

From Ideology to Electability: The Implications of Non-Cadre Candidate Recruitment on PKS's Strategy and Efforts to Become an Open Party

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Abstract

This study discusses the recruitment strategy of non-cadre legislative candidates carried out by the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in the 2009 Legislative Election. As a cadre-based party, this step is a significant innovation in the history of PKS. The research uses a qualitative approach with an analytical descriptive method, utilizing in-depth interviews with resource persons and analysis of related documents. The results of the study show that the recruitment policy of non-cadre candidates is influenced by several main factors. First, efforts to increase electability in non-PKS base areas. Second, recruiting figures who are considered capable of making a significant contribution to the party's goals. Third, an experiment to make PKS a more open party. Finally, pragmatic reasons such as the party's financial needs. However, this step caused various criticisms, both from internal and external circles, because it was considered contrary to the principle of the cadre party that prioritized internal cadres. Theoretically, this policy reflects a change in the character of PKS from party ideology to more pragmatic. This research highlights the importance of balancing political pragmatism and ideological consistency in maintaining party cohesion. These findings are relevant to understand the dynamics of political parties in Indonesia, especially in facing the challenges of political modernization.

1. Introduction

The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) has emerged as one of the important actors in Indonesia's post-reform political landscape. Political reforms that began with the fall of Suharto in 1998 opened up a more inclusive democratic space, providing opportunities

for the birth of new parties with different ideologies and strategies. PKS, which is a transformation of the Justice Party (PK), positions itself as a unique political party because it combines Islamic values with a modern approach to party management. The forerunner of PKS was actually removed from the campus da'wah movement that developed in the 1980s, especially in major universities in Indonesia. This movement provided a solid ideological foundation and initial structure, which later became the hallmark of this party as a cadre party (Damanik, 2002).

The uniqueness of PKS lies in its strong ideological orientation, where Islam is not only understood as a religion, but also as a political guideline. In the doctrine of PKS, da'wah is the main mission, which is realized through political activities to create an Islamic social order. This is different from several other Islamic parties that tend to be culture-based, such as the National Awakening Party (PKB) which is close to Nahdlatul Ulama, or the National Mandate Party (PAN) which has Muhammadiyah roots. PKS, on the other hand, positions itself as a party ideology that seeks to build an Islamic society through a structured and planned approach. This view is supported by an intensive cadre regeneration system, ranging from member learning, tiered training, to the formation of core cadres who are ready to play a role at various levels of politics (Furkon, 2004).

In its development, PKS is not only known as an Islamic party, but also as a party with a disciplined and professional organizational structure. The regeneration system implemented by this party involves various membership increases, ranging from novice members to expert members, with training that focuses on developing intellectual, moral, and leadership competencies. PKS cadres are prepared to face political and social challenges through systematic training methods, such as liqo, daurah, and mukhayyam, which are adapted from the Muslim Brotherhood's da'wah method in Egypt. With this approach, PKS has succeeded in building a reputation as a clean, organized, and loyal party to Islamic values.

However, this ideological orientation also poses challenges. In the context of modern democracy, PKS faces a dilemma between maintaining the exclusivity of its ideology or adapting to more inclusive political dynamics. On the one hand, PKS must maintain its integrity as a da'wah party with cadres who are loyal to Islamic principles. On the other hand, as a participant in the electoral political system, PKS must compete with other parties to gain wider support from the pluralistic Indonesian society. This shift became even more apparent when PKS began to open up by recruiting non-cadre candidates in the 2009 Legislative Election, a step that became an important point in the political party's journey.

The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) is one of the interesting phenomena in Indonesia's post-reform political dynamics. Although it often receives sharp criticism as a party with a hidden agenda to formalize Islamic law, PKS is actually able to show a strong appeal in the eyes of some Indonesian people. With a fairly innovative political strategy, the party exceeded the expectations of many political observers, recording significant growth in vote acquisition from the 1999 election to the 2009 election. In that decade, PKS succeeded in increasing its electability from only 1.4% to 7.8% of the national vote (Furkon,

2004). This success certainly does not happen instantly, but is the result of a combination of strategies, the hard work of cadres, and the ability to understand the needs of the community.

The success of PKS is not only reflected in the increase in votes, but also in the strengthening of its cadre base. In the early days of its establishment, this party only had about 30 thousand active members. However, the number jumped dramatically to more than 800 thousand active members in 2009. This strong cadre base is not only the driving engine, but also the backbone of the campaign party in implementing its programs at the grassroots level. The existence of solid and militant cadres allows PKS to continue to reach out to the community directly, creating a party image that is close to the people and responsive to the problems faced by its constituents.

PKS's innovative strategy in attracting public attention is also inseparable from its ability to take advantage of relevant social and political issues. This party is known to be able to build an image as a clean, caring, and professional party. For example, PKS often positions itself as an anti-researcher of major parties involved in corruption cases. With this approach, PKS has succeeded in attracting the sympathy of community groups who want real changes in governance. This approach is also the main attraction for young voters, the middle class, and urban communities who are becoming saturated with transactional politics.

In addition, PKS also shows good adaptability in reading national political dynamics. For example, despite having a strong Islamic ideological base, PKS often adjusts its political rhetoric to be more inclusive. This can be seen from various campaign programs that carry universal issues such as eradicating corruption, improving the quality of education, and alleviating poverty. With this approach, PKS was able to gain support from a more diverse group of people, including non-Muslims who were interested in its pragmatic programs.

However, the success of PKS also raises various challenges and controversies. Criticism of PKS often centers on the alleged existence of a hidden agenda to formalize Islamic law in the state order. Although PKS often denies these accusations, public skepticism about the party's ideological agenda is still an obstacle in expanding support. On the other hand, the party also faces internal challenges, including maintaining ideological consistency amid pressure to be more pragmatic in political competition.

With all its achievements and challenges, PKS is an example of how ideological-based political parties can remain relevant in the midst of Indonesian politics which tends to be pragmatic and transactional. Through innovative strategies, cadre consistency, and the ability to read the needs of the community, PKS has positioned itself as one of the important actors on the national political stage. Going forward, the main challenge for PKS is how to maintain its growth momentum without losing the ideological identity that is the basis of its existence.

As a cadre party, PKS has a distinctive pattern of recruitment and regeneration. This process includes rigorous selection, tiered training, and ideological training, which ensures that each cadre has moral, intellectual, and leadership competencies (Rush &

Althoff, 2002). However, in the 2009 Legislative Election, PKS made a breakthrough by recruiting candidates for legislative members (candidates) from non-cadre circles. This step raises internal matters, because it is considered to deviate from the basic principle of the cadre party which has been prioritizing internal cadres in the candidacy process (Muhtadi, 2012).

This non-cadre recruitment policy is motivated by several factors. First, PKS seeks to increase electability in areas that are not its traditional base. Second, this step aims to reach figures with professional backgrounds, entrepreneurs, and social activists who are considered to have a significant influence on society. Third, this strategy is part of PKS's experiment to become a more inclusive and flexible party in facing political competition (Furkon, 2004).

This research plays an important role in understanding the transformation experienced by the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), from a party that has historically been based on ideological regeneration to a more pragmatic political approach. This transformation not only reflects adaptation to the complex dynamics of national politics, but also indicates PKS's efforts to expand its political support base amid increasingly fierce competition in the Indonesian political scene. The focus of this research lies in exploring the strategy of PKS in recruiting non-cadre legislative candidates, by highlighting the cases of Abdul Aziz Suseno, Arif Minardi, and Kemal Aziz Stamboel as a representation of this phenomenon.

Through a case study approach, this study explores how the policy of recruiting non-cadre candidates is implemented by PKS. This approach allows for a deep understanding of the party's internal dynamics, especially in terms of the selection process, decision-making, and acceptance of the policy among the core cadres. Not only that, this study also highlights how this strategy affects the organizational structure of the party, especially in terms of the relationship between the central, regional, and cadre bases at the grassroots level.

One of the important aspects discussed in this study is the impact of the policy on the party's ideology. As a party born from the spirit of Islamic da'wah, PKS has been known to have a strong and cohesive ideological platform. However, the step to recruit non-cadre candidates shows that there is a compromise on this ideology in order to achieve greater political benefits. This study explores the extent to which PKS is able to maintain a balance between its ideological principles and the need to remain relevant in an electoral political system.

In a broader context, this study places the transformation of PKS as part of the political dynamics in Indonesia that continue to change. The political system in Indonesia, which tends to be pragmatic, encourages political parties to adopt more flexible strategies to win the people's vote. This study analyzes how PKS, as a cadre party, tries to adapt to the demands of an increasingly open political system without losing its identity as a values- and ideologically based party.

Through a case study of three non-cadre candidates, this study also provides insight into the internal negotiation process that occurs within PKS. The election of Abdul Aziz

Suseno, Arif Minardi, and Kemal Aziz Stamboel was not without controversy. The three have different backgrounds and networks from traditional PKS cadres, raising questions about their suitability with the party's vision and mission. This study explores how parties manage the potential internal conflicts that arise due to these differences.

In addition, this study also looks at the impact of heating up non-cadre candidates on the relationship between PKS and its constituents. As a party that has been known to have a loyal mass base, this change in strategy poses a risk of alienation among traditional supporters. This study aims to understand how PKS communicates these changes to constituents, as well as their impact on voter loyalty.

This study also pays special attention to the implementation of PKS transformation to the Indonesian political system. As one of the parties that carries the cadre regeneration model, PKS's move to adopt an open party approach shows a change in the national political landscape. This study analyzes how this transformation affects the relationship between political parties, as well as its impact on the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia.

Furthermore, this study reveals the complexity in the implementation of pragmatic policies in ideologically based parties. This PKS move not only reflects internal challenges, but also external pressures from an increasingly competitive political environment. This study offers a new perspective on how ideologically based parties in Indonesia adapt to modern political realities.

This research is not only relevant to understand the internal dynamics of PKS, but also makes a significant contribution to the literature on the political party system in Indonesia. By putting the experience of PKS in a broader context, this study helps to explain how political parties in Indonesia respond to the challenges faced in the era of increasingly open electoral democracy.

In the end, this study provides a rich and in-depth view of the journey of PKS from a cadre-based party to a more pragmatic approach. The findings produced can be a reflection for PKS and other political parties in determining their political strategies in the future. This research is also the basis for future studies that want to explore changes in the political party system in Indonesia.

2. Research Method

The research methodology in this study uses a qualitative approach with a descriptive-analytical method, as described in the research document. This methodology aims to deeply understand the recruitment process of non-cadre legislative candidates (candidates) of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in the 2009 Legislative Election through an analytical approach that suppresses descriptive data on empirical data. The data collection techniques used included field observations to understand recruitment patterns and practices directly, in-depth interviews with 11 sources, including party leaders and PKS administrators who were directly involved in the recruitment process, as well as literature studies by collecting relevant documents such as journals, media articles, and official reports.

Data analysis is carried out systematically by identifying the main themes that emerge from interviews, observations, and written documents. This approach allows researchers to relate empirical findings to the theoretical frameworks used, such as the political party theory by Maurice Duverger, the political recruitment theory of Pippa Norris, and the Islamic and political approaches developed by Gabriel Almond. Through data triangulation, the validity of the research results is strengthened by comparing various data sources obtained to ensure the consistency of the findings.

This methodology is effective in uncovering the strategic reasons behind the recruitment policy of non-cadre candidates by PKS, including electoral motives, experimentation as an open party, and the party's financial needs. By combining primary and secondary data, this study is able to provide a comprehensive understanding of the importance of the policy to the identity of PKS as a cadre party as well as a da'wah party. This approach is in accordance with the need for research that focuses on the internal dynamics of political parties and their impact on the Indonesian political system.

3. Results and Discussion

Recruitment of non-PKS cadre candidates: a case study of Abdul Aziz Suseno

Abdul Aziz Suseno is a successful contractor and businessman from Blitar who was active in various sports and business organizations in Sampang, Madura, before entering the world of politics. He is known as a simple, religious figure, and has a wide social network, including in the business and sports sectors (See Interview with Abdul Aziz, 2013). In 2008, PKS recruited him to run as a candidate for legislative member (candidate), although he was initially not interested in politics because he focused on business (Interview with Abdul Aziz, 2013). Abdul Aziz decided to join PKS after being influenced by the intensive approach of PKS cadres through gatherings, sports activities, and invitations to various party events (Abdurrahman, 2013). The approach used reflects the fardi recruitment model that prioritizes personal relationships as an effective strategy to attract non-cadre figures with a wide network (Mahfud Interview, 2013).

After being elected as a member of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia for the 2009-2014 period, Abdul Aziz served in Commission IX in charge of labor and health, before being transferred to Commission VIII which dealt with rural, hajj, and religious issues (DPR Guidebook, 2009). As a legislator, he contributed to the discussion of a number of important bills such as the Bill on Villages, which aims to strengthen village governance and reduce the gap between villages and cities (PKS Faction, 2012). In addition, he is active in the CSR Committee and supervision of the implementation of the hajj pilgrimage, including encouraging the transparency of hajj funds (Interview with Abdul Aziz, 2013).

In commission VIII, Abdul Aziz is involved in a number of discussions on bills that are considered crucial, such as the bill on villages. In addition to the Bill on Villages, he also focused on a number of other crucial issues in the field of supervision such as communal conflicts between Sunni and Shia supporters in Sampang Regency. According

to him, a number of bills are still being discussed in the House of Representatives and will be completed during this year's session, such as the Bill on Villages which he considers very important for the sustainability of the village in the future. Regarding the supervision related to his constituency, one of the issues that Abdul Aziz focuses on is the communal conflict between Sunni and Shia Islamic supporters that occurred in Sampang Regency, Madura. (Azyumardi Azra, 1994; See Abdul Aziz Interview, 2013). As a representative of the PKS Faction, he seeks to find a peaceful solution through dialogue and involves various parties, including religious leaders, local governments, and NGOs (Hidayat Nur Wahid, 2012). This conflict reflects the importance of cross-group dialogue to maintain harmony in a pluralistic society (Kuntowijoyo, 2002).

In appearance, PKS is a da'wah party that focuses on Islamic values of rahmatan lil 'alamin, such as anti-corruption, tolerance, and social concern. Abdul Aziz rejected the accusation that PKS has an agenda for the rigid implementation of Islamic law. According to him, the party's vision is to fight for justice and prosperity within the framework of the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila, without ignoring pluralism (Abdurrahman Wahid, 2009; Interview with Abdul Aziz, 2013). As a member of the House of Representatives, he is not only involved in the discussion of laws and regulations, but also seeks to build direct connections with his constituents in Madura, especially through social activities and economic strengthening of the village community (Interview with Abdul Aziz, 2013).

Recruitment of non-PKS cadre candidates: a case study of Arif Minardi

Arif Minardi is a labor activist who plays an important role in the world of Indonesian politics, especially through his involvement with the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Born in Bandung on March 25, 1943, Arif came from a simple family and developed a spirit of independence since childhood. This perseverance was taken to continue his education at the University of Brawijaya (Unibraw) Malang in the 1980s, where he was influenced by secular thought and leftist activism such as Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Che Guevara. During his studies, Arif actively associated with activists of the Indonesian National Student Movement (GMNI), which is more affiliated with PDI Perjuangan (Interview with Arif Minardi, April 5, 2013).

A major change occurred in Arif's life after he returned to Bandung, when he began to abandon leftist thinking and turn to Islamic studies, including hardline ones such as Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Muslim Ummah Forum (FUI). He also studied with figures such as Abu Jibril and Haroyono from the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (DDII), who influenced his outlook and direction of life. This decision further emphasizes his tendency to combine religious and social life, as well as form a solid personal character before entering society (Interview with Arif Minardi, April 5, 2013).

In the late 1990s, Arif Minardi briefly joined the Moon Star Party (PBB) after reform, although his decision to join the party did not last long due to internal conflicts. Arif then focused on his activism in the world of labor, especially at PT Dirgantara Indonesia (PTDI), where he has worked since 1997. He led a massive protest against the company's policy of unilaterally laying off workers in 2004. This action brought a meeting with Edi

Janur, the PKS DPP administrator who is also involved in labor issues. This meeting opened the way for Arif to get closer to PKS (Interview with Edi Janur, April 7, 2013; Arif Minardi, Interview February 15, 2013).

PKS views Arif Minardi as a potential figure, both from his track record as a labor figure who has a wide network in Bandung and his good integrity among the community and workers. Since 2005, Edi Janur began to meet Arif intensely and at the end of 2008, Arif was recommended to become a legislative candidate (candidate) from PKS. Arif eventually joined PKS and was elected as a member of the House of Representatives in the 2009 election, where he joined Commission IX which discussed labor, health, and transmigration issues (Interview with Edi Janur, April 7, 2013).

As a member of the House of Representatives, Arif Minardi is known to be quick to respond to social problems, especially those related to workers. He often goes directly into the field to find out the existing conditions and advocate for the interests of workers. One example of an important action he took was facilitating street vendors (PKL) to get business loans from Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) through the People's Business Credit (KUR) program. Arif also urged the government to free hospital fees, by giving an example like the Bali Regional Government which provides free health services for its citizens (Interview with Arif Minardi, February 15, 2013; Berita Satu, April 10, 2013).

Regarding labor issues, Arif argued that the labor system in Indonesia is still very chaotic, especially regarding the Decent Living Needs (KHL) number which is often a polemic between employers, the government, and workers. He emphasized the importance of a clearer and fairer system for workers to meet their living needs. In PKS, Arif is involved in various policies that benefit workers and marginalized groups, with the aim of channeling their aspirations into public policy (Interview with Arif Minardi, February 15, 2013).

Arif Minardi is also known for his heroic actions in fighting for the fate of workers. One of the latest was when he and a number of members of Commission XI of the House of Representatives went to the Minister of SOEs Dahlan Iskan to demand clarification regarding his absence from a meeting that discussed the fate of workers in SOEs. This action shows Arif's courage in upholding labor rights and realizing justice for them. He also argued that the absence of the Minister of SOEs in the meeting was a form of insult to the people represented by the House of Representatives (Berita Satu, April 10, 2013).

The recruitment process of Arif Minardi by PKS did not happen suddenly. Since 2003, PKS through Edi Janur has begun to focus on strategic partnerships with civil society groups, including workers, farmers, and fishermen. PKS views that to become an inclusive party, they need to build relationships with underprivileged groups that are often marginalized in government policies. Arif Minardi, with a background as a labor activist, is a figure who is very suitable for this strategy (Interview with Edi Janur, April 7, 2013).

Not only that, PKS also provides logistical support and mediation for PT Dirgantara's labor actions, which are often carried out in Jakarta. PKS is actively involved in fighting for workers' rights by facilitating their needs, such as accommodation and food during the action. This strengthens the relationship between Arif Minardi and PKS, and

shows PKS's commitment to fighting for social justice for the lower groups (Interview with Edi Janur, April 7, 2013).

As part of PKS's strategy to embrace the underclass, Arif Minardi also plays an important role in advocating for social issues in the DPR. As a member of Commission IX, he continues to push for pro-labor and pro-health policies to be implemented in real terms. One of the major efforts that he encouraged was to make health costs free for the people, a step that is considered very important in improving the welfare of the community (Interview with Arif Minardi, February 15, 2013).

Recruitment of Non-Cadre Candidates for Pks: A Case Study of Kemal Aziz Stamboel

Kemal Aziz Stamboel, a non-cadre legislative candidate from the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), has a rich background in the world of financial consultants and social organizations. Born in Malang in 1949, Kemal has had a career of more than two decades at Pricewaterhouse Coopers Consulting Indonesia and IBM Business Consulting Indonesia. He is also active in various government agencies and non-governmental organizations, including as a member of the Supervisory Board of the Aceh and Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency and Deputy Executive Chairman of the National Council for Technology, Information and Telecommunications.

Kemal Stamboel joined PKS because of his desire to serve the community and contribute to the making of laws that reflect the aspirations of the people. He believes that the House of Representatives is a forum for advancing the nation, and he emphasizes the importance of creating a balanced democratic politics, with a focus on alleviating poverty, unemployment, and ignorance. After being elected as a member of the House of Representatives in 2009, Kemal served as Chairman of Commission I which deals with defense and security, before being transferred to Commission XI which focuses on finance and banking.

Kemal has the view that DPR members should not seek material benefits, but focus on community service. He sees the House of Representatives as a platform to capture the aspirations of the people and turn them into pro-people policies. In carrying out his duties, he often raises important issues such as poverty, unemployment, and education, and strives to create jobs and infrastructure that support the agricultural sector.

Kemal's recruitment process into PKS reflects a change in the party's strategy, which was previously more exclusive. PKS is now open to recruiting non-cadre cadres who have certain qualifications, with the aim of expanding the support base and changing the party's image. Kemal contributed to introducing a new perspective within the party and emphasized the need for a balance between ukhrawi and secular values.

During his tenure, Kemal was involved in various bills related to financial and economic issues. He argued that poverty must be addressed structurally and comprehensively, with a focus on infrastructure development and community empowerment. Kemal also wrote two books that reflect his thoughts on the importance of ideas in politics and poverty alleviation strategies in Indonesia.

Kemal Aziz Stamboel is an example of a politician who is committed to serving the

community and fighting for the aspirations of the people through political channels. With his strong background in the business and social world, he seeks to bring about positive change in public policy and encourage PKS to become a more inclusive and responsive party to the needs of the community.

Analysis of PKS Policy in the Recruitment of Non-Cadre Candidates in the 2009 Legislative Election

This study analyzes the policy of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in recruiting non-cadre legislative candidates in the 2009 legislative elections. This analysis is based on data obtained from PKS's internal documents, books, and interviews with the PKS Central Leadership Council (DPP) management. The main questions raised in this study are the reasons and basis behind PKS's decision to recruit non-cadre candidates, as well as the criteria applied in the recruitment process.

As a party that claims to be a cadre party, PKS's decision to recruit non-cadre candidates raises questions among the public. PKS, which is known for its strict recruitment system, usually prioritizes internal cadres who have been trained and meet certain qualification standards. Nevertheless, PKS continues to recruit individuals from outside the party, who are considered to be able to increase the party's vote.

PKS believes that good recruitment can contribute to an increase in votes in elections. Therefore, this party conducts recruitment carefully, considering the importance of the quality of cadres in maintaining and increasing the acquisition of legislative seats. The increase in the number of PKS seats from 1999 to 2009 is considered the result of systematic efforts in recruiting qualified cadres.

Data shows that between the 1999 and 2009 elections, PKS experienced a significant increase in votes, in contrast to other Islamic parties such as PPP and PKB which experienced a decline. This shows that PKS has succeeded in implementing a systematic recruitment pattern and cadre regeneration level, which has a positive impact on cadre militancy. This militancy is strengthened through an intensive tarbiyah system, where PKS instills ideological values to every cadre through various recitation and training forums.

Prior to the 1999 elections, many doubted the ability of Islamic parties to gain majority support, given the poor experience of the past and inadequate infrastructure. However, this prediction proved to be wrong, especially for PKS who managed to win 7 seats in the House of Representatives in their first election. Election data shows that PKS continues to experience an increase in seats in the House of Representatives, with 45 seats in the 2004 election and 57 seats in the 2009 election. In contrast, other Islamist parties declined, with the PPP and PKB losing many seats.

Although survey results show that Islamic parties tend not to have majority support, PKS has managed to maintain its position and even improve. This study shows that PKS's success in recruiting non-cadre candidates is a strategy that contributes to positive election results, as well as reflects the party's ability to adapt to existing political dynamics.

The following is the data on the votes obtained by political parties in the 1999 elections.

Table 1
PK votes in the 1999 election

N C	Party No.	Party Name	Vote Count	%
1	11	PDI-Perjuangan	35.689.073	33, 76
2	33	Golkar	23.741.749	22, 46
3	35	PKB	13.336.982	12, 62
4	9	PPP	11.329.905	10, 72
5	15	GENTLEMAN	7.528.956	7,1 2
6	22	PBB	2.049.708	1,9 4
7	24	Justice Party	1.436.565	1,3 6

Source: KPU

In the 2004 election, PKS received significant votes in the 6th position, up one level from the 1999 election with the election of 45 PKS cadres as members of the DPR/MPR from the original 7 people, a prestigious achievement considering PKS is a newcomer in the national political scene.

Table. 2
PKS votes in the 2004 election

Party	Valid Vote	% Valid Votes	Chair Parliam ent	% Seats Parliament
Golka r	24.480.7 57	21,6	128	23,3
PDIP	21.026.6 29	18,5	110	20,0
PKB	11.989.5 64	10,6	53	9,6
PPP	9.248.76 4	8,2	57	10,4
Demo crat	8.455.22 5	7,5	58	10,5
PKS	8.325.02 0	7,3	45	8,2
GENT	7.303.32	6,4	54	9,8

LEM AN	4			
Other s	22.633.1 31	19,9	45	8,2
<i>Total</i>	113.462. 414	100,0	550	100,0

Source : KPU

Likewise, with the results of the 2009 election, PKS's vote acquisition increased to 4th position below the Democrats, Golkar, and PDIP and was in the first position among Islamic parties such as PKB, PAN, and PPP. The achievement of PKS's increasing votes is the result of the achievements of the regeneration and recruitment system carried out by PKS so far.

Table 3
PKS gains in the 2009 elections.

	Party Name	Incoming Voice	Incoming Votes %	Number of Seats
	Democratic	21.703.137	20,85	150
	Golkar	14.600.091	14,45	107
	PDIP	13.037.757	14,03	95
	PKS	8.206.995	7,88	57
	PAN	6.254.580	6,01	43

Source : KPU

If you look at the PKS votes obtained from the 1999 to 2009 elections, the tendency of its electability has increased quite significantly. This happens because of the ability of PKS to recruit and nurture its cadres neatly.⁸ This is what distinguishes it from other Islamic parties which are generally based on the mass of Indonesian Islamic organizations and rely only on the popularity and strength of senior figures. Meanwhile, PKS began to recruit and cadre its members at a certain level, such as cadres through tarbiyah institutions and campus organizations.

With a pattern of recruitment and regeneration that is tiered using a networked cell system, PKS believes that in this way (without denying other factors) it is more possible to increase the party's vote. In the midst of voter pragmatism, PKS remains confident that by recruiting quality cadres, PKS's votes will continue to grow. This belief is what makes PKS continue to make breakthroughs in recruitment. Including the recruitment of non-cadre candidates as an effort to increase the party's vote. Of course, the external candidates must have qualified qualities as desired by PKS.

Experiment in Becoming an Open Party

The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) has experienced significant changes in the recruitment of legislative candidates (candidates) in line with the desire to become a more open party. The urge to recruit individuals from outside the party emerged in response to the need to increase electoral votes. PKS, which previously implemented a strict and closed recruitment process, is now starting to accept candidates from outside the cadres.

The Chairman of the PKS Syuro Assembly, Hilmi Aminudin, noted that the desire to become an open party has existed since the National Congress in Bali in 2008. However, this open declaration was hampered by immature internal preparations. PKS seeks to build inclusivity in response to pluralism, which is considered part of Islamic teachings. In the past, the exclusivity of PKS was due to the need to protect the party's identity, but as cadres spread in various regions, PKS began to interact with communities outside of Islam.

Experiences in regions such as Papua, Bali, and East Nusa Tenggara encouraged the discourse of openness, which was later elevated to national policy. PKS can no longer be considered an exclusive party, because it opens up opportunities for non-cadres to join. In the First National Congress in Bali, PKS Deputy Secretary General, Fahri Hamzah, revealed that PKS will look for candidates from outside the party to strengthen the quality of cadres. All individuals can now register as PKS cadres and candidates, who will undergo party-related training.

PKS's strategy to become an open party is an experiment to expand the voter base. The change in the image of PKS to a more inclusive party was evident ahead of the 2009 elections, with advertisements carrying national figures and the slogan "party for all". PKS seeks to reach voters outside its traditional base, including non-Muslims and large Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah.

Although the results of the 2009 election were not optimal, PKS continued to strive to increase the share of the voter market and change its orientation to an open middle party. This approach reflects an electoral competition strategy that suits the preferences of the majority voters who are in the middle. PKS invests large funds in socialization through the media, especially television, to expand the reach of the message and attract voter sympathy outside the traditional base.

The openness of PKS also reflects the change in the mental model in responding to the development of the times. The second generation of PKS, which consists of former campus activists, brings a new, more inclusive perspective. They view heterogeneity as a wealth that can strengthen the unity of the nation. Therefore, PKS seeks to eliminate narrow religious views and ethno-nationalism that can damage the integrity of the nation.

PKS considers that the issue of nationalism and the Republic of Indonesia is final, so Islam and the state do not need to be opposed. PKS's openness is expected to achieve the target of obtaining 20% of the vote in the upcoming elections. The Chairman of the PKS DPP for the West Java Region, Sudarman, emphasized that PKS is always open to all circles, including non-Muslims, to become members and administrators.

In Papua, PKS has recruited non-Muslim members of the DPRD, showing that openness has been implemented before this discourse is rolled out at the national level.

The Chairman of the Papua PKS DPW, Ichwanul Muslimin, stated that non-Muslim cadres in PKS have high loyalty. In Bali, PKS is also open to accepting members from various religious backgrounds, including Hinduism.

William Liddle argued that inclusive parties are more independent and flexible, not tied to one particular social force. PKS responded to this by recruiting legislative candidates from non-tarbiyah circles. Although the openness of PKS sometimes seems half-hearted, especially at the level of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, at the provincial and district/city levels, there are non-Muslim candidates who have been registered.

Overall, PKS strives to become a more inclusive and open party, hoping to increase votes and expand its voter base. This openness is a strategic step to face challenges on the national political stage and gain support from various segments of society.

Three Reasons for Recruiting Non-Cadre PKS Candidates

The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) faces challenges in increasing its electability, which encourages the party to implement a strategy of recruiting non-cadre legislative candidates. This step was taken to attract voters by taking advantage of the popularity and grassroots base of the recruited candidates. PKS not only considers popularity, but also the competence and capacity of the candidate as a candidate for the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, considering that the party's reputation as "clean, caring, and professional" is at stake.

1. Increasing Party Electability

The electability of PKS and its candidates is highly dependent on the political preferences of voters. The recruitment of non-cadre candidates is an important strategy in an effort to increase electability. PKS realizes that relying on internal cadres is not enough, especially in certain areas that require additional vote support. Therefore, the recruitment of non-cadre candidates is considered a strategic step to attract voter sympathy, even though PKS is known as a cadre party that has a strong cadre system.

In the 2009 legislative elections, PKS recruited non-cadre candidates by considering their potential to increase the party's electability. This is a bet for PKS, which has been known as a cadre party.

2. Recruiting Qualified Non-Cadre Candidates

PKS faces several challenges in expanding its voter base. First, a vote base that is too strong based on religion limits the reach of PKS, although the party seeks to expand its image with more general jargon. Second, PKS voters are more concentrated in urban areas than in rural areas, where the dominance of old parties such as Golkar and PDIP is still strong. Third, PKS has difficulty entering areas with minority Muslim populations, such as North Sulawesi and Papua, where PKS has

not managed to gain significant votes.

To overcome this problem, PKS is recruiting non-cadre candidates who have a strong vote base, including businessmen, labor leaders, NGOs, academics, and the farming and fishing communities. This recruitment is considered an innovative effort in PKS's political strategy, especially in areas that have not yet become their vote base.

A concrete example of this strategy is the recruitment of Abdul Aziz Suseno in Madura, which is expected to gain votes in the area. Abdul Aziz has a strong political network and is an influential figure in Madura. In addition, Kemal Aziz Stamboel was also recruited because of his adequate educational and financial background, as well as his competence in economics and banking.

PKS also recruited Arif Minardi, a labor leader in West Java, as part of a strategy to expand voter reach from the labor community. Arif is considered to be able to replace internal cadres who can no longer continue their duties, as well as represent the interests of workers in parliament.

With a legislative election system that uses open proportionality, PKS needs to accommodate qualified non-cadre candidates to compete effectively. This shows that PKS must adapt to the existing political dynamics to win the most votes.

In the 2009 elections, for example, PKS was only strong in a few regions. The following is a political map and PKS votes in the central House of Representatives as a result of the 2009 elections:

Table 1.7.

Names of Members of the House of Representatives and PKS Constituency 2009

	Area Election	Name of Board Member	Procurment Chair
	Nangro Aceh Darussalam	1. M. Nasir Djamil 2. Raihan Iskandar	2 Seats
	Sumatra: (West Sumatra, North Sumatra, and South Sumatra)	1. Tifat Sembiring (Sumbar 1) 2. Iskan Qolba Lubis (Sumut 2) 3. Ansory Siregar (Sumut 3) 4. Irvan Pryitno 5. Refrizal (Sumbar 2) 6. Mustafa Kamal (Sumsel 1) 7. Bukhori Yusuf (South Sumatra 2)	7 Seats
	Riau Islands	1. Chairul Anwar 2. Herlini Amran	2 Seats
	Bengkulu	1. Infatuation. Siahfan B. Complete	1 Seat

	Lampung	1. Al Muzzamil Yusuf 2. Abdul Hakim	
	Jakarta	1. Ahmad Zainuddin 2. Mohammad Shahibul Iman 3. Adang Daradjatun 4. Achmad Rilayyadi	4 Seats
	Banten	1. Zulkieflimansyah 2. Jazuli Juwaini 3. Indra SH (Paw) Yoh Yusra:	3 Seats
	West Java	1. Arif Minardi 2. Ledia Hanifa Amaliah 3. Ma'mur Hasanuddin 4. Ecky Awal Mucharam 5. Yudi Widiana Adia 6. Soemandjaja 7. Mahfudz Abdurrahman 8. Arifinto 9. Mahfudz Siddiq 10. Nurhasan Zaidi 11. Surahman Hidayat 12. Kemal Azis Stamboel	12 Seats

**Names of Members of the House of Representatives and PKS
Constituency 2009**

	Consti tuency	Name of Board Member	Seat Acqu isitio n
	Central Java	1. Zuber Safawi 2. Gamari 3. M. Martri Agoeng 4. Hidayat Nur Wahid 5. Sugiho's WorksSuwondo 6. Toss is an anarchist. 7. Ir. Suswono 8. Agoes Poernomo	8 Seats
	East Java	1. Sigit Susiantomo 2. Muhammad Misbakhoon 3. Lutfi Hasan Ishaq 4. Rofi' Munawar 5. Memed Sosiawan	6 Seats

		6. Abdul Azis Suseno	
	Kalimantan	1. Rahman Amin 2. Aboe Bakar al Habsy 3. Nabel Al Musawa 4. From Hidayat Nur KalTim	4 Seats
	Island Southeas t West	1. Fahri Hamza	1 Seat
	Sulawesi	1. Asmin Amin (Pub) Anis Matta 2. Tamsil Linrung 3. Andi Rahmat 4. Yan Herizal 5. Akbar Zulfaqar (Pub) Adhyax Dault	5 Seats

Source: Public Relations of the PKS Faction

The data above shows that the political power of PKS at the national level is only concentrated in the Java region, especially West Java, East Java, and Central Java. While outside Java, PKS's votes were less significant, only Sumatra and Kalimantan got a lot of votes. This data and vote acquisition at the central level was then used as the basis for changing the recruitment strategy of PKS into an open party. PKS wants to gain votes in all regions, especially in non-Muslim majority areas such as Papua and Bali as well as areas with minimal PKS votes such as in Madura.

3. The Birth of a New Generation of PKS

In this study, Zulkieflimansyah revealed that the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) has learned from the experience of previous elections, where the exclusivity of this party resulted in a lack of increased votes and alienated non-Muslim voters. This exclusivity also makes PKS easily slandered as an extremist party with a hidden agenda to implement Islamic law in Indonesia.

The first generation of PKS, which was considered less prepared to adapt to the wider society, had a "black-and-white" outlook. They often divide groups into conflicting categories, such as Islam versus infidelity, and truth versus falsehood. This approach is considered inappropriate by the younger generation of PKS, who are more progressive and strive to prioritize similarities and common ground with

various other groups. This young generation seeks to expand its support base by collaborating with groups that have different ideologies, as long as there are common interests.

The younger generation of PKS is also aware that an exclusive political approach does not gain public sympathy and is more likely to result in slander against Islamic parties. They try to keep up with the times by avoiding an approach that is too legalistic and formalistic, which is considered monotonous and prioritizes too many Islamic symbols. Alternatively, this new generation emphasizes substance and inclusivity, with the goal of creating an egalitarian and democratic Indonesia.

In the typology of Islamic political parties, the first generation of PKS can be categorized as a formalistic-fundamentalist party, which prioritizes Islam as a formal basis and program. On the contrary, the younger generation of PKS seeks to redefine Islamic political ideals with a more adaptive and compromising approach, including involving non-cadre legislative candidates. They focus more on issues relevant to society, such as poverty alleviation and job creation.

The stark difference between the first and second generations of PKS can be seen in the way they look at the issues. The first generation tends to be rigid and less open, using halal and haram standards, as well as black and white. Meanwhile, the second generation is more flexible and compromising, and emphasizes more substance than Islamic symbols in their political practice.

This research discusses the patterns and strategies used by the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in recruiting non-cadre legislative member candidates. There are two recruitment models that are commonly applied by PKS, namely individual recruitment and collective recruitment. SMEs tend to use these two models interchangeably, depending on the individual to be recruited.

In the context of recruiting non-cadre candidates, PKS emphasizes a personal approach. This strategy focuses on interpersonal relationships and does not highlight the attributes or interests of the party. The recruitment process is done informally, which allows for flexibility in approach. A clear example of this strategy can be seen in the recruitment of Abdul Aziz Suseno, where PKS uses simple and familiar methods, such as playing badminton and establishing friendships.

This informal approach, which is carried out on an ongoing basis, aims to build mutual respect and trust, especially in the context of increasing public distrust of political parties. In this case, party symbols are avoided to create a more intimate atmosphere.

A similar strategy was applied in the recruitment of Arif Minardi, where Edi Janur from the PKS DPP created a sense of comfort and built trust. The interactions that are established are egalitarian, emphasizing more on friendship than formal relationships. Edi Janur acts as a facilitator for Arif in supporting his interests as a labor activist, with a sincere and selfless approach.

Kemal Aziz Stamboel also went through a similar recruitment process. His closeness to Zulkieflimansyah and M. Sohibul Iman made his transition into PKS

easier. His experience in the banking and NGO sectors made him adapt quickly. Through regular discussions held by PKS, Kemal showed interest in joining as a candidate, with a personal approach applied.

This study emphasizes that in the context of increasing public distrust of political parties, conventional and structural recruitment methods are often counterproductive, especially for experienced figures. Therefore, a personal approach that creates good and mutually beneficial social relationships is the most effective strategy for PKS in recruiting non-cadre candidates.

recruitment criteria for non-cadre legislative candidates of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) with the aim of improving the party's image and ensuring the alignment of political attitudes with the ideology of PKS.

1. Improving the Party's Image

PKS, as a party with Islamic ideology, has a mission to improve the party's image through the recruitment of non-cadre legislative candidates. One of the main focuses is to create a clean, accountable, and transparent government, and to commit to the reform and social justice agenda. PKS prioritizes anti-corruption slogans and tries to maintain its reputation as a *da'wah* party that cares about the community. Because non-cadre candidates will represent the party's vote in parliament, PKS is very careful in choosing individuals who can improve the party's positive image.

PKS wants to eliminate the perception of exclusivity as a party that only recruits members with Islamic ideology. The presence of non-cadre candidates, such as Abdul Aziz Suseno and Kemal Aziz Sitomboel, shows that PKS is open to all groups who have a similar vision and mission.

2. Have a Political Stance in Accordance with PKS

PKS is committed to making Islam a solution in the life of the nation and state. In the recruitment process of non-cadre candidates, PKS emphasizes the importance of aligning attitudes and ideologies with party values. Many non-cadre candidates are interested in joining PKS because of the party's involvement in various social activities and responsiveness to community problems.

An example given is Abdul Aziz Suseno, who was interested in joining PKS because of the characteristics of young, educated, and caring cadres. PKS is also known to be active in humanitarian activities, which further strengthens the confidence of legislative candidates to participate in politics through PKS.

3. Quality of Non-Cadre Candidates

PKS does not only look for non-cadre candidates carelessly; Quality and integrity are the main considerations in the recruitment process. Non-cadre candidates such as Arif Minardi and Kemal Stamboel have a good leadership track record and are expected to improve the party's image. PKS believes that by recruiting quality

individuals, they can contribute significantly to saving the nation from various challenges.

Overall, this study shows that PKS strives to maintain a positive image as a clean and caring party, while remaining open to individuals who have a consistent vision and mission, without sacrificing quality and integrity.

PKS's policy in recruiting non-cadre candidates is a policy that does not reflect as a cadre party. So far, PKS is aware of the importance of recruitment for regeneration and opening up space for participation through political party channels. PKS has a good cadre regeneration system so that the ideological values instilled in each cadre are very strong and militant.

In addition, PKS also fosters its cadres with neat and systematic cadre levels with clear religious doctrines. This is what distinguishes it from other Islamic parties that are affiliated with the masses of Indonesian Islamic organizations and rely only on the popularity and strength of senior figures by denying a systematic cadre regeneration system. Meanwhile, PKS begins to cadre its members at a certain level, such as cadre through tarbiyah institutions and campus organizations.

From these characteristics, PKS is categorized as a modern party. There are four criteria for modern parties, including, First, minimizing referent power. It is undeniable that every party needs a figure or a knot. However, excessive dependence on figures can invite feudal culture and political dynastic systems. Second, a modern party is built through the ability of its members to carry out a process of reflectivity. The Party facilitates its members to be able to look to the future and make changes in the structure or system if it is predicted that certain things will not work. Reflectivity is the ability to determine the reasons for one's behavioral choices. Thus, the modern party is a party that is progressive in adapting to dynamic situations.

Third, modern parties are built through the stages of regeneration. The three stages run integratively, namely recruiting people to join the party forum, then fostering cadres to become loyalists and then distributing cadres into certain positions. Dynamic-pragmatic developments often hurt this stage of regeneration. The party is often the entrance for the emergence of non-cadre politicians on behalf of the party in the struggle for certain public positions. Fourth, modern parties must be willing and able to carry out party functions. Among these functions is to be a channel of political aggregation, conflict control and control. However, the party has an important position in stimulating and showing the direction of political interests that should be of public concern.

However, PKS in the 2009 Legislative Election began to recruit non-cadre candidates. In the end, PKS no longer upholds consistency as a cadre party that implements a political recruitment system. Policy of recruiting a number of names of legislative candidates

Non-cadres are proof that PKS recruitment can be negotiated by electoral interests. For example, for the sake of party electability, the experiment of becoming an open party and improving the party's image so that PKS takes a policy of non-cadre candidates, in this case PKS faces two challenges at once.

First, being an open party does not mean without problems. The openness of PKS may add support outside the captive market of PKS so far, but at the same time PKS must be ready to lose its traditional voters, fanatical voters, and core cadres who do not agree with the decision of openness. It is not an open secret that the choice becomes open, but it further strengthens the relationship between the "justice faction" and the "welfare faction" within PKS. In fact, the exit of Yusuf Supendi (one of the founders of PK) who summoned a number of PKS elites as an implication of disappointment due to PKS turning around its political khittoh. Yusuf Supendi assessed that PKS is no longer a da'wah party, but has been trapped in pragmatic political interests and the fading of the Islamic color of PKS.

For this reason, the shift of PKS to become an open party is a risky political *ijtihad*. With this change, the future of PKS is really at stake, whether the popularity and electoral level of PKS is increasing or on the contrary, PKS is abandoned by traditional voters who have contributed to the acquisition of PKS votes in every election. PKS can be threatened by an ideological base that wants the party to return to its original state without experiencing the slightest change.

Second, PKS recruiting non-cadre candidates shows inconsistency. PKS, which has been populist with parties that have consistently carried out a multi-tiered cadre regeneration process, and this political recruitment or cadre process also requires time, energy and high loyalty, but this non-cadre candidate recruitment policy can hurt cadres who have high loyalty. The internal solidity of the party could be threatened by this policy. So that it can bring out the potential of factions in the party body. On the other hand, this non-cadre recruitment policy will have an impact on instant culture and unhealthy shortcuts for future generations. PKS will not create superior and loyal cadres but rather prioritizes short-term electoral interests which are very pragmatic.

The logic of electoral competition that wants to target voters from various segments also relies on financial strength as an important factor to increase the party's electability. PKS cannot just rely on limited cadre contributions. As a result, there

have been several instances where some elites have become permissive in fundraising. The case of Adang Darajatun's "dowry" in the Jakarta Regional Election, which was accused by Yusuf Supendi, for example, shows that this party is considered no different from other parties that quote boat money for regional head candidates, even under the pretext of political costs. There are also accusations that the party is not selective in recruiting legislative candidates. Misbakhun or Adang Darajatun, for example, because he has a financial base, suddenly shot into the ranks of elite members of the House of Representatives from PKS. In the lexicon of political science, the behavior of PKS by recruiting legislative candidates and regional heads who have strong financial resources and a mass base refers to the pattern of survival. If the survival pattern by recruiting candidates for public officials who are not rooted in the tradition of PKS cadre regeneration continues, but is more based on financial factors, then the party will be aligned with its main support base.

Third, the recruitment policy of non-cadre candidates makes PKS no different from other parties. PKS, which has always had firm principles, turns out that its policies are very easy to negotiate by electoral interests, especially to increase the party's electability. PKS is a party that is more electorally oriented than a party that consistently maintains and prioritizes its cadres. As a result, there is no difference between PKS and other parties. The characteristics of modern parties have been reduced through pragmatic policies. So that the perception of PKS as a da'wah party is increasingly far from the party's ideals that should be applied in real terms. Recruiting non-cadre candidates because they intend to improve the party's image actually eliminates the culture of regeneration and adds to the indecisiveness of PKS in its attitude. PKS is still classified as a cadre party or a non-cadre party like other parties.

4. Conclusion

The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) has emerged as an important actor in post-reform Indonesian politics, especially after the fall of Suharto in 1998 which opened the door for new parties. PKS, which originated from the transformation of the Justice Party (PK), combines Islamic values with a modern approach to party management, making it unique among other Islamic parties. PKS has strong roots in the campus da'wah movement that developed in the 1980s, which provided a solid ideological foundation and structure (Damanik, 2002).

PKS places Islam not only as a religion, but also as a political guideline. Da'wah is the main mission of the party, which is realized through political activities to create an Islamic society. The cadre regeneration system implemented by PKS involves training and multi-level learning, preparing cadres to play a role in various levels of politics (Furkon, 2004). In its development, PKS is known as a party with a disciplined and professional organizational structure, with a focus on developing cadre competencies.

However, this ideological orientation poses challenges, especially in the context of

modern democracy. PKS faces a dilemma between maintaining the exclusivity of its ideology and adapting to more inclusive political dynamics. An important step in the party's journey was the recruitment of non-cadre legislative candidates in the 2009 Legislative Election, which showed a shift in strategy from a cadre party to a more open party.

PKS's success in increasing its electability from 1.4% in the 1999 election to 7.8% in the 2009 election reflects the party's attractiveness among the public. PKS managed to build a strong cadre base, increasing from 30 thousand members to more than 800 thousand active members in 2009. These solid cadres are the backbone in implementing programs at the grassroots level.

PKS's innovative strategy in attracting public attention involves the use of relevant social issues, creating an image as a clean and caring party. PKS often positions itself as an anti-researcher of the major parties involved in corruption cases, attracting the attention of young voters and the middle class who are saturated with transactional politics. PKS also shows good adaptability in reading national political dynamics by adjusting political rhetoric to be more inclusive.

However, the success of PKS has caused internal controversy and challenges. Criticism often centers on the alleged existence of a hidden agenda to formalize Islamic law in the state order. On the other hand, PKS also faces the challenge of maintaining ideological consistency amid pressure to be more pragmatic.

The transformation of PKS into a more inclusive party is reflected in the recruitment of non-cadre legislative candidates. This study explores the PKS strategy in recruiting non-cadre candidates, focusing on the cases of Abdul Aziz Suseno, Arif Minardi, and Kemal Aziz Stamboel. The methodology used is a qualitative approach with descriptive-analytical methods, including in-depth interviews and field observations to understand recruitment patterns.

The three cases of non-cadre candidates show that PKS is not only looking for popularity, but also considering the quality and integrity of candidates. Abdul Aziz, a contractor, was elected as a member of the Indonesian House of Representatives and contributed to various social issues. Arif Minardi, a labor activist, is known for his advocacy for workers' interests. Kemal Stamboel, with a background in the financial sector, seeks to bring a new perspective in public policy.

This study also analyzes the impact of non-cadre recruitment policies on party ideology. PKS seeks to maintain a balance between ideological principles and the need to remain relevant in an electoral political system. PKS's openness in recruiting non-cadre candidates reflects a change in the party's political paradigm, which was previously more exclusive.

This non-cadre recruitment policy shows that PKS is trying to expand its political support base in the midst of increasingly fierce competition. However, this step also has the potential to cause internal conflicts and threaten the solidity of cadres. This research provides insight into how PKS manages these changes and their impact on the party's relationship with its constituents.

Overall, this study reveals the complexity of implementing pragmatic policies in ideologically based parties. PKS, through its innovative recruitment strategy, has demonstrated its ability to adapt to modern political realities. However, the main challenge for PKS is how to maintain its ideological identity amid efforts to increase electability and expand support.

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