity. Corruption has been ingrained in the way society interacts with government officials, making it even more difficult to reform this culture.

In Montesquieu's idea of separation of powers, the executive and legislative branches should stay out of the way of law enforcement authorities so that the government may be functional and fair. This autonomy is critical for the Corruption Eradication Commission to conduct impartial investigations and prosecutions of corruption cases. The efficiency of eliminating corruption is greatly enhanced by the independence of powerful anti-corruption agencies, as shown by comparisons with other nations like Hong Kong with the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). When it comes to corruption charges, the ICAC can move swiftly and decisively because of its extensive investigative powers that do not need authorization from other agencies (Azwar & Subekan, 2022). In order to restore the efficacy and independence of the Corruption Eradication Commission, it is vitally important to revise regulations that restrict its jurisdiction. For example, wiretapping operations should not need approval from the Supervisory Board.

According to the philosophy of good governance, the police should be open and accountable to the public. To avoid the misuse of authority, good governance stresses the need of transparency in governmental procedures and the execution of laws (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). For instance, as mentioned earlier, actual evidence from Transparency International demonstrates that nations like Sweden and New Zealand, who have responsible and transparent law enforcement agencies, have lower levels of corruption and enjoy high public confidence in these institutions. The Corruption Eradication Commission may improve its openness and responsibility by incorporating public oversight into its performance evaluations and enhancing its internal reporting and auditing systems. Public engagement does double duty: it boosts confidence in the Corruption Eradication Commission and makes sure that everything it does follows legal and fair standards.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a crime prevention philosophy that stresses the need of taking precautions to lessen the likelihood of criminal activity (Sohn, 2016). Education and anti-corruption initiatives are crucial in changing people's perspectives and actions about corruption, which is a key component in the fight against it. Countries with robust anti-corruption education programs, like Finland and Singapore, tend to have lower levels of corruption, according to data from the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). To eradicate corruption and promote honesty and fair play at all levels of society, the Corruption Eradication Commission should broaden and enhance its anti-corruption education programs and anti-corruption initiatives. This allows for a more comprehensive formation of an anti-corruption culture in society and increases the efficacy of anti-corruption measures.

Revision of policies to guarantee the Corruption Eradication Commission's independence, expansion of educational programs and anti-corruption campaigns, and increased transparency and accountability in law enforcement are all necessary to strengthen the Corruption Eradication Commission's role in overcoming political corruption and supporting constitutional democracy in Indonesia. This strategy has the backing of legal and factual theories that highlight the need of public education, accountability, openness, and the autonomy of law enforcement agencies as cornerstones in the fight against corruption and for the preservation of democratic institutions.

#### 4. Conclusion

Corruption in Indonesia's political sphere has dampened public enthusiasm for and engagement in government, leading many to lose faith in and eventually abandon the electoral process altogether. People become distrustful and hesitant to take part in political activities like voting when they see corruption involving public authorities and politicians. Although the Corruption Eradication Commission was strengthened by Law 19 of 2019, which amends Law 30 of 2002, its efficacy is still deemed subpar. There are challenges to the execution of this legislation, which grants the Corruption Eradication Commission more jurisdiction, including the ability to investigate and prosecute corruption cases.

Reducing reliance on illicit fundraising and increasing openness and accountability of the political process are two goals of comprehensive party and campaign finance reform that are necessary to fortify constitutional democracy. Furthermore, it is critical to strengthen the Corruption Eradication Commission's power and autonomy so that it can effectively execute the law without political meddling. To restore public confidence and serve as a deterrence, harsh and consistent consequences for corrupt officials must be implemented. The goal of these measures is to strengthen constitutional democracy in Indonesia and encourage more active engagement from the general people in order to make the government more transparent and responsible.

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