

Reassessing the Reserve Component: A Critical Review of Indonesia's Law on the Management of National Resources for State Defense

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Article Info

Accepted: 2024-03-20

Revised: 2024-07-09

Accepted: 2024-12-30

Keywords: The Law Management of National Resources for National Defense (PSDN), Reserve Component, National Defense System, Military.

Abstract

This paper examines the legal and conceptual issues surrounding Law No. 23/2019 on the Management of National Resources for National Defense (PSDN), with a particular focus on the management of the Reserve Component. It argues that the PSDN Law contradicts several constitutional principles and established legal norms in Indonesia. The analysis highlights four key areas of concern:

(1) the excessively broad role assigned to the Reserve Component in addressing hybrid threats, which risks blurring the boundaries between military and civilian functions; (2)

Article 75's provision allowing the use of regional government budgets to fund reserve

components, which undermines the constitutional principle of centralized military financing; (3) the divergence of Indonesia's Reserve Component policy from international trends that increasingly emphasize defense diplomacy, professionalism of security actors, and voluntary service; and (4) the problematic expansion of the Reserve Component's role within the national security architecture. The paper concludes that a reorientation of defense priorities is necessary, to the one that focuses on the modernization of Indonesia's primary weapons systems and the welfare of its professional military personnel, while ensuring that the Reserve Component operates within a clear, constitutional, and accountable framework

1. Introduction

Any discussion of the Reserve Component in national Defense certainly cannot be separated from its relationship with the Principal Component—namely, the military.¹ This is because, by design, the Reserve Component is intended to support active-duty military personnel when needed, particularly in addressing military threats such as war. Therefore, prior to examining the Reserve Component in depth, it is essential to first understand the role and transformation of the military itself, as well as the broader framework of military reform in Indonesia.

The term “military” generally refers to institutions and activities related to the armed forces and the conduct of warfare. Within the framework of the state, the military serves as a coercive institution tasked with defending national sovereignty and engage in warfare.² Thus, the fundamental purpose of the military within a state is to protect national security from external threats, particularly war. Morgenthau describes the military as the *ultima ratio* of state power, the final instrument upon which a state relies. The military exists to confront external threats and serves as a coercive tool for safeguarding national interests abroad. This interpretation has evolved into what is known as the military’s functional imperative, a foundational understanding of the role of the armed forces and the unique character of military institutions.³

According to Samuel Huntington (1993), the *raison d’être* of the military is to fight and defeat enemies in war. Samuel Huntington, *New Contingencies, Old Roles*, Joint Forces Quarterly (Washington, D.C., 1993). For this reason, the military should be recruited, educated, trained, and equipped for the purpose of confronting potential military threats from other states. Across the world, this role of the military—to prepare for and engage in warfare against external threats—has remained a consistent and widely accepted norm.⁴

Given its function, and mandate to confront the threat of war, every country in the world prepares a strong and modern military capacity and capability. This is

¹ Arief Fahmi Lubis, “Implementasi Undang-Undang Nomor 3 Tahun 2002 Tentang Pertahanan Negara Dalam

Menghadapi Gangguan Militer,” *Jurnal Begawan Hukum (JBH)* 2, no. 1 (2024): p. 313 , <http://www.sekolahpendidikan.com/2017/03/sistem-pertahanan-dan-keamanan-negara.html#>.

² Bryan A Garner, *Black Law Dictionary* 7th Edition (West Group, 1999).

³ Timothy Edmunds, “What Are Armed Forces For? The Changing Nature of Military Roles in Europe, *International Affairs*,” *International Affairs* 82, no. 6 (2006): 1059-1060.

⁴ KA Putri and I Triadi, “Peran Militer Sebagai Pelindung Rakyat Indonesia Pada Saat Negara Dalam Keadaan Darurat Ditinjau Dari Perspektif Militer (Berdasarkan Kejadian Gerakan Aceh Merdeka),” *Madani: Jurnal Ilmiah Multidisiplin* 1, no. 10 (2023): p. 467, <https://jurnal.penerbitdaarulhuda.my.id/index.php/MAJIM/article/view/1079%0Ahttps://jurnal.penerbitdaarulhuda.my.id/index.php/MAJIM/article/download/1079/1140>.

typically achieved through consistent training and the development of advanced weapons systems, particularly during peacetime, when militaries are prepared and maintained in a state of readiness through professionalization efforts. This military's core function—to prepare for and engage in war—was widely regarded as the natural and dominant role of armed forces, particularly up until the Cold War era. The dynamics of the Cold War, marked by an intense arms race, has encouraged militaries in many countries to anticipate the possibility of inter-state or inter-alliance conflict.⁵

Countries have competed to strengthen their armed forces with the aim of creating a deterrent effect against their adversaries. As a result, the role of the military during this period was firmly focused on addressing external threats.⁶ The end of the Cold War, however, is widely seen as a turning point that reshaped global understandings of threat, the military, and security. Barry Buzan argues that the post-Cold War period marked a shift away from the dominance of politico-military security issues that had prevailed for over four decades.⁷ Changes in the international strategic environment have led many countries to revise their Defense reviews, reassessing how they interpreted and responded to emerging security challenges. Rather than focusing solely on how to win wars, many states began to prioritize how to preserve global peace.⁸

Benjamin Miller identifies several key expansions in the conceptualization of threats, the military, and security in the post-Cold War era. *First* is the origin of threats. Once dominated by inter-state rivalry, now it has broadened to include domestic challenges, particularly those arising between the state and its own citizens. *Second*, the nature of threats has expanded beyond conventional military capabilities to encompass economic instability, immigration, political unrest, disease, and environmental degradation. *Third*, responses to threats are no longer confined to military alliances but now include democratization efforts and global market mechanisms. *Fourth*, the responsibility for providing security has shifted from being the sole domain of the state to also involving international institutions and multilateral interventions. *Lastly*, the core values underpinning security have

⁵ Maimunah Sambas et al., "The Impact of the Arms Race on the Economic Growth of the United States and Russia," *International Journal of Humanities Education and Social Sciences (IJHESS)* 3, no. 6 (2024): pp. 2947.

⁶ Albrecht Schnabel and Marc Krupanski, "Evolving Internal Roles of the Armed Forces: Lessons for Building Partner Capacity," *PRISM* 4, no. 4 (2014): 120-121. Military roles beyond warfare, such as nation-building efforts, have indeed taken place. However, these were not considered significant due to the overwhelming external threats during the Cold War era.

⁷ Barry Buzan, "Rethinking Security after the Cold War" (*Cooperation and Conflict* 32, no. 1, 1997), pp. 6-9.

⁸ James R. Ayers, "Military Operations Other Than War in the New World Order: An Analysis of Joint Doctrine for the Coming Era, Graduate Research Paper in Air Force Institute of Technology," *Ohio: Wright-Patterson Air Force Base* (1996): 10. It is important to understand that the concept of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) is an evolution of the definition of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) in U.S. military doctrine, which was first introduced during the Ronald Reagan administration. LIC itself is defined as "political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states."

also evolved, from concerns with independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty to include human rights, economic well-being, and environmental protection.⁹

In other words, security is no longer confined to the domain of state security but now also encompasses the concept of human security.¹⁰ The shift in the nature of threats in the post-Cold War era has influenced how military operations are conducted. In response to peace-related crises, the role of the military has expanded to include tasks under Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), particularly in the context of peacekeeping missions. While these changing global security dynamics have created space for military involvement in MOOTW, the military's primary function remains warfare. Participation in humanitarian efforts or civil operations may occur, but this does not imply that military personnel are institutionally prepared, organized, or trained for non-combat roles.¹¹ Consequently, MOOTW should be regulated as exceptional, limited, and temporary in nature, and carried out within a clearly defined and strictly governed framework.

Albrecht Schnabel and Marc Krupanski (2012) argue that the role of the military in the context of domestic MOOTW—particularly in providing assistance to civilian government agencies—should be framed as a response to specific, limited situations. These situations should be defined by specific characteristics: they occur when civilian institutions are unable to respond effectively—either because the scenario is extremely rare, because equipping civilian agencies with the required capabilities would be prohibitively expensive, or because such capabilities already exist within the military. As such, the military's role in domestic MOOTW must be understood as a last resort, conducted under accountable civilian authority, and strictly limited to enhancing the capacities and capabilities required by civilian institutions. Albrecht and Marc Krupanski Schnabel, *Mapping the Evolving Internal Roles of the Armed Forces*, (Geneva: DCAF, 2012).

To a certain extent, military deployment in MOOTW also demands careful attention to context and proportionality. On one hand, disproportionate or poorly contextualized military engagement risks undermining military professionalism by disrupting its organizational focus, training routines, and strategic preparedness for its primary function: warfare.¹² On the other hand, excessive involvement in civilian domains can blur the civil-military boundary and may set a troubling precedent for democratic governance and the institutional integrity of the armed forces. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Demokrasi*,

⁹ Miller, "The Concept of Security," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 24 (2001): 18–23.

¹⁰ Anang Puji Utama, "Aspek Pengaturan Keamanan Nasional Dalam Kerangka Demokrasi," *Ganaya : Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Humaniora* 7, no. 3 (2024): p. 32.

¹¹ Huntington, Samuel, *New Contingencies, Old Roles*, Joint Forces Quarterly, 1993.

¹² Samuel Huntington, *New Contingencies, Old Roles*. Joint Forces Quarterly, 1993.

Keamanan Dan Peranan Militer, Dalam Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, *Dinamika Pemikiran Internal Tentang Peran Dan Fungsi TNI Di Era Transisi Demokrasi* (Political Research Center of LIPI, 2001).

Based on these considerations, it is important to frame the discussion of the Reserve Component as a supporting element to the military—as the principal component—in addressing military threats or war. The problem, however, lies in how the Reserve Component is managed under the PSDN Law. Instead of focusing solely on supporting military Defense, this Law expands the Reserve Component's mandate to include hybrid threats, as outlined in Article 29—a shift that is problematic and misaligned with the core logic of national defense. Similarly, the inclusion of non-military threats in Article 4 is unnecessary and further blurs the intended function of the Reserve Component. Therefore, it is crucial to critically review the scope of the Reserve Component's role and ensure that it remains limited to military threats. Provisions related to non-military and hybrid threats should be excluded from the PSDN Law.

Building on the background discussed above, this paper focuses on the following key issues within the PSDN Law:

1. How has military reform evolved within the broader framework of security sector reform in Indonesia?
2. What is the existing position and function of the Reserve Component within Indonesia's national defense system?
3. How do other countries structures and regulates their reserve military component?

2. Research Method

This study adopts a normative juridical research method, which is commonly used in legal research to examine the norms contained within statutory regulations and other authoritative legal sources. Rather than collecting empirical data from the field, this method focuses on the systematic analysis of primary legal materials, such as legislation and government regulations, as well as secondary legal sources, including scholarly literature, legal commentaries, and academic journals. The primary concern of this study is the management of national resources for state defense in Indonesia, with a specific emphasis on the establishment and governance of the reserve component.

Two analytical approaches are employed in this study: the statutory approach and the conceptual approach. The statutory approach involves a critical examination of Law Number 23 of 2019 on the Management of National Resources for State Defense and its implementing regulations. Through this approach, the research analyzes the legal structure, principles, and substantive norms outlined in the legislation,

particularly those that govern the rights and obligations of citizens as part of the reserve component.

The conceptual approach, on the other hand, is used to explore and clarify key legal concepts relevant to this issue, such as national defense, citizenship, human rights, and the rule of law. This approach allows for a normative assessment of how well the current legal framework aligns with constitutional ideals and fundamental democratic values. It also facilitates critical reflection on whether the legal construction of the reserve component respects the balance between state security interests and individual rights.

By applying these methods, the study aims to provide a critical legal analysis of the existing statutory framework, evaluate its compatibility with both domestic constitutional principles and international legal standards, and offer constructive recommendations for legal reform in the area of national defense policy in Indonesia.

3. Results And Discussion

3.1 Military Reform within the Framework of Security Sector Reform in Indonesia

Every country or government naturally seeks to protect its sovereignty and stability from various forms of threats. As part of this effort, most governments establish security institutions such as the military, police, and intelligence services, and grant them the authority to use legitimate force in order to safeguard national security.

Ideally, the exercise of this authority is aimed at ensuring the safety and well-being of the entire nation and state.

However, the delegation of such power does not always lead to positive outcomes. Since threat perceptions are often shaped by the government's own political and ideological views, there is a risk that citizens—or even the constitutional order itself—may be constructed as threats. Whereas, the fundamental purpose of security services should be to protect the entire nation and state, including its citizens, rather than positioning them as threats.¹³ This tendency toward biased threat perception is commonly found in authoritarian regimes, where power is centralized in the executive branch, as was the case in Indonesia during the New Order era.¹⁴

Nonetheless, this pattern is not confined to authoritarian regimes alone. Similar risks persist in countries undergoing democratic transitions. In such contexts, the

¹³The publication by the Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence of South Africa explains that, essentially, all security services in democratic states present a political paradox. This is further complicated by the powers of intelligence agencies, which are inherently characterized by secrecy. See Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence, *Intelligence in a Constitutional Democracy: Final Report to the Minister for Intelligence Services*, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/others/ReviewCommSept08.pdf>.

¹⁴ Kisno Hadi, "Perbandingan Penegakan Demokrasi Di Indonesia Pasca-Rezim Suharto Pemerintahan Militeristik Seperti Sudan Demokratis . Namun , Kalau Istilah Yang Sama Negara Ini Yakni Bagaimana Mencari Dasar Keadaan Rezim Militeristik Yang Menguasai Terjadi Pada Kedua Ne," *Insignia Journal of International Relations* 6, no. 1 (2019): p. 17.

state itself can become a source of insecurity for its own citizens. Security is often invoked to justify state policies and actions, even when these result in the suppression of civil liberties or the marginalization of certain groups. In many cases, the rhetoric of security becomes a tool for legitimizing the abuse of power, placing society in a position of constant pressure and fear. The increasing number of human rights violations and excessive use of force by state apparatuses raises critical questions about the role of the state in safeguarding, rather than threatening, public security.

For example, the abuse of authority in the name of security can be seen in the use of militias or neighborhood watch personnel (*Pamswakarsa*) to confront the population—particularly in conflict areas, but also during political unrest outside formal conflict zones. In Indonesia's history, the civilian militarization orchestrated by those in power has often served political interests, frequently leading to violence and human rights violations. Prior to the 1999 East Timor referendum, the regime mobilized a number of pro-government civilian groups—commonly referred to as militias—that were later implicated in acts of violence. Similarly, in 1998, *Pamswakarsa* groups were deployed to suppress student-led demonstrations opposing the Special Session of the People's Consultative Assembly.

To prevent such potential negative impacts, countries—especially democratic ones—seek to establish comprehensive regulations, effective oversight mechanisms, protection of human rights, prevention of abuse of authority in the provision of security services, and to ensure that security management operates under a legitimate, transparent, accountable, and democratic system. These important key points are then summarized in a concept known as security sector reform (SSR).¹⁵

The concept of SSR itself can be understood as the transformation of security institutions, including the clarification of roles, responsibilities, and authorities of all security actors (military, police, intelligence, and others). It emphasizes the importance of aligning the security apparatus with democratic principles and good governance, in order for the security framework of a state to function effectively. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Security System Reform and Governance, 2005.

Military reform, as a core component of security sector reform (SSR), is typically undertaken in post-authoritarian countries undergoing democratic transitions. In authoritarian regimes, the military often plays a dominant political role, either as the direct holder of power or as the principal supporter of an

¹⁵ K B Prasetyo, J Mahroza, and ..., "Implementation of Good Governance in Indonesia's Defense and Security Sector Reform Facing the Dynamic of Globalization," *Jurnal Kewarganegaraan* 7, no. 1 (2023): 1101, <http://journal.upy.ac.id/index.php/pkn/article/view/5203%0Ahttp://journal.upy.ac.id/index.php/pkn/article/download/5203/3125>.

authoritarian civilian leader. It is not only tasked with defending national sovereignty and addressing external threats but is also frequently used as the main instrument for maintaining internal security and suppressing dissent. Moreover, the military is often deeply involved in practical political life, resulting in an excessively broad and politicized role. In such contexts, the military risks losing its core identity as a professional defense institution.

The transition from authoritarianism to democracy, particularly in the post- Cold War period, has therefore demanded the professionalization of the military. Armed forces are expected to return to their primary function of national defense and withdraw from domestic politics. However, transforming an institution that has long held significant political and coercive power is no easy task. The success or failure of military reform will profoundly affect not only the outcome of broader security sector reform but also the trajectory of democratic consolidation itself.

In Indonesia, Security Sector Reform (SSR) has been a key pillar of the broader wave of political reform that began in 1998. SSR emerged in response to demands from student movements and civil society organizations, who called for the professionalization of key security actors, including the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), the National Police, and intelligence agencies. At its core, SSR in Indonesia seeks to transform the structure, legal framework, and institutional culture of these bodies—from closed and secretive institutions into ones that are transparent, accountable, and aligned with democratic governance.¹⁶

It must be acknowledged that the momentum for security sector reform—particularly military reform—across various countries has been strongly influenced by shifts in global political dynamics as well as developments within national contexts. The same holds true for Indonesia, where the progress and setbacks of military reform have been shaped by broader waves of democratization in the Third World countries, the intensifying forces of globalization, and evolving international norms related to human rights. Domestically, political power struggles have also played a crucial role in directing the course of TNI reform.

Within this context, Indonesia's military reform process has yielded several notable achievements. Among the most significant is the revocation of the *Dwifungsi* (Dual Function) doctrine of ABRI (now TNI), followed by the formal prohibition of military involvement in practical politics.¹⁷ This marked a critical shift and offered a breath of fresh air for Indonesia's democratic transition. Unlike the New Order period, when military dominance blurred the boundaries between civilian governance and defense, the current political landscape is no longer

¹⁶*Almanak Reformasi Sektor Keamanan 2007* (DCAF, 2007).

¹⁷Ni'matul Huda, "Hak Politik Tentara Nasional Indonesia Dan Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia Pasca Reformasi," *Jurnal Hukum Ius Quia Iustum* 21, no. 2 (2014): p. 224.

defined by military control. Under previous Suharto's regime, the military not only upheld the state but became synonymous with political power, contributing to the paralysis of civilian institutions and the entrenchment of authoritarian rule.¹⁸

While military reform has achieved several milestones, fundamental challenges persist in aligning the military with democratic principles. There are still several crucial agendas of military reform that have not yet been completed, such as the agenda of military justice reform and the agenda of restructuring the territorial command and other agendas.¹⁹

From a legal standpoint, the foundation for TNI reform within the framework of security sector reform is laid out in the 2000 MPR Decrees. In particular, MPR Decree No. VI/2000 on the separation of the TNI and the National Police, and MPR Decree No. VII/2000 on their respective roles, serve as the principal legal instruments mandating that these two security institutions operate under distinct functions. Together, these provisions establish the legal and institutional separation of the TNI and the National Police, affirming their different authorities and responsibilities within the national security architecture.

In the Constitution, the basic principles of security politics are stated in Chapter XII, Article 30 of the 1945 Constitution. The amended Article 30 stipulates the following:

- (1) *Every citizen has the right and duty to participate in the defense and security efforts of the state.*
- (2) *The defense and security efforts of the state shall be carried out through a system of total people's defense and security by the Indonesian National Armed Forces and the Indonesian National Police as the main forces, and the people as supporting forces.*
- (3) *The Indonesian National Armed Forces consist of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force as state instruments assigned to defend, protect, and preserve the integrity and sovereignty of the state.*
- (4) *The Indonesian National Police, as a state instrument responsible for maintaining public security and order, is tasked with protecting, guiding, serving the public, and enforcing the law.*
- (5) *The structure and position of the Indonesian National Armed Forces and the Indonesian National Police, the division of authority between the Armed Forces and the Police in carrying out their duties, the requirements for citizen participation in defense and security efforts, and other matters related to defense and security shall be regulated by law.*

¹⁸ Defa Akhdan Naufal, "Supersemar Dan Stabilitas Politik : Analisis Transformasi Kekuasaan Dari," *Socius: Jurnal Penelitian Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial* 2, no. 5 (2024): p. 18.

¹⁹ Nurkhasanah Leni, "Keterlibatan Militer Dalam Kancan Politik Di Indonesia," *Jurnal Tapis: Jurnal Teropong Aspirasi Politik Islam* 9, no. 1 (2013): p. 93.

At a more operational level, the government has enacted several key laws in the defense and security sector, including Law No. 3 of 2002 on State Defense, Law No.

34 of 2004 on the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), Law No. 2 of 2002 on the Indonesian National Police, and Law No. 17 of 2011 on State Intelligence. These laws serve as the fundamental legal framework for strengthening Indonesia's security architecture. While their enactment represents a significant achievement of the security sector reform agenda, it is important to note that these laws have also faced criticism and raised concerns regarding certain provisions and their implementation.

In this context, the broad definition of threats outlined in the PSDN Law— which encompasses military, non-military, and hybrid threats—raises significant concerns for the governance of the security sector. As stated in Article 4, Paragraph 3, these threats include acts of aggression, terrorism, communism, separatism, armed rebellion, natural disasters, environmental damage, border violations, piracy, theft of natural resources, disease outbreaks, drug trafficking and abuse, cyberattacks, and nuclear, biological, and chemical threats, as well as any action deemed to endanger national sovereignty, territorial integrity, or the safety of the nation. This expansive and loosely defined scope risks blurring the boundaries between civilian and military domains, complicating the institutional management of security and creating opportunities for the abuse of power. As such, it poses a serious challenge to the ongoing process of security sector reform.

Furthermore, assigning the Reserve Component to address non-military threats carries the risk of exacerbating social tensions and triggering horizontal conflict. Indonesia's past experiences—such as the deployment of pro-government militias in Timor-Leste prior to the 1999 referendum and the mobilization of *Pamswakarsa* in 1998 to confront student demonstrations—illustrate the dangers of civilian militarization. These groups were often implicated in human rights violations, particularly in the case of Timor-Leste, and serve as a cautionary reminder of the risks associated with deploying non-professional forces in politically charged or complex domestic situations.

These concerns are especially troubling when viewed in light of Indonesia's constitutional framework, which firmly establishes the centralized nature of defense governance. In almost all countries, whether federal or unitary, defense responsibilities are not delegated to subnational entities or autonomous regions. In Indonesia, national defense is a key function of the central government, as outlined in the 1945 Constitution, the Law on National Defense, the Law on the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), and the Law on Regional Government. To carry out defense functions, the central government is supported by several core institutions: the Ministry of Defense, which assists the President in formulating and

implementing defense policy; the TNI, as the main component of national defense; and the President, who holds supreme command over the armed forces.


The centralized nature of defense command is explicitly affirmed in Article 10 of the 1945 Constitution, which states that the President holds supreme authority over the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This principle is reinforced in the Law on National

Defense: Article 13 paragraph (1) stipulates that the President has the authority and responsibility over the management of the national defense system. While article 14 paragraph (1) affirms this centralized nature in regard to the deployment of Indonesian National Armed Forces, in which the President holds the authority and responsibility for the deployment of Indonesian National Armed Forces.

The centralized nature of Indonesia's defense governance is further affirmed in the Law on the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI). This law stipulates that the TNI operates under the authority of the President, particularly concerning the deployment and use of military force, as outlined in Article 3 and reinforced by Articles 17 and 18. Additionally, Articles 12 to 16 regulate the organizational structure and form of the TNI, further consolidating its position under centralized command. Complementing this, Law No. 23 of 2014 on Regional Government reaffirms those strategic domains- including foreign affairs, defense, security, justice, national monetary and fiscal policy, and religion, fall under the exclusive authority of the central government (Article 10, Paragraph 1).

Moreover, the TNI's command structure is clearly delineated in Article 3 of the TNI Law. Paragraph (1) confirms that the authority to deploy and utilize military force lies solely with the President. In contrast, Paragraph (2) specifies that matters related to defense policy, strategy, and administrative support fall under the coordination of the Ministry of Defense. This legal framework reinforces the principle that while the President exercises supreme command, the Ministry of Defense plays a key role in policy planning and resource management. For further clarity, this division of roles is illustrated in the diagram of the national defense management structure below. Propatria Team, Reformasi Sektor Keamanan Indonesia, ed. Andi Wijajanto (Jakarta, 2024).

Structure of National Defense Administration



Moreover, the principle of centralization in the defense sector is not only related to the matters mentioned above, but also requires that military budgeting be carried out centrally through the State Budget (APBN). This centralized approach to military budgeting is emphasized in both the Law on State Defense and the Law on the Indonesian National Armed Forces. The Law on State Defense states that national defense is financed by the State Budget (Article 25 paragraph 1). Meanwhile, the Law on the Indonesian National Armed Forces outlines several provisions that require centralized budgeting for the military. Article 66 states that:

(1) The Indonesian National Armed Forces shall be funded from the national defense budget sourced from the State Budget; (2) The budget requirements referred to in paragraph (1) shall be submitted by the Ministry of Defense. Furthermore, Article 67 paragraph (2) states that in urgent situations requiring operational funding for military operations, the Commander shall submit the budget request to the Minister of Defense to be financed through the Contingency Budget sourced from the State Budget. This request must be approved by the Minister of Defense and submitted to the House of Representatives. Therefore, the principle of centralization does not allow the Indonesian National Armed Forces to directly obtain funding from outside the State Budget (non-budgetary sources).

The rationale behind this centralized budgeting system is to ensure the development of a defense force that is measurable, effective, and efficient. Decentralization of defense functions, particularly financial management, could fragment oversight and hinder the establishment of a unified and coherent national defense system. Centralized control of military budgeting thus plays a critical role in maintaining effective oversight, ensuring accountability, and directing the

institutional development of the Indonesian National Armed Forces in line with national defense objectives.

In this context, the budget arrangement for the Reserve Component—through regional budgets or other funding sources as stipulated in Article 75 of the PSDN Law—is inappropriate and contradicts existing legal frameworks. As a supporting element to the principal defense component during wartime, the Reserve Component should be financed exclusively through the State Budget (APBN) to ensure consistency with the centralized nature of defense governance and to maintain accountability within the national defense system.

3.2. The Position of the Reserve Military Component in the Indonesian Defense System

In the Indonesian Constitution, the role of citizens in national defense and security is recognized as that of a supporting force—not as a formal reserve component. Article 30 of the 1945 Constitution affirms that every citizen has both the right and the obligation to participate in the defense and security of the state. This provision reflects a constitutional balance between civic rights and responsibilities in the context of national defense.

The specific concept of a “reserve component” only emerged later, with the enactment of Law No. 3 of 2002 on State Defense. This law defines the reserve component as national resources that have been prepared to be mobilized in order to strengthen and expand the capacity of the main component. Its establishment is intended to enhance the state’s defense capacities.

According to Law No. 3 of 2002 on State Defense, national defense encompasses all efforts to safeguard the sovereignty of the state, maintain the territorial integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, and protect the safety of the entire nation from threats and disruptions to national stability. The function of national defense is thus directed at addressing both military and non-military threats.

In this context, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) serve as the principal component responsible for responding to military threats, and are supported by the reserve and supporting components. In contrast, responsibility for managing non-military threats lies with government institutions outside the defense sector, as stipulated in Article 7 of the Law on State Defense.

Within this national defense system, thus, the establishment of a reserve component by the Ministry of Defense should be understood as a means to support the main component—namely, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI)—in addressing military threats or the possibility of war with other states.²⁰ In contrast, for non-military threats, it is not appropriate for the Ministry of Defense to form or

²⁰Yesika Theresia Sinaga, “Komponen Cadangan Sebagai Wujud Bela Negara Dan Strategi Dalam Menangkal Ancaman Radikalisme-Terrorisme Di Indonesia,” *Jurnal Pancasila dan Bela Negara* 1, no. 2 (2021): p. 52.

mobilize a reserve component, as the responsibility for handling such threats falls under civilian institutions outside the defense sector, in accordance with Article 7 of the Law on State Defense.

Establishing a reserve component to respond to threats beyond the military domain departs from the fundamental purpose and rationale of military formation. In principle, within democratic states, the military is established primarily to prepare for and engage in war. In countries that maintain reserve forces or enforce compulsory military service, these mechanisms are generally designed to address external military threats (war).²¹ Even when the military is assigned non-combat roles, such involvement is typically limited to exceptional circumstances, such as states of emergency, and is subject to strict legal and political oversight.

In this context, assigning the reserve component to respond to hybrid threats— as outlined in Article 29 of the Law on the Management of National Resources for State Defense (PSDN Law)—is inappropriate and inconsistent with the legal and institutional framework of national defense. Likewise, the elaboration of non-military threats in Article 4 of the PSDN Law is unnecessary. The law should be narrowly focused on regulating the role of the reserve component in supporting the main component, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), in responding to military threats, particularly in times of war. As such, provisions and explanations related to non-military and hybrid threats should be excluded from the PSDN Law.

In recent decades, particularly in the post-Cold War era, the nature of conflict has shifted, with intra-state conflicts becoming more prevalent than inter-state wars. Against this backdrop, the development of a professional military, police force, and intelligence apparatus is far more critical than expanding reserve forces or introducing compulsory military service. Addressing the root causes of internal conflict—through the pursuit of political, economic, and legal justice—is a more urgent and sustainable strategy for maintaining national stability.

Furthermore, the evolution of international legal institutions, dispute resolution mechanisms, and regional organizations—such as the ASEAN Community in Southeast Asia—has contributed to a decline in the use of war as a means of resolving disputes between states. Today, inter-state conflicts are increasingly managed through diplomacy, dialogue, and international legal channels, rather than through military confrontation.

Considering the above, it is important for the government to focus its efforts on enhancing national defense capabilities through the modernization of weapons systems and the improvement of military personnel welfare.²² It is not a secret that

²¹ Fauzan Hidayat, "Urgensi Kebijakan Rekrutmen Aparatur Sipil Negara Dalam Komponen Cadangan," *Jurnal*

Kebijakan Pemerintahan 5, No. 1 (2022): Page 34.

²² Dhezya Pandu Satresna, "Politik Hukum Undang-Undang Nomor 23 Tahun 2019 Tentang Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Nasional Untuk Pertahanan Negara," *Japhtn-Han* 2, No. 2 (2023): Page 287.

Indonesia's defense equipment remain far from ideal. ²³According to data from the Ministry of Defense's Defense Posture Book, only 50 to 60 percent of principal weapons systems are currently operable. Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, *Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia 2015*, III. (Jakarta: Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, 2015). In light of these limitations, the government must allocate its defense budget more effectively and efficiently, prioritizing the modernization of essential defense assets and the well-being of active-duty personnel, rather than expanding reserve forces with unclear strategic relevance.

3.3. The Management of the Reserve Military Component in Other Countries

Each country adopts different approaches to involving its citizens in national defense, shaped by distinct historical, political, economic, social, and cultural factors, as well as their responses to changing geopolitical and geostrategic conditions. There are some countries that implement conscription, while others rely entirely on voluntary participation.

In recent decades, however, many countries that previously enforced conscription have abolished it.²⁴ Most countries in the European Union, as well as the United States, have abolished the concept of conscription. It is the same with the majority of EU countries that are also members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) which perceived conscription as economically disruptive and detrimental to workforce productivity due to the time required for basic military training.

In this era of globalization, countries that have abolished conscription tend to place greater emphasis on strengthening technology and developing a professional military force as the key factors in achieving victory in warfare. Additionally, with the increasing relevance of asymmetric warfare, traditional conscription models are seen as less effective and less relevant to contemporary security needs.

It is also important to note that the use of criminal sanctions against individuals who refuse conscription or reserve service is widely regarded as incompatible with international human rights norms. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, through Resolution 1998/77, affirmed the right of individuals to refuse military service on the basis of religious or moral convictions—particularly those who reject the use of weapons in conflict resolution.²⁵ This principle, known

²³ Yuliana Nur Anissa, Yusa Djuyandi, and University of Bangka Belitung, "Analisis Pemenuhan Kebutuhan

Minimum Essential Froce (Mef) Dalam Pengadaan Alat Utama Sistem Senjata (Alutsista) Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Tni) Scripta : Jurnal Ilmiah Mahasiswa Fakultas Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik Scripta: Jurnal Ilmiah

Mahasiswa," Scripta : Jurnal Ilmiah Mahasiswa 3 (2021): Page 36,
<https://Scripta.Fisip.Ubb.Ac.Id/Index.Php/Scripta/Article/View/115>.

²⁴ Raden Mas Jerry Indrawan and Efriza Efriza, "Membangun Komponen Cadangan Berbasis Kemampuan Bela

Negara Sebagai Kekuatan Pertahanan Indonesia Menghadapi Ancaman Nir-Militer," Jurnal Pertahanan & Bela Negara 8, no. 2 (2018): p. 34.

25 Robby Simamora, "Hak Menolak Wajib Militer: Catatan Atas RUU Komponen Cadangan Pertahanan Negara," Jurnal Konstitusi 11, no. 1 (2016): p. 132.

as conscientious objection, is recognized in many democratic countries. In line with this, several states offer alternative forms of service, such as civilian or social work programs, as lawful substitutes for compulsory military or reserve duties.

Moreover, terminologies and frameworks for reserve components vary across countries, encompassing both broad and narrow aspects of national defense components. Countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, for instance, use the term "reserve" to refer to the entirety of their respective national defense reserve components. However, both countries further divide their national defense reserves into two components: (1) regular forces; and (2) reserve forces. The nuance lies in the fact that regular forces consist of full-time professional soldiers, while reserve forces comprise personnel who serve temporarily or are on call for specific periods. Moreover, Canada uses the term "militia" for its reserve units, while countries like India and the Philippines classify theirs as "paramilitary" forces. The use of different terms reflects political and security considerations unique to each country.

Specifically in the United States, there is currently no conscription. The last time conscription was implemented by the U.S. federal government was during World War I (1914–1918), World War II (1939–1945), the Korean War (1950–1953), and the Vietnam War (1955–1975). However, to this day, all male U.S. residents aged 18 to 25 are still required to register with the Selective Service System, an agency that maintains a pool of eligible individuals for activation in times of war or national emergency by order of the President and Congress.²⁶

The United States currently has two models of reserve components, following the abolition of the conscription program, namely the National Guard and the reserve component.²⁷ The National Guard is part of the reserve components of the United States Army and Air Force. Meanwhile, the U.S. National Guard consists of members from each state as well as U.S. territories such as Guam, the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and Washington, D.C.²⁸

The National Guard operates under dual control, namely the state governments and the federal government. National Guard units can be mobilized for active federal duty to assist the regular armed forces during wartime or in a national emergency declared by Congress, the President, or the U.S. Secretary of Defense. They can also be activated for deployment within their respective states following a state of emergency declaration by the governor of the state or territory

²⁶ Selective Service System, <https://www.sss.gov/>. accessed on October 21, 2024.

²⁷ Hendra Manurung and Rahmat Pannyiwi, "Volume 2, No 1, October DOI: Page: 72-89 Kehadiran Komponen

Cadangan (KOMCAD) Dalam Pertahanan Negara : Implementasi Operasi Militer Selain Perang (OMSP)”
2,

no. 1 (2024): p. 81.

28 32 U.S.C. § 101 Definitions (National Guard), Title 32 of the United States Code

in which they serve. Most members of the U.S. National Guard hold full-time civilian jobs while serving part-time in the National Guard.²⁹

Meanwhile, the reserve components of the United States Armed Forces are military organizations tasked with supporting the active-duty forces when needed, where their members generally perform military duties for a minimum of 39 days per year. These reserve components in the U.S. are collectively known as the National Guard and Reserve.

The purpose of the U.S. reserve components is to provide trained units and qualified individuals available for active duty in the armed forces in times of war or national emergency.³⁰ There are seven U.S. military reserve components, divided into two categories: the Regular Reserves and the National Guard. The U.S. military reserve components that fall under the category of Regular Reserves include the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve. Meanwhile, the reserve components categorized under the National Guard are the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard.

In the implementation of its Reserve Component system, the U.S. Department of Defense formally recognizes and applies the principle of conscientious objection. Each branch of the armed forces—including the Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard—maintains its own policies and procedures for processing claims of conscientious objection, allowing individuals to request exemption from combat roles based on deeply held moral or religious beliefs.³¹

An individual who has already enlisted in the U.S. military may apply for classification as a conscientious objector (1-A-O) and, if approved, will be assigned to two years of non-combatant or civilian service “that contributes to the maintenance of health, safety, or the national interest.”³² When conscription is reactivated and the reserve component is mobilized, individuals called to serve in the reserve are also given the opportunity to apply for conscientious objector status. If accepted, they fulfill their obligation through two years of alternative service. As a result, individuals who refuse activation on conscientious grounds are not subject to criminal penalties, as their service is recognized as a lawful alternative to military duty.

Furthermore, in democratic countries that implement reserve component systems, the legal provisions concerning reserve forces are generally limited to human resources—namely, citizens—and do not extend to natural resources, artificial resources, or physical infrastructure. This practice is evident in countries

²⁹ 10 U.S.C. § 12401 Army and Air National Guard of the United States: Status, Title 10 of the United States Code

³⁰ 10 U.S.C. § 10102, Title 10 of the United States Code

³¹ “Department of Defense Instruction 1300.06,” 2007.

³² 50 U.S.C. § 3806(j), Title 50 of the United States Code

such as the United States, the Philippines, and others, where the concept of reserve forces is clearly confined to individuals prepared to support the military when needed.

In this context, the inclusion of natural resources, artificial resources, and other facilities and infrastructure as part of the reserve component—as stipulated in Article 28 of Indonesia’s State Defense Reserve Law (PSDN Law)—is highly problematic and should not be retained. The 1945 Constitution, particularly Article 30, defines “supporting forces” exclusively in reference to citizens. Therefore, the regulation of reserve components in the PSDN Law should be restricted to human resources alone.

Moreover, the PSDN Law does not clearly outline the mechanisms for identifying, verifying, or managing non-human resources as reserve components. This lack of clarity opens the door to potential abuse of authority, particularly in the arbitrary seizure or reallocation of natural resources, land, and infrastructure owned by citizens.

Such ambiguity also risks fueling resource-related and agrarian conflicts between the state and communities. In Indonesia, land disputes involving the military—often in the name of national defense development—have occurred in multiple regions. Notable examples include the cases of Alas Tlogo in Pasuruan, East Java, and Urut Sewu in Kebumen, Central Java, among others. These conflicts highlight the dangers of vaguely defined legal provisions that enable militarized land acquisition without sufficient safeguards for citizen rights and participation.

4. Conclusion

In conclusion, this paper has identified several fundamental problems in the framework of the State Defense Reserve Law (PSDN Law). At the core of these issues is the law’s overly broad scope, which extends beyond military threats to include hybrid and non-military threats. This expansive categorization blurs the boundaries between military and civilian domains, complicates the institutional management of national security, and creates significant risks of abuse of authority. The deployment of reserve components in response to non-military threats also raises the potential for horizontal conflicts, particularly in politically sensitive or contested areas.

In addition, the PSDN Law also deviates from the established principle of centralized defense governance. Article 75, which permits the use of regional government budgets to fund reserve components, stands in direct contradiction to Indonesia’s legal framework on national defense, which mandates that all military functions and finances remain under central government authority. Allowing subnational budgeting for defense-related functions risks fragmenting the command structure and undermining national oversight.

In light of these challenges, it is imperative that Indonesia reconsiders the orientation of its defense policy. Rather than expanding a reserve component

grounded in an ambiguous and inconsistent legal framework, the government should prioritize the modernization of its principal weapons systems and the welfare of professional military personnel. As global trends continue to move toward professionalization, technological capability, and diplomatic engagement, Indonesia's national defense strategy must reflect these priorities. Ensuring that legislation like the PSDN Law aligns with constitutional mandates, democratic principles, and long-term strategic needs is essential for the development of an accountable and effective defense sector.***

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