

Administrative Law Approaches to Corruption Control: A Systematic Literature Review on Strategies in Developing and Developed Countries

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Article Info	Abstract
Received: 10/11/2024 Revised: 19/02/ 2025 Accepted: 05/03/2025 Keywords: Administrative Law; Anti-Corruption Strategies; Governance; Institutional Reform; Systematic Literature Review	Corruption remains a persistent challenge worldwide, manifesting differently in developing and developed countries. While developing nations struggle with systemic corruption due to weak institutional frameworks and limited administrative oversight, developed countries face more sophisticated forms, such as regulatory capture and lobbying. This study systematically reviews administrative law approaches to corruption control, comparing strategies across different governance contexts. Using a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) guided by the PRISMA framework, this research analyzes existing literature to identify key administrative mechanisms for mitigating corruption. The findings highlight that developing countries require stronger regulatory enforcement and institutional reforms, while developed nations must enhance transparency in policymaking and lobbying regulations. Additionally, international cooperation and emerging technologies are crucial in addressing corruption globally. The study concludes that effective anti-corruption strategies must be adaptable to contextual administrative and legal challenges. The insights provided contribute to refining administrative law policies aimed at fostering accountability and integrity in governance.

Riyan Israyudin, Laode Rudita. Administrative Law Approaches to Corruption Control: A Systematic Literature Review on Strategies in Developing and Developed Countries.

I. Introduction

Corruption remains a persistent challenge worldwide, manifesting differently in developing and developed countries. While developing nations struggle with systemic corruption due to weak institutional frameworks, limited administrative oversight, and political resistance, developed countries encounter more sophisticated forms of corruption, such as regulatory capture, opaque lobbying, and undue corporate influence (Demeshko et al., 2024). The impact of corruption extends beyond diminishing public trust in government institutions, as it also leads to economic inefficiency, social injustice, and political instability (Ponce et al., 2021). Given the varying manifestations and institutional capacities in different countries, understanding how administrative legal frameworks shape anti-corruption efforts is crucial for designing effective and sustainable governance strategies (Badur et al., 2024).

Administrative law plays a critical role in structuring anti-corruption measures, as it regulates government operations, transparency, and public accountability mechanisms (Yuan, 2024). Developing countries often face governance challenges, including weak regulatory enforcement, limited resources, and a lack of institutional autonomy, which hinder their ability to combat corruption effectively (Wang et al., 2018; Brody et al., 2020). In contrast, developed countries benefit from well-established legal systems and stronger oversight institutions, yet they are not immune to corruption, which often emerges in more covert and complex forms (Wijayanti et al., 2022; Gebresilassie et al., 2024). As such, comparative studies of corruption control strategies in different governance contexts can provide valuable insights into the role of administrative law in shaping effective anti-corruption policies.

Developing countries frequently struggle with corruption that is exacerbated by structural weaknesses, such as poverty, social inequality, and limited access to essential services (Hussain et al., 2022; Saputra, 2019; Pham, 2020). Meanwhile, developed nations encounter corruption in the form of influence peddling, financial misconduct, and policy manipulation, often enabled by sophisticated regulatory loopholes (Tran, 2021; Bolarinwa & Soetan, 2019). Addressing corruption effectively requires an in-depth examination of administrative law mechanisms, institutional oversight, and regulatory enforcement to understand how these factors influence corruption control strategies across different national contexts.

Corruption response strategies implemented in developing and developed countries often reflect differences in institutional approaches and law enforcement capacity. In developing countries, counter-corruption strategies often focus on structural reforms and capacity building of oversight institutions (K.S. & Patel, 2018). However, resource constraints and political influence often hamper these efforts (Malipula, 2024). On the other hand, developed countries are more likely to use well-structured law-based approaches, supported by independent judicial systems and strict internal oversight mechanisms. These differences suggest that success in tackling corruption is highly dependent on the local context and existing institutional structures, requiring a country-specific approach (Kuipers, 2022).

Developing countries face challenges in building adequate institutional capacity to tackle corruption, especially in areas where poor governance, lack of resources, and strong political influence are major obstacles (Lituhayu et al., 2023). In contrast, developed countries are often able to mobilize greater resources to support anti-corruption institutions and ensure that strict oversight mechanisms are consistently applied. However, this is not to say

that developed countries do not face their challenges. In these countries, corruption often occurs at higher levels, with actors having access to greater political and economic power, which can make law enforcement efforts more complicated (Ulain & Hussain, 2020).

In the context of tackling corruption, the perspective of institutions and authority personnel is crucial. Institutions such as anti-corruption agencies, prosecutors, and courts have a huge responsibility in enforcing the law and ensuring accountability in the public sector (Ikoh, 2018). The strength of these institutions in enforcing the law often determines the success or failure of a country's anti-corruption strategy. In addition, authority personnel, including public officials and law enforcement, play a key role in the implementation of anti-corruption policies (Williams-Elegbe, 2018; Ali & Yahya, 2019).

Their integrity and competence greatly influence the effectiveness of efforts to prevent and prosecute corrupt practices. Therefore, this study will focus on how institutional roles and authority personnel in these two groups of countries shape and influence corruption response strategies (Abbas et al., 2023). The role of authority personnel in tackling corruption cannot be underestimated, as they are the implementers of policies designed to combat corruption (Martinsson, 2021). In some cases, failures in tackling corruption occur not because of poor policies, but because of ineffective implementation, caused by a lack of integrity or competence of authority personnel. On the other hand, success in tackling corruption is often linked to the presence of authority personnel who have a strong commitment to law enforcement and accountability (Amadi, 2021). Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of the role of institutions and authority personnel is crucial to understanding the dynamics of handling corruption in various countries (Fernández, 2022).

Due to the importance of this study, there is an urgent need to conduct a systematic analysis comparing corruption response strategies in developing and developed countries, especially from the perspective of administrative law. Previous studies tend to focus on one aspect only, without looking at how the interaction between institutions and regulatory frameworks can affect the success of anti-corruption strategies. By conducting this systematic review, it is hoped to identify common patterns and trends that apply across different contexts, as well as understand how these contextual factors affect the outcomes of the strategies implemented.

This research also aims to fill a gap in the existing literature by providing comprehensive insights into cross-country comparisons in tackling corruption. The objectives of this study are to 1) compare corruption handling strategies between developing and developed countries based on administrative law perspectives; and 2) analyze the impact of administrative regulations and institutional oversight on corruption control in various sectors. By identifying the factors that support or hinder the success of anti-corruption strategies in different governance contexts, this study can help policymakers design more targeted and effective policies. In addition, the results of this study are expected to provide a deeper understanding of the institutional dynamics and the role of administrative law in tackling corruption, thereby offering useful recommendations for improving governance and increasing public accountability across nations. Thus, this study not only contributes to the development of theory but also has broad practical implications in global efforts to combat corruption.

II. Literature Review

Administrative Law Frameworks and Anti-Corruption Strategies in Developing and Developed Countries

Administrative law plays a crucial role in shaping anti-corruption strategies across different governance contexts, with significant variations between developing and developed countries. Developing nations often face structural challenges, including weak institutional frameworks, limited regulatory enforcement, and political interference, which hinder the effectiveness of their anti-corruption policies (Sophia, 2020). These constraints create an environment where corruption thrives, exacerbated by factors such as inefficient public administration, inadequate legal mechanisms, and a lack of transparency (Sophia, 2020). In contrast, developed countries typically benefit from well-established legal systems, stronger oversight mechanisms, and higher levels of bureaucratic accountability, which contribute to more effective corruption control (Kravtsova & Oshchepkov, 2019).

The effectiveness of administrative law in curbing corruption is closely tied to the robustness of institutional frameworks within a country. Research suggests that nations with weak legal and regulatory institutions often struggle to implement anti-corruption laws effectively due to the absence of independent oversight, weak enforcement mechanisms, and political patronage (Suvedi, 2024). Conversely, countries with strong administrative institutions tend to experience lower corruption levels, as their legal frameworks foster accountability, transparency, and the efficient allocation of resources (Jungo, 2024). Strengthening administrative legal frameworks is essential not only for reducing corruption but also for enhancing market efficiency, promoting fair competition, and ensuring that public resources are used effectively to support economic growth (Jungo, 2024).

The role of administrative law in corruption control becomes even more evident when examining its impact on governance and economic performance. Studies indicate that the relationship between corruption and economic growth is significantly influenced by the quality of a country's legal and institutional structures (Marakbi et al., 2019). Effective administrative laws can deter corrupt behavior by imposing stringent legal sanctions, increasing transparency in public sector operations, and reinforcing accountability mechanisms (Bakare et al., 2023). However, in many developing countries, these measures remain difficult to implement due to deeply entrenched corruption networks and bureaucratic inefficiencies. The implementation of whistleblower protection laws and public accountability mechanisms faces significant resistance, further complicating the enforcement of anti-corruption regulations (Okafor et al., 2020). Additionally, international interventions, such as privatization mandates imposed by global financial institutions, have sometimes had unintended consequences by creating new rent-seeking opportunities and weakening state oversight (Reinsberg et al., 2019).

Corruption also affects institutional stability at the firm and economic levels, with variations depending on a country's administrative and legal frameworks. In developed nations, corruption often leads to regulatory capture, reducing the effectiveness of public policies and stifling fair competition (Okrah & Nepp, 2022). In contrast, in developing economies with weak regulatory institutions, corruption can paradoxically serve as a mechanism to circumvent bureaucratic inefficiencies, allowing businesses to operate despite governance deficiencies (Cooray & Schneider, 2018). This highlights the complex and often

context-dependent relationship between administrative law, corruption control, and economic performance. The differences in administrative legal structures and anti-corruption strategies between developing and developed countries have significant implications for governance effectiveness. Developing nations must address political resistance, institutional fragility, and limited administrative resources to strengthen their corruption control mechanisms. Meanwhile, developed countries must refine their regulatory frameworks to prevent subtler forms of corruption, such as undue corporate influence and opaque lobbying practices.

Role of Administrative Personnel in Anti-Corruption Strategies

The effectiveness of administrative law in combating corruption is heavily influenced by the role of personnel authority, particularly in terms of independence, integrity, and accountability. Personnel involved in administrative oversight, anti-corruption agencies, and judicial bodies play a critical role in the implementation and enforcement of anti-corruption regulations (Reza et al., 2020). However, in developing countries, law enforcement officers, regulatory personnel, and public administrators often face systemic challenges, including political pressure, insufficient resources, and economic incentives that perpetuate corrupt practices (Zouaoui et al., 2021). In contrast, developed countries tend to have more independent and transparent personnel structures, which enhance the effectiveness of their anti-corruption policies and enforcement mechanisms (Christos et al., 2018).

Perceptions of corruption also play a crucial role in shaping governance effectiveness, trust in public institutions, and economic outcomes (Munteanu et al., 2024). Countries with stronger anti-corruption frameworks and higher transparency ratings tend to experience greater public confidence in governance, which in turn supports economic stability and development (Qaiser et al., 2018). Furthermore, corruption distorts administrative incentives by encouraging unproductive rent-seeking behavior and undermining economic progress (Ibrahim, 2020). Reducing corruption through effective administrative law enforcement can significantly contribute to increased national income, improved public services, and higher living standards (Pavlik et al., 2023).

Nonetheless, the relationship between corruption control and economic growth is often nonlinear. While reducing corruption generally benefits governance and economic performance, excessively rigid regulatory environments may also hinder innovation and economic flexibility (Trabelsi, 2021). This variation highlights the need for balanced administrative law strategies that not only deter corruption but also promote an enabling environment for economic activities. The impact of corruption control policies also varies regionally, with some countries experiencing adverse economic consequences from corruption, while others paradoxically see limited economic gains due to informal governance mechanisms (Gebresilassie et al., 2024).

Ultimately, the success of anti-corruption strategies hinges on the effectiveness of administrative personnel in enforcing legal and regulatory measures. Strengthening personnel accountability, enhancing administrative transparency, and refining corruption perception strategies are key to developing effective governance frameworks. As corruption dynamics differ between developing and developed countries, understanding the role of administrative law and regulatory personnel in shaping corruption control mechanisms is essential for crafting anti-corruption policies that align with diverse governance realities.

III. Research Method

Overview of the Systematic Literature Review Process

The methodology employed in this research is the Systematic Literature Review (SLR), aimed at identifying, assessing, and interpreting all relevant research findings related to the comparison of corruption handling strategies between developing and developed countries from the perspective of institutional frameworks and personnel authority. The SLR process follows the PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) guidelines, which consists of the following stages (Moher et al., 2010):

- a. Identification: In this stage, a literature search is conducted to gather articles, journals, and other documents relevant to the research topic. The search is performed through electronic databases such as Google Scholar, Scopus, and Web of Science using predetermined keywords.
- b. Screening: After the identification stage, the search results are screened to remove duplicates and irrelevant articles. Articles that do not meet the inclusion criteria or are outside the scope of the research are eliminated at this stage.
- c. Eligibility: Articles that pass the screening stage are then evaluated for eligibility based on the established inclusion and exclusion criteria. Articles that do not provide sufficient data or are not relevant to the research focus are also eliminated at this stage.
- d. Inclusion: Articles that meet all criteria are included for further analysis. This stage results in a final list of literature that will be analyzed in depth in the research.

Data Extraction

After the literature selection process is completed, the next stage is data extraction from the selected articles. This process includes identifying and recording key information from each article relevant to the research objectives.

- a. Search String
The literature search is conducted using various keywords relevant to the research topic. The keywords used are tailored to the databases accessed and include terms such as "corruption handling strategies," "developing countries," "developed countries," "institutional framework," and "personnel authority."
- b. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
In this study, inclusion and exclusion criteria were established to refine the article selection process, ensuring that the mapping of results focuses on factors relevant to the research topic. The criteria are as follows:

Table 1. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

Inclusion Criteria		Exclusion Criteria	
1)	Articles published in reputable scientific journals.	1)	Articles that do not provide empirical data or concrete research findings.
2)	Articles discussing corruption handling strategies in the context of developing or developed countries.	2)	Articles that are not fully accessible (only available as abstracts).
3)	Articles published within the last 10 years to ensure data relevance.		
4)	Articles available in English or Indonesian.		




Figure 1. A systematic literature review diagram based on the PRISMA guidelines, as implemented for research by Moher et al. (2010)

IV. Results and Discussion

Results

The **systematic literature review** reveals a significant focus on **developing countries** in studies related to administrative law approaches to corruption control. The distribution of reviewed papers highlights key regions where corruption remains a critical issue, particularly in nations with evolving governance frameworks and regulatory challenges. This emphasis reflects the **complexities of corruption enforcement**, where institutional capacity, administrative oversight, and legal mechanisms vary widely. The following discussion explores these findings in depth, comparing **anti-corruption strategies** in developing and developed countries while analyzing the role of administrative law in shaping effective governance and policy implementation.

Distribution Paper Based on Developing & Developed Countries

Table 2. Distribution Paper Based on Developing & Developed Countries

Country	Total Papers	Percentage
Developing Countries		
Moldova	1	2%
Ukraine	5	10%
India	2	4%
Brazil	3	6%
China	5	10%
Indonesia	12	24%
South Africa	1	2%
Romania	1	2%
Uzbekistan	1	2%
Nepal	1	2%
Pakistan	2	4%
Uganda	1	2%
Malaysia	1	2%
Mexico	2	4%
Bangladesh	1	2%
Nigeria	6	12%
Bulgaria	1	2%
Developed Countries		
Japan	1	2%
Russia	1	2%
USA	1	2%
South Korea	1	2%

Based on the distribution of countries, the research reviewed in this study was published in several countries, including Moldova, Ukraine, India, Brazil, China, Indonesia, South Africa, Romania, Uzbekistan, Nepal, Pakistan, Uganda, Malaysia, Mexico, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Bulgaria, Japan, Russia, USA and South Korea. Based on the findings from these countries, the country with the highest journal article publication is Indonesia with 12 journals each and a percentage of 24%.

Distribution Paper Based on Year




Figure 2. Distribution Paper Based on Year

Based on the years of research in the range 2016-2024, 50 years of journal and proceedings publications were obtained with a total percentage of 100%. In 2016 there was 1 journal with a percentage of 4%. In 2018, 2020 there were 5 journals with a percentage of 10%. In 2019, 2022 there were 4 journals with a percentage of 8%. In 2021 there were 6 journals with a percentage of 12%. In 2023 there were 17 journals with a percentage of 34%, while in 2024 there were 8 journals with a percentage of 16%. Based on this data, it can be concluded that from 2016 to 2024 there were fluctuations in publishing.

Target Paper

Table 3. Target Paper

Type of Paper	Total Papers	Percentage
Journal	50	100%

Based on the type of journal, this research is divided into two categories: proceedings and scientific journals. Based on the findings of these two types of research, 50 studies were published with a total percentage of 100%, and all were indexed in reputable databases.

The Comparison of Corruption Handling Strategies Between Developing and Developed Countries Based on Institutional and Personnel Authority Perspectives

In the context of institutional and personnel authority perspectives, the legal framework and anti-corruption policies, the role of personnel authority, along with social and political dynamics, are crucial to the effectiveness of corruption handling. The implementation of anti-corruption policies relies on a clear and effective legal framework and the active role of personnel authorities in enforcing these policies. Personnel authorities, encompassing oversight and law enforcement, must function optimally to ensure compliance with anti-corruption policies. Additionally, social and political dynamics influence how these policies are received and applied, often determining their effectiveness in tackling corruption. Institutional reform and strengthening are also essential to create a transparent and accountable system, supporting sustainable and effective anti-corruption efforts.

Table 4. The Comparison Corruption Handling Strategies Between Developing and Developed Countries Based on Institutional and Personnel Authority Perspectives

Research Aspect	Developing Countries	Developed Countries	Source Reference
Legal Framework and Institutions	Law enforcement institutions are often weak and under resourced.	Law enforcement institutions are more established and have sufficient resources.	(Moraru & Samoilenco, 2023); (Omelchuk & Berdar, 2023)
	Legal reforms are often hindered by political resistance and economic interests.	Comprehensive and transparent legal framework, with strong internal oversight systems.	(Pomaza-Ponomarenko et al., 2023); (Shukla, 2021)
	Lack of coordination between anticorruption agencies, the prosecutor's office, and the judiciary.	Good coordination between various agencies related to corruption handling.	(Husin, 2024); (Kovaliv, 2023)

Research Aspect	Developing Countries	Developed Countries	Source Reference
AntiCorruption Policy Implementation	Policies are often ineffective due to implementation issues, lack of oversight, and systemic corruption.	Anticorruption policies tend to be more effective due to strict oversight and consistent implementation.	(Sarjito, 2024); (Selepe, 2023)
	Public oversight and community involvement in corruption handling are still limited.	Strong public oversight, with active roles of media and civil society in monitoring the government.	(Susanti et al., 2024); (Sakib, 2022)
Role of Personnel Authority	Personnel authority is often involved in corruption due to political pressure or economic incentives.	Personnel authority tends to be more independent and committed to integrity and accountability.	(Kim, 2023); (Kong & Liu, 2024)
	Strong political influence often affects the independence of law enforcement.	Political influence is relatively low, with mechanisms to maintain the independence of law enforcement agencies.	(Khoirunnisa & Jubaidi, 2023); (Yamaguchi & Yahagi, 2024)
Social and Political Dynamics	Corruption is often driven by political and economic instability, as well as weak governance.	Corruption is more hidden, often related to political lobbying and influence of interest groups.	(Shi & Pan, 2018); (Kikalishvili, 2023)
	Social structures that support corruption, such as patronage and nepotism, are still strong.	Social structures are more transparent and accountable, with stricter oversight systems.	(Stebeneva, 2023); (Lasslett & Capus, 2024)
Effectiveness of Corruption Handling	The effectiveness of anticorruption strategies varies, often with limited and inconsistent results.	Higher effectiveness, with strategies tailored to the existing legal and institutional context.	(Nonik et al., 2024); (Iancu, 2024)
	Anticorruption efforts often face significant challenges from within the government itself.	Corruption handling is more systematic, with support from an independent judiciary.	(Das, 2018); (Kekere & Preye, 2024)
Institutional Reform and Strengthening	Reforms are often gradual and incomplete, depending on political commitment.	Reforms are continuously implemented with an emphasis on transparency and accountability.	(M. Ali et al., 2023); (Zamboni & Litschig, 2018)
	Anticorruption institutions often lack political support and resources to operate effectively.	Anticorruption institutions are supported by a strong legal system and firm policies.	(Hope et al., 2020); (Jiang et al., 2022)

The comparison of corruption handling strategies between developing and developed countries from institutional and personnel authority perspectives reveals significant differences. In developing countries, legal frameworks and institutions are often weak and under-resourced, with legal reforms frequently hindered by political resistance and economic interests. There is also a lack of coordination between anticorruption agencies, the prosecutor's office, and the judiciary. On the other hand, in developed countries, law enforcement institutions are more established and well-resourced, with a comprehensive and transparent legal framework supported by strong internal oversight systems. This allows for more effective anticorruption policies due to strict oversight and consistent implementation,

supported by active public oversight and the involvement of media and civil society.

When it comes to the role of personnel authority, developing countries often face challenges such as political pressure or economic incentives that compromise the independence and integrity of law enforcement. Political influence tends to be strong, affecting the overall effectiveness of anticorruption efforts, which often yield limited and inconsistent results. Conversely, in developed countries, personnel authority tends to be more independent, with less political influence, resulting in higher effectiveness of corruption handling. Reforms in these countries are ongoing, focusing on transparency and accountability, supported by robust legal systems and consistent political commitment to strengthening anticorruption institutions.

Impacts of Differences in Corruption Handling Strategies Between Developing and Developed Countries

The following table compares the impacts of corruption handling strategies between developing and developed countries. It highlights how these strategies affect political stability, economic growth, public services, law enforcement, institutional integrity, and social outcomes.

Table 5. Impacts of Differences in Corruption Handling Strategies Between Developing and Developed Countries

Impact Aspect	Developing Countries	Developed Countries	Source Reference
Impact on Political Stability	Widespread corruption leads to political instability and can trigger protests or unrest.	Political stability is better maintained due to strong oversight systems and higher public trust.	(Barbabela, 2023); (Shabbir et al., 2016)
	Political corruption reduces government legitimacy and lowers public trust in state institutions.	Trust in political institutions is stronger, even though corruption exists, but it is more controlled and effectively handled.	(Abiloro et al., 2020), (Harahap et al., 2021)
Impact on the Economy	Corruption hinders foreign investment and economic growth, leading to inefficient resource allocation.	Negative economic impacts are more controlled, with a more stable investment climate and higher economic predictability.	(Wibisana & Hasbullah, 2024); (Yani et al., 2023)
	The private sector is affected by additional costs from corruption, such as bribes, increasing operational costs.	Corruption is more hidden (e.g., nontransparent lobbying), but it does not significantly impede economic growth.	(Alfada, 2019); (Danlami, 2024)
Impact on the Public Sector	Public services such as education, health, and infrastructure are disrupted by corruption, causing unequal access.	Public services tend to be of higher quality and more equitable, although there is still a risk of corruption at the policy level.	(Khan & Bhatti, 2022); (Handayani et al., 2022)
	Corruption results in ineffective budget allocation and poor management of public resources.	Budget management is more effective with stricter oversight, although the risk of misappropriation still exists.	(S. Wang et al., 2021); (Estevam et al., 2021)
Impact on Law Enforcement	Corruption in law enforcement leads to low trust in the judicial system and law enforcement agencies.	The law enforcement system is more trusted and considered fair, although there is criticism of certain groups' influence.	(Fiala & Premand, 2018); (Aldana et al., 2022)

Impact Aspect	Developing Countries	Developed Countries	Source Reference
	Weak law enforcement due to corruption exacerbates social justice issues and inequality.	More consistent law enforcement helps maintain social justice and public order.	(Silaban & Umar, 2023); (Petrova, 2021)
Impact on Institutional Integrity	Rampant corruption leads to erosion of governmental institutional integrity, weakening control and oversight functions.	Institutional integrity is better maintained, with effective oversight mechanisms and strong institutional independence.	(Spencer et al., 2016); (Aliu, 2019)
	Difficulty in reforming corrupt institutions hampers anticorruption efforts and reinforces the status quo.	Institutional reforms are more effectively carried out, although challenges like lobbying and political influence remain.	(Baqutayan & Mayati, 2021); (Mangla, 2022)
Social and Moral Impact	Widespread corruption lowers societal morale, fostering apathy and permissive attitudes towards unethical behavior.	Society is more aware and critical of corruption, with social pressure to maintain transparency and accountability.	(Salomo & Rahmayanti, 2023); (Garnica-Monroy & Alvanides, 2019)
	Social inequality worsens due to injustice in wealth distribution and access to basic services.	Social impact is more controlled with better social protection mechanisms and more equitable wealth distribution.	(He et al., 2018); (Nwosu & Ataguba, 2019)

The differences in corruption handling strategies between developing and developed countries have significant impacts on various aspects of society. In developing countries, widespread corruption often leads to political instability, triggering protests or unrest due to the public's loss of trust in state institutions. This political corruption reduces government legitimacy, further eroding confidence in the political system. Economically, corruption in these regions hinders foreign investment, leading to inefficient resource allocation and stunted economic growth. The private sector faces additional costs from corruption, such as bribes, which increases operational expenses and reduces competitiveness. Public services, such as education, health, and infrastructure, suffer from unequal access due to corruption, resulting in disrupted services and ineffective budget allocation. Furthermore, corruption within law enforcement leads to low trust in the judicial system, exacerbating social justice issues and deepening inequality. The erosion of governmental institutional integrity weakens oversight functions, making reform efforts difficult and reinforcing the status quo. Socially, widespread corruption lowers societal morale, fostering apathy and permissive attitudes toward unethical behaviour, while worsening social inequality through unjust wealth distribution.

In contrast, developed countries generally maintain better political stability due to stronger oversight systems and higher public trust, even though corruption still exists. Political institutions in these regions enjoy stronger legitimacy, with trust levels being higher despite the presence of corruption, which is more controlled and effectively handled. Economically, the impacts of corruption are more contained, resulting in a more stable investment climate and higher economic predictability. While corruption manifest in more hidden forms, such as nontransparent lobbying, it does not significantly impede economic growth. Public services in developed countries tend to be of higher quality and more equitably distributed, with stricter oversight leading to more effective budget management. Law

enforcement is generally more trusted and considered fair, maintaining social justice and public order more consistently. Institutional integrity is better preserved through effective oversight mechanisms, and reforms are more successfully implemented despite challenges like lobbying and political influence. Socially, these countries benefit from a more aware and critical society that applies pressure to maintain transparency and accountability, with better social protection mechanisms in place to ensure more equitable wealth distribution.

Discussion

The Comparison of Corruption Handling Strategies Between Developing and Developed Countries Based on Institutional and Personnel Authority Perspectives

In developed countries, the legal framework for combating corruption is typically well-established, characterized by clear laws, regulations, and institutions dedicated to enforcing anti-corruption measures. These nations often boast independent judicial systems, specialized anti-corruption agencies, and robust legal procedures that ensure transparency and accountability. Conversely, developing countries exhibit weaker legal frameworks, with laws that are outdated, poorly enforced, or subject to manipulation by those in power (Brody et al., 2020). Institutions in these regions tasked with fighting corruption often face challenges such as inadequate resources, political interference, and a lack of independence, which hinders their effectiveness (Brody et al., 2020). Moreover, the role of the judiciary is vital in combating corruption, as laws and institutions play a significant part in these efforts. It is essential to prioritize institutional reforms and integrity-building to combat corruption effectively, rather than solely focusing on increasing penalties for offenders (Owusu, 2024). International collaboration is also highlighted as necessary to combat corruption, as it is closely linked to inequality and growth (Andrew, 2022).

Developed countries typically exhibit a robust implementation of anti-corruption policies, supported by strong institutions such as anti-corruption commissions, independent judiciaries, and effective law enforcement agencies (Achim et al., 2018). These countries often have professional and accountable personnel authorities, empowered to investigate and prosecute corruption without undue influence. Additionally, developed nations benefit from a strong civil society, a culture of transparency, and active media and non-governmental organizations that help expose corruption and advocate for reforms (Kotukov et al., 2023).

Conversely, in developing countries, the implementation of anti-corruption policies faces substantial challenges due to limited resources, weak governance structures, and pervasive political instability (Brody et al., 2020). Personnel authorities in these regions often struggle with a lack of professionalism and independence, rendering them vulnerable to bribery and political pressure, which undermines their capacity to tackle corruption effectively (Johnson, 2024). For instance, in countries like Indonesia, despite efforts to impose severe penalties on corrupt individuals and conduct high-profile arrests, corruption remains a persistent issue due to systemic flaws and insufficient enforcement mechanisms. Similarly, Moldova and Ukraine, while advancing in their anti-corruption initiatives, continue to deal with entrenched corruption networks and inadequate institutional support.

Moreover, the socio-political dynamics in developing nations exacerbate the problem. High poverty levels and political patronage can create fertile ground for corruption to flourish (Baig, 2019). In countries such as India and Brazil, aggressive anti-corruption campaigns and

legal reforms have been implemented; however, the effectiveness of these measures is often limited by political influence and institutional weaknesses. In South Africa and Romania, ongoing reforms aim to strengthen anti-corruption frameworks, yet political interference and resource constraints frequently hinder progress. These challenges are also evident in countries like Uzbekistan, Nepal, and Pakistan, where systemic issues and political instability continue to impede the success of anti-corruption efforts.

The effectiveness of corruption handling strategies varies significantly between developed and developing countries. Developed nations benefit from robust legal frameworks, independent institutions, and higher levels of public trust, leading to generally lower corruption levels and more effective governance (Ulain & Hussain, 2020). In contrast, developing countries often face a combination of weak institutions, inadequate resources, and complex socio-political dynamics, which limit the effectiveness of their anti-corruption strategies (Oyamada, 2017). Although some developing countries have seen notable successes with anti-corruption initiatives, these instances remain exceptions rather than the norm, highlighting the need for tailored approaches and sustained international support.

To enhance corruption handling, both developed and developing countries need to focus on institutional reform and strengthening. Developed nations should continuously improve existing institutions to ensure independence and transparency. In contrast, developing countries require urgent and comprehensive institutional reform, including capacity building for anti-corruption agencies, enhancing judicial independence, and fostering integrity and accountability (Johnson, 2024). International support and cooperation are also crucial for helping developing countries strengthen their institutions and implement effective anti-corruption strategies (Brody et al., 2020).

The successful implementation of anti-corruption policies requires a multi-faceted approach that addresses institutional weaknesses, social dynamics, and political factors. While developed countries have stronger frameworks and institutions in place, developing nations face more significant challenges that necessitate comprehensive reforms and international support to combat corruption effectively.

Impacts of Differences in Corruption Handling Strategies Between Developing and Developed Countries

Corruption-handling strategies play a crucial role in shaping various aspects of society, including political stability, economic development, public sector efficiency, law enforcement integrity, institutional integrity, and social/moral values. In developing countries where corruption is systemic, inadequate strategies can lead to weakened governance, eroded public trust, and increased political unrest. This can result in reduced foreign investment, slower economic growth, and inefficient resource allocation, hindering overall economic development (Johnson, 2024). Moreover, poor corruption control in the public sector can lead to a lack of services and infrastructure development, as well as the diversion of public funds, exacerbating inequality (Foster, 2023).

In contrast, developed countries with robust anti-corruption frameworks tend to experience greater political stability due to their ability to prevent and address corruption effectively, maintaining public confidence in institutions. These countries also foster a more favorable business environment, attracting investment and promoting economic growth

through transparency and predictability (Johnson, 2024). Additionally, their more efficient public sectors deliver better services and infrastructure, contributing to higher living standards (Foster, 2023).

Furthermore, corruption within law enforcement agencies in developing countries can undermine the rule of law, leading to selective justice and a lack of trust in legal institutions, which can exacerbate crime and insecurity. In contrast, developed countries with stronger oversight mechanisms ensure fair and consistent administration of justice, maintaining law enforcement integrity. Moreover, the institutional integrity in developed countries is stronger, supporting effective governance and the rule of law, which fosters a stable and trustworthy political environment (Onwujekwe et al., 2019).

In terms of social and moral impact, pervasive corruption in developing countries can lead to social disillusionment and a breakdown of societal values, while stronger anti-corruption efforts in developed countries reinforce integrity and fairness, promoting social cohesion and ethical standards (Tan et al., 2016). Therefore, effective anti-corruption strategies are essential for promoting political stability, economic growth, efficient public services, law enforcement integrity, institutional integrity, and social cohesion.

Challenges, Limitations, and Policy Implications

The findings from the research reveal significant challenges in implementing effective anti-corruption strategies in both developing and developed countries. In developing countries, the main challenges include weak institutional frameworks, political resistance, and a lack of resources that hinder the effective enforcement of anti-corruption policies. These challenges are exacerbated by systemic corruption, which often infiltrates law enforcement and judicial systems, making reforms difficult. In contrast, developed countries, while possessing stronger institutions and more resources, face challenges related to hidden forms of corruption, such as lobbying and the influence of interest groups, which are more difficult to detect and regulate.

The limitations of the study primarily stem from the differences in data availability and the varying contexts of corruption across different countries. Developing countries often lack comprehensive data on corruption, which limits the ability to make accurate comparisons with developed countries. Moreover, the diversity of political, economic, and social environments makes it difficult to apply a one-size-fits-all approach to anti-corruption strategies. These limitations suggest that policymakers should be cautious in directly transferring anti-corruption strategies from developed to developing countries without considering contextual differences.

Given these challenges and limitations, policy implications are clear: there is a need for tailored anti-corruption strategies that consider the specific conditions of each country. For developing countries, strengthening institutional frameworks and increasing transparency and accountability within public institutions should be prioritized. Additionally, international cooperation and support can play a crucial role in overcoming resource limitations. For developed countries, policy implications include the need to enhance regulation and oversight of lobbying activities and other forms of hidden corruption, as well as ensuring that anti-corruption agencies remain independent and free from political influence.

Future Research Direction

The findings of this study highlight several areas where further research is needed, particularly in bridging the gap between strategies used in different contexts. One area that warrants further exploration is the effectiveness of context-specific anti-corruption strategies, particularly how certain strategies can be adapted to different political, economic, and social environments. Future research could focus on comparative case studies of countries that have successfully adapted strategies from other contexts to understand the key factors that contributed to their success. Another area for future research is the role of international organizations and cross-border cooperation in combating corruption. Given that corruption often transcends national boundaries, understanding how international legal frameworks and cooperative efforts can be enhanced to support national anti-corruption initiatives is essential. Additionally, research into the effectiveness of international sanctions and incentives in promoting good governance and anti-corruption measures in developing countries could provide valuable insights for policymakers.

Further research is also needed on the impact of emerging technologies and digital tools in the fight against corruption. While digital platforms and data analytics offer new opportunities for enhancing transparency and accountability, they also present new challenges, such as cyber corruption and data misuse. Understanding how these technologies can be effectively integrated into anti-corruption strategies, particularly in developing countries with limited digital infrastructure, is critical for future research. Finally, research should explore the sociocultural factors that influence the success of anti-corruption strategies. Corruption is deeply embedded in the social fabric of many countries, and understanding the cultural and societal norms that either support or hinder anti-corruption efforts is crucial. Studies that investigate how public attitudes toward corruption can be shifted, and how cultural factors can be leveraged to support anti-corruption initiatives, will be important in designing more effective and sustainable strategies.

4. Conclusion

This study reveals significant differences in corruption handling strategies between developing and developed countries, emphasising the crucial role of both institutional frameworks and personnel authority perspectives. Developing nations often grapple with institutional weaknesses and resource constraints, which hinder their anti-corruption efforts, while developed countries face challenges such as covert forms of corruption like political lobbying. Effective anti-corruption strategies must therefore address both institutional and personnel authority issues by tailoring approaches to each country's unique context. Policymakers should focus on strengthening institutions, enhancing transparency, and addressing the roles of personnel authorities to combat corruption effectively. Additionally, understanding the influence of cultural and technological factors is essential for designing and implementing successful anti-corruption policies. Future research is recommended to delve deeper into the adaptation of anti-corruption strategies that align with local conditions and to explore the role of technology and international cooperation in combating corruption across various contexts.

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