

Pseudo-Statolatry Among Salafi Wahhabi Groups Towards Law No. 52 of 2009 on Population Development and Family Planning: A Critical Study of the Debate on Birth Control as Limitation or Regulation

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Abstract

The Salafi group rejects the government's policy on family planning with various theological and political arguments, while on the other hand this group claims to be an obedient citizen to the government. This research article aims to answer how the model of the rights and obligations of Salafi groups as citizens after the attitude of rejection of family planning policies. The method used in the study is descriptive legal research with a legalism approach. This study answers that the Salafi group considers the family planning policy as an effort to "limit births" while what is meant is "child regulation". The policy on family planning also gained legitimacy from scholars, even from Salafi scholars. Because the family planning policy has gained theological and political legitimacy, the Salafi group is obliged to comply with the policy by implementing rewards and punishments.

Introduction

Rapid population growth and not accompanied by good regulations will have a negative impact on the quality of life of the community, such as an increase in the unemployment rate due to the lack of job availability, increasing poverty rates, and poor quality of health services (Suhandi et al., 2018; Windia, 2018), increasing maternal and child mortality during childbirth (Nurritzka & Saputra, 2013; Rahma et al., 2020) to the high rate of stunting (Karyati & Julia, 2021; Siswati, 2018).

The negative impact of the demographic bonus above, the Indonesian government has designed various strategies (Suantra et al., 2016), one of which is through the ratification of Law No. 52 of 2009 concerning Population Development and Family Development. The government continues to solve population problems by establishing the National Family Planning Coordinating Board (BKKBN) through the Family Planning (KB) program (Indraswari & Yuhan, 2017). Family planning is the result of government innovations that aim to regulate pregnancy and child birth spacing to create better welfare and life for families (Fatchiya et al., 2021; P. K. D. Putri et al., 2019), although sometimes these policies reap pros and cons (Harsyi & Tengah, 2021; Widiatmaka & Hakim, 2021).

The pros and cons of implementing the family planning program come from the Salafi group. According to the results of Syafi'i's research on Salafi groups in Yogyakarta in 2017, there are two categories of Salafi, namely, Conservative Salafi and Moderate Salafi. Conservative Salafi groups reject the birth control policy, because it is not based on the postulates in the Qur'an and hadith. Meanwhile, moderate Salafi allow family planning to limit the number of births with emergency provisions. Although there are differences of view, basically these two Salafi groups both disagree if family planning becomes the standard measure of welfare for families (Syafi'i, 2017).

In addition to Syafi'i, Saratri also said that Salafi groups in Central Java openly rejected the family planning policy as an effort to limit the number of births. Salafi groups support the pronatalist movement (increasing the number of descendants) as a form of rejection of family planning which is actively socialized through Salafi media (Iffah Muzammil, 2013). Wilonoyudho through the results of his research recommends a strategy to reduce the tension of Salafi group rejection of family planning through the active and participatory involvement of Salafi groups in family planning activities (Wilonoyudho et al., 2020), although according to the author, this strategy is not strong enough, because from the beginning the Salafi group has expressed its rejection of family planning policies and related activities, except through an empowerment program approach that is not on behalf of family planning (Malik, 2023b).

Salafi rejected with political and theological arguments for family planning policy, then that reason triggered the stagnation of the implementation of the family planning program in Indonesia. The political reason is that family planning is considered a Jewish strategy that uses the Indonesian government to weaken Islam through population reduction, while the theological reason is because in the Qur'an and hadith there is no evidence that legitimizes the family planning policy (Haris, 2019; Syafi'i, 2017). To prove it, a separate study is needed. The impact of stagnation in the implementation of family planning policies then almost every year there is an increase in the population (Fitrianita, 2019; Khotijah & Madkur, 2018; Syafi'i, 2017). For example, in 2023 the population of Indonesia will reach 278 people, in 2022 the population will be 275.77, in 2021 the population will be 272.68, in 2020 the population will be 270.20. Thus, since

the period 2018-2023, there has been an increase of 7.8 people (Aas Tejasmar, 2023).

According to data on population growth in Indonesia that continues to increase from year to year, there is a contribution of Salafi groups in it (Wilonoyudho et al., 2020) which is evidenced by the attitude of supporting the pronatist movement (multiplication of offspring through early marriage and polygamy) (MUHTARAM, 2023). In addition, the number of Salafi-affiliated educational institutions in Indonesia continues to grow, even until 2024 Salafi-affiliated educational institutions will number 965 (Yayasan IT Support Da'wah, 2024).

The Salafi attitude that is not subject to the provisions of Law No. 52 of 2009 *relates* to the Salafi statement "the government is the same as *thogut*." This statement arose because Salafi was faced by the government when fighting for Islamic Sharia as the legal basis in Indonesia (Malik, 2023b). In line with Abdul Malik's opinion, Krismono then divided the Salafi group into three: **first**, Salafi Jihadists, namely Salafi who are dissatisfied with using a religious doctrine approach to solve every problem of the Muslim ummah. **Second**, rejectionist Salafi are groups with pragmatic and dynamic characters that focus on the "purification" movement of Islamic teachings using an educational and da'wah approach. **Third**, reformist Salafists, namely Salafists who combine the study of traditional Wahhabi views on social theological issues and the Muslim Brotherhood in current political issues (Krismono, 2017; Malik, 2023b).

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Salafis are trying to fight for an increase in the Muslim population as contained in Islamic teachings, so they reject family planning, (Ariyeni, 2019; MUHTARAM, 2023; Wilonoyudho et al., 2020), but the increase in the population of the Salafi group has a negative impact on the relationship of rights and obligations as citizens. The state establishes various policies that always refer to the realization of common interests, including family planning policies which basically aim to regulate the population of Indonesia (Karyati & Julia, 2021; Suhandi et al., 2018; Tiffani et al., 2020). The rejection of the Salafi group against the family planning policy also has an impact on the increase in new groups that oppose government policies (Muliono, 2015), including the Salafi group whose population continues to grow (MUHTARAM, 2023; Wilonoyudho et al., 2020; Yayasan IT Support Da'wah, 2024).

The phenomenon of Salafi group's rejection of family planning policies is in contrast to the Salafi ideological doctrine that states a loyal attitude towards the government, (Muliono, 2015). The Salafi attitude which on the one hand deifies the state/government by obeying every state policy is called the term statolatry (Munif, 2018), but the attitude of Salafi group obedience to the government is not fully implemented because Salafi rejects the policy of family planning. Based on this argument, the author then called Salafi a pseudo-statolatry (obedience to a pretended state/government).

This study is interesting to analyze in depth using the perspective of legalism, especially about "what are the rights and obligations of Salafi as citizens and Salafi's rejection of Law No. 52 of 2009?". The basic assumption of the legalism school is that law functions as social control, because humans tend to attach importance to their own interests, if left unchecked, there will be conflicts of interest (Ma et al., 2015). Morality and conscience are not able to defeat evil desires in humans, so humans must be controlled by the rule of law implemented by a strong ruler (Moon, 2013).

If this group continues to be allowed to reject family planning, it will harm other Indonesian people, moreover, this reason only justifies certain arguments and ideological interests, therefore the government as the organizer of power must control Salafi groups using the law through *reward and punishment*, but the government needs to consider that Salafi groups are groups that identify themselves as groups that obey the government, Therefore, this study is interesting to conduct, especially to answer: what is the model of the rights and obligations of the Salafi group after the rejection of Law No. 52 on the regulation of population development and family development ?

Methodology

The type of research used in this research article is normative legal research, which makes the 1945 Constitution and Law No. 52 of 2009 concerning the regulation of population development and family development as the basis for constructing the norm system (Purwati, 2020). Legal norms are used to see the

phenomenon of Salafi who declare themselves as citizens who obey the government based on ideological doctrines, but on the other hand reject the provisions of Law No. 52 of 2009 (Arif & Fatimah, 2016; Khamid, 2016). The phenomenon of obedience and disobedience to the government is obtained through observations, website documentation, study videos and research articles, then matters that require confirmation of the parties related to the object of study are taken through interviews. This research article uses a legislative and legalism approach to examine the relationship between various interpenetrations of Salafi rights and obligations as citizens (Sabian Uthman, 2014).

Result and Discussion

Salafi Attitude Towards Law No. 52 of 2009 concerning the Regulation of Population Development and Family Development.

Wahhabi Salafi in Indonesia is an Islamic group that is synonymous with harsh religious practices in carrying out the purification movement against Islamic teachings, as well as the thinking of the figure who pioneered the beginning of this group's movement, namely Ibn Taymiyah. Such Salafi attitudes often give birth to conflicts in society because their views are contrary to cultural values, modernism that is developing today, one of which is the attitude of Salafi rejection of family planning policies (Unggul Purnomo Aji & Kerwanto, 2023).

The theological argument for Salaf's rejection of Law No. 52 of 2009 is because it contradicts the Qur'an, namely Surah al-Isra verse 31

It means: "*And do not kill your children for fear of poverty, we will give you sustenance and to them.*"

Based on the postulates of the Qur'an above, Law No. 52 of 2009 is contrary to the teachings of Islam, then it is also considered to violate the nature of human beings as creatures created by God who have been guaranteed sustenance, therefore the fear of falling into poverty due to the birth of a child, so at that time humans have denied the presence of Allah as a sustenance giver (Al-Fauzi, 2017; Syafi'i, 2017).

Salafi Views on the Concept of Family

The family is the smallest unit in the social structure consisting of father, mother and child (Herawati et al., 2020). In Salafi family life this concept of family also applies, but there are significant differences, especially regarding the duties of a father, mother and child. The duties of fathers in Salafi families are very centralistic, especially those related to the indoctrination of ideology to family members, so that the obligation to obey the father is not just out of fear but is a form of obedience to the teachings of ideology (Malik, 2023a). The duties of

mothers/wives in Salafi families tend to focus on household affairs, although this is often considered an act of domestication of the role of wives by women and other communities, but for Salafi this is an order of Islamic teachings so that women are more active in the house and not just the command of the husband. Mothers and other Salafi women are allowed to do activities outside the home with a note accompanied by *their mahram* to avoid actions that violate Islamic law (Khotijah & Madkur, 2018).

Children in Salafi families have no right to make choices and are entirely determined by the father. In Salafi families, the direction of children's education is directed to the interests of the hereafter, so since the family environment a solid educational fortress has been built so that it is not easily influenced by the environment, and if it is solid, Salafi families will send their children to educational institutions that have ideological similarities (Khotijah & Madkur, 2018; Malik, 2023a). Thus, the concept of family according to Salafi is understood as an activity oriented towards the enforcement of Islamic sharia (Daha, 2019).

Salafi Views on Family Planning (KB)

There are three reasons why Salafis reject the family planning policy, namely: *First*, limiting the number of children. Family planning, according to the Salafi group, is synonymous with limiting the number of children, while according to the government, family planning opens up opportunities to improve the quality of family welfare (Tiffani et al., 2020). This rejection includes two views at once, namely the view of family planning based on the dictates of religious teachings and the view of family planning as a state policy that must be obeyed by all people.

According to Islamic teachings, the family planning policy is contrary to the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad.

Meaning: *I am the man with the most followers on the Day of Resurrection and I am the one who first knocks on the door of Heaven.*

Based on the above hadith, Salafi is proud to have many children because the Prophet Muhammad is happy with the large number of ummah, therefore

Salafi wants to contribute to affirming that Islam is a great religion (Rohim, 2017). This opinion proves that Salafi rejects family planning based on the postulates of menstruation above, then rejects the government's argument about the importance of family planning for the common good (MUHTARAM, 2023).

From a policy perspective, Salafi considers the family planning policy to be inappropriate and has not been tested for correctness. The government's concern about the population explosion which has an impact on the reduced availability of natural resources to meet the needs of the community so that it

must be controlled through family planning is too excessive (Tiffani et al., 2020). China as the country with the largest population in the world is still meeting its needs, even the Bedouin Arabs who live in the barren desert also continue to live prosperously (MUHTARAM, 2023), therefore the Salafi group considers the implementation of family planning policies inappropriate.

The increasing number of maternal and child deaths during childbirth and must be controlled through birth control is also not right according to Salafi, because according to them, the more often a mother gives birth, the healthier it will be because the discharge of *puerperal blood* is the most perfect process of cleansing the body and can only be experienced by mothers who give birth. If there is a case of the death of the mother during childbirth according to Islamic teachings, it is included in the category *of martyrdom*, as well as people who die in the field of *jihad fi sabillillah* which is worth worship (Shafi'i, 2017). Thus, the government's assumption about the urgency of family planning is considered too excessive and cannot be proven.

Second, early marriage. According to the government, one of the triggers for the population explosion is early marriage, therefore the government issued a policy to mature the age of marriage, the age of 20 years for brides and 25 years for grooms (Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 16 of 2019 concerning Amendments to Law No. 1 of 1974 concerning Marriage, 2019). The purpose of maturing marriage is to prevent cases of divorce, poverty, death of mothers and children during childbirth due to unprepared uterine conditions to cases of babies born in abnormal / deformed conditions. This policy is denied by Salafi groups because early marriage is able to prevent adultery between men and women (Rohim, 2017).

Third, polygamy. Polygamy is one of the themes that quite often triggers debate in society, especially related to a fair attitude towards married wives. The link between polygamy and the implementation of family planning is because polygamy increases the number of Indonesians through marriage. Salafi argues that one way to increase the population of Muslims can be through polygamy, as mentioned in Islamic teachings (Jaelani, 2023). Polygamy is an encouragement for Salafi members to increase the population of Muslims, but what the Salafists do has been contrary to the policy of family planning (Shafi'i, 2017; Tarwiyah, 2017).

Salafi firmness in upholding the principle of purifying Islamic teachings and rejecting various government policies on family planning, maturation of marriage age and polygamy is considered contrary to Islamic teachings (Jaelani, 2023), if the right solution is not found, then Salafi groups tend to continue to

carry out actions of rejection of the implementation of family planning such as: **First**, supporting Pronatalism and disagreeing with birth restrictions, **Second**, conducting an active campaign on the rejection of the implementation of family planning policies through various mass media belonging to Salafi groups (Al-Fauzi, 2017; Tiffani et al., 2020).

Pseudo-Salafi Stations

Statolateri comes from two words, namely *state* and *idolatry* which refers to an attitude that makes the state the source of reference for everything (state centrism). This term was first introduced by Giovanni Gentile which was later developed by Gramsci in the context of power relations that gave birth to a very strong hegemonic effect on the people by the state (Munif, 2018; Robinson, 2004). According to Gramsci, the statolateri is related to a situation where the people's sense of dependence on the state is so strong due to the influence of profound power, that it not only reaches the realm of people's obedience and obedience, but is able to create cultural leadership that includes culture, art, science and others. Through this path of hegemony of power, the state builds an intimate relationship with the people (Bates, 2010).

In the context of the discussion of this article, the term statolateri is associated with the oath of allegiance, obedience, and obedience of the Salafi group to the state based on the ideological doctrine that is believed, even when the leader in power behaves unjustly, the Salafi group is obliged to obey (Haris, 2019; Krismono, 2017; Muhammaddin, 2013; Muliono, 2015).

The Salafi group's pledge of allegiance to the state is an order of their high imam (Fatmawatun, 2019; Luluk Husnawati, 2015; Unggul Purnomo Aji & Kerwanto, 2023), but the attitudes and behaviors of Salafi groups in Indonesia contradict their doctrines. The disobedience of Salafi groups to the state and government in Indonesia is evidenced by their rejection of the implementation of family planning policies, even rejection not only in the form of arguments but actively participatory campaigning against family planning, rejecting birth control and supporting pronatalism (multiplying offspring), supporting early marriage, and supporting polygamy (Dewantara, 2019; Hakim, 2014; Haris, 2019; Malik, 2023b; Muliono, 2015; Wilonoyudho et al., 2020).

The author would like to say that the attitude of the Salafis when viewed based on the doctrine of their teachings should obey the provisions of the policy imposed on behalf of the state, but what happened on the contrary they rebelled. Such an attitude is then called pseudo-statolateri (loyalty, obedience, pseudo-obedience of the Salafi group to the state).

Pseudo-Salafi State: The Perspective of Law No. 52 of 2009, the 1945 Constitution, and Pancasila.

Salafi is a transnational group that adapts to local culture (Robinson, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2001) then became a new color in the plurality of the Indonesian nation (Ihsan, 2014; Maksum, 2016). After the process of adapting to local culture to become part of the Indonesian people, Salafi should be subject to state regulations, such as guiding the values of Pancasila, understanding the value of Bhineka Tunggal Ika, complying with the 1945 Constitution (Najamudin, 2023), including obeying Law No. 52 of 2009 concerning Population Development and Family Development.

Good citizen behavior should be reflected in every Salafi attitude, because this group has a strong commitment to implementing obedience to the state (Haris, 2019; Krismono, 2017; Malik, 2023b), because of ideological doctrines that require obedience to leaders, even to tyrannical leaders (Luluk Husnawati, 2015; Maksum, 2016; Muliono, 2015), as contained in the book *al-aqidah al-wasithiyyah belonging to Ibn Taymiyah* and *al-Ushul-tsalatsah by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab* (Pratama, 2021; SEFRIYANTI & ARIF, 2022; Tarwiyah, 2017).

The facts that occur are different from the conditions that should be, precisely the attitude of pseudo-statolatry (Haris, 2019; Muliono, 2015), against Law No. 52 of 2009 contradicts the practices of good citizen behavior. Such an attitude, if it continues to be taught to the next generation of Salafis, will give birth to more and more future generations who will reject government policies, especially against Law No. 52 of 2009, and it is even possible that lawsuits and rejections will encroach on other issues such as the form of the state and the offer of Islamic shari'a as an alternative to state law (Hamdi et al., 2021; Haris, 2019; Muhammaddin, 2013; Saparudin & Emawati, 2023).

According to data from the Directory of Sunnah Schools throughout Indonesia in 2024 (Yayasan IT Support Da'wah, 2024), the number of Salafi-affiliated educational institutions can be described through the following table:

Table. Number of Educational Institutions Affiliated with Salafi Groups in Indonesia

No	Level of Education	Godh
1	Daycare	12
2	Early Childhood Education	29
3	Kindergarten	107

4	Madrasah Ibtidaiyah	36
5	Primary school	202
6	Madrasah Tsanawiyah	60
7	Junior High School	207
8	Madrasah Aliyah	28
9	High School	95
10	Vocational High School	5
11	Islamic Boarding School	130
12	Course Institutions	27
13	College	27
Overall Total		965

Based on the fantastic number of Salafi schools, it can be imagined how the activities and intensity of Salafi ideological indoctrination to thousands of young Indonesians will be. Salafi which is synonymous with its rejection of family planning has produced thousands and even millions of cadres of ideological successors through the media and educational institutions that have been formed. Therefore, the state must be present to carry out control and prevention by questioning the commitment of Salafi obedience to the Indonesian government (Haris, 2019; Krismono, 2017; Madali, 2020), including Salafi intolerant actions against other Islamic groups in Indonesia, triggering conflicts either in the name of ideology or individuals often adorn the front pages of news in the mass media, such as the Salafi conflict in Lombok in 2022 (Fitriani, 2016) (Deni Hardiawan Putra, 2018; Fitriani, 2016; NNTB.COM, 2022).

In order to anticipate various potential Salafi threats, it must be encouraged to immediately enforce Law No. 52 of 2009, because on the one hand Salafis establish closeness with the government through the image of a group that obeys *Ulil Amri* as stated in their doctrine (Haris, 2019; Muhammaddin, 2013), but on the other hand, the behavior of Salafi social life is often the opposite, as evidenced by their rejection of family planning programs, intolerant attitudes towards Islamic groups that are different from them (Deni Hardiawan Putra, 2018; NNTB.COM, 2022; Tarwiyah, 2017).

In addition to the enforcement of Law No. 52 of 2009, efforts that can be made are to encourage socialization and socialization of the essence of diversity as a national identity (nationalism). The essence of Indonesia's national identity is Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and the motto *Bhineka Tunggal Ika* which are internalized in the ideology of any group that grows and develops in

Indonesia, including Salafi (Alfaqi, 2015; Dewantara, 2019; Hakim, 2014; Latif, 2020; Najamudin, 2023; Prastyo, 2013; L. O. Putri & Dewi, 2021). Such efforts are a reactualization of the enforcement of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (BAPPENAS RI, 1945).

The responsibility for the creation of history, peace, order and security for the community is the responsibility of all components of society, both state administrators and society in general. Disobedience to the law, anarchy, conflict is a product produced by society itself, because every group, including Salafis and their ideology at the social level, is often inseparable from the revolutionary movement, because in the public sphere, the social arena is a field of ideological contestation, including Salafi. Established ideologies seek to maintain power, while counter-ideologies such as Salafis seek to seize power. This is what often happens so that the presence of groups such as Salafi and their ideology is often coupled with revolutionary movements (Aziz, 2020; Murdi & Shulhan Hadi, 2018; Saparudin, 2017).

In the context of Salafi in Indonesia and other Islamic groups each trying to create Indonesia according to their version, so that there is a contest between Salafi groups and other Islamic groups, it is even possible that the contestation is also in order to take over state power (Ihsan, 2014; Krismono, 2017; Muliono, 2015).

The mechanism that must be carried out by the state to discipline Salafi groups uses the *Ideological State Apparatus* and *Repressive Apparatus approaches*. The function of *the Ideological State Apparatus* is to carry out *Consensual Control* so that individuals voluntarily accept the ideology of the dominant group in order to form their attachment to the state. *The Ideological State Apparatus* works by manipulating the public to form an awareness that is in accordance with the goals of the state through cultural and educational channels. The way the *Ideological State Apparatus works* slowly leads the public to agree and be ready to carry out the ideology by means of *religion, education, family, communication, political, cultural*. If the first strategy is successful, the process of planting ideology is successful, but if it is not successful, it must be included in the next strategy, namely *the Repressive Apparatus* (RSA).

The Repressive Apparatus works in a *Coersive Control manner* by utilizing direct and coercive forces, such as the police, the army, the courts, the bureaucracy and the law. For Salafi groups who are not obedient and obedient to Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution and Bhineka Tunggal Ika can be forced to use the strategy of *the Ideological State Apparatus* (Hutagalung Daniel, 2004; Rehmann, 2007).

Model of the Implementation of Law No. 52 of 2009 for Salafi Groups Perspectives on Legalism.

Legalism is a legal study developed by assuming that human nature has an evil disposition since it was purified and has a tendency to fulfill its own pleasure and profit (Ma et al., 2015; Moon, 2013). Legalism assumes that if human beings are allowed to follow the desires of self-interest, the instinct to conquer and rule will have a devastating impact on humans, the universe, and the agreements in a country, because human beings in the context of individuals and groups fight for their own standards of happiness, then do not hesitate to destroy anything that stands in the way of the goal.

The school of legalism considers that the morality that exists in humans, which should be the controller of actions and at the same time the differentiator between sensible human behavior and animals, has not been fully able to become a reins that control human actions (Eggert, 2022; Green, 2023; Luthan, 2012), so that a life was born that was dominated by the desire to have fun and gain benefits individually and in groups. The question is: does the Salafi group not know that if the population is not properly regulated and controlled, it will have an impact on the reduced availability of natural resources? Does the Salafi group not know that the increasing population will affect the availability of jobs? Do Salafis not know that fewer jobs will create unemployment and contribute to the increase in crime rates? Do the Salafi groups not know if the maternal and child mortality rate increases due to the birth distance that is too close and the growth of the child is not optimal due to too many children? Do the Salafi groups know that if the birth distance of a child is too close, it will have an impact on women's reproductive health? (Fatchiya et al., 2021; Fitrianita, 2019; MUHTARAM, 2023; Syafi'i, 2017), and Do Salafi groups not know that their attitude is detrimental to other groups and the Indonesian people in general?

The author believes that Salafi and other groups are aware of these negative impacts, but their knowledge and consciousness are defeated by ideology, the ego of the group in order to maintain the status quo. The government as the administrator of state power can use the law to coerce with the argument that every citizen has given up the rights of individuals and groups to be regulated by the state through a political contract between the people and the state, then the state gives a return in the form of creating welfare, order, and peace for each of its citizens (Nur Wahyudi, 2022).

The state behavior practiced by the Salafi group is an example of state behavior that prioritizes personal interests, group ideology and overrides the interests of other communities, because the negative effects of the attitude of non-compliance based on the results of several previous studies will have an impact on other Indonesian people, such as poverty, population density, health, unemployment to the increase in maternal and child mortality during childbirth (Karyati & Julia, 2021; Suhandi et al., 2018), although the results of the study need to be followed up again to find out how much the Salafi group contributes to the increase in poverty and unemployment in Indonesia.

According to the perspective of legalism, one of the things that can be tried to unravel these various problems is through law enforcement by strong leaders who have skills in managing the government, because only through law enforcement is able to control human desires (Badri, 2016; Krismono, 2017; Madali, 2020). Poor law enforcement in a country by allowing each group to fight for its ideology will give birth to a new polarization that will be a threat to the ideology of the state that has been agreed upon by all members of the nation, so the law must be obeyed and even imposed on every individual and group that is part of a state, because the common goal in a state can be achieved using laws controlled by strong rulers. Laws that are not controlled by strong rulers give birth to a fragile social order (Guanabara et al., 2014; Nur Wahyudi, 2022; Purnamasari, 2017; Puspitarini, 1967). The law and a strong government are a series that cannot be separated, because a strong ruler is needed to regulate the different interests of each people so that there is no collision between each other.

The author argues that people are born in a selfish state, fighting for personal interests, groups and group ideologies, then morality cannot be used as a foothold for humans to behave as good citizens in carrying out their duties and obligations (Harun Yahya, 2002; Latif, 2011; Saepullah, 2020; Sumadi, 2016), then a law is needed to regulate, namely a law controlled by a strong ruler, because if the weak ruler is the controller, a good law will have no impact on the common good (Farida, 2022; Pranoto, 2020; Suantra et al., 2016), as well as the implementation of Law No. 52 of 2009 concerning Population Development and Family Development which is still not fully accepted by the Indonesian people (MUHTARAM, 2023; Syafi'i, 2017).

Humans cannot be relied on to do good by themselves, it is necessary to develop a legalistic way of thinking. The implementation of the legalist way of thinking aims to achieve stability, order and happiness in the ideals of the nation and state successfully realized in one forum of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. To realize this goal, a way of thinking about legalism is needed

through the strict application of the law by strong rulers, then accompanied by the application of *reward and punishment* (people who obey the law are given rewards and people who do not obey receive punishment) (Ma et al., 2015; Moon, 2013).

To apply *reward and punishment* in law enforcement to run effectively and efficiently, at least three elements of legalism must exist, namely: *first*, the authority of the leader (a strong ruler who has authority, is obeyed, respected, feared, authoritative, charismatic, who has power) (Chaidar, 2017). If the government is not respected, has no authority, is not considered to have authority, then the law has no power. Thus authority occupies a very important position in the law enforcement process, because only power makes humans obey. *The second* (the art of governing or the ability to organize society). In order for one law enforcement process to run effectively and efficiently, what is needed is not only authority, but also other skills are also needed such as skills in managing government, being smart in managing government, having strategies to manage government.

A leader is required to have authority and governance skills, because if the ruler who has authority but does not have the skills in implementing legal strategies will result in poor law enforcement. *The third law* (*reward and punishment*), a law that contains rewards and punishments, retribution and punishment. People who obey the law get rewards, and people who break the law should get punishment. If this concept is not able to be implemented properly, the state remains weak.

Legalism wants the law to run well through implementation by leaders who have authority, have the skills to lead and apply *rewards* for those who are disciplined in implementing it and *punishment* for those who are not disciplined in implementing it. The implications of the concept of legalism that focuses on law enforcement are:

First, the education system and family system are completely controlled by the state. If there is an ideology that has the potential to change the ideology of the state, the law and the form of the state, it must be destroyed. If there are figures who have the potential to damage ideology, law and state form, they must be punished, because they have an impact on the weakening of state power, if there are citizens who behave in contradiction to the provisions of the law, they must be sanctioned in accordance with the applicable provisions. Everyone must think according to the ideology of the state, and prohibit various new ideologies that are not in line with the ideology of the state.

Second, prioritizing law enforcement over personal interests, family interests, and the interests of group ideology. Thus, among the duties of family members, group members are to hand over family members or groups that violate the law to the government. Legalism considers that human beings must be for the state, that is, human beings must submit to the state, their freedom is completely handed over to the state, because in return the state will provide welfare to the people. This is the logic of the way of thinking of legalism, namely a government that focuses on law (Badri, 2016; Ma et al., 2015; Prastyo, 2013; UL AKMAL, 2021).

Conclusion

Salafi's rejection of the policy of Law No. 52 of 2009 violates the rights and obligations as citizens stated in the 1945 Constitution, violates the values of Pancasila and violates the doctrine of Salafi teachings about the obligation to obey the rulers. The Salafi group misunderstands Law No. 52 of 2009 which is considered the same as "*birth control*" which tends to have a negative connotation, while Law No. 52 of 2009 uses the term "*ancestry arrangement*" which has a positive connotation. The provisions of Law No. 52 of 2009 concerning the regulation of pregnancy distance, birth distance and other provisions are allowed according to Islamic teachings. Thus, if there is a group that rejects the provisions of Law No. 52 of 2009, the state will revoke their rights and obligations as citizens and replace them with punitive sanctions because they have the potential to trigger conflicts, then for obedient and obedient people must be protected their rights and obligations, even given gifts.

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