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THE IMPACT OF BUDGET EFFICIENCY POLICIES ON COMPETITION IN
GOVERNMENT CONSTRUCTION TENDERS: EVIDENCE FROM EAST KALIMANTAN

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ABSTRACT

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This study aims to examine the impact of government budget efficiency measures on competition in public procurement, specifically construction tenders for small enterprises in East Kalimantan Province. It seeks to understand whether efficiency-driven budget cuts influence the number of participants. A quantitative approach was employed using secondary data from the national procurement platform. A total of 335 tenders before efficiency and 124 tenders after efficiency were analyzed using descriptive statistics and the nonparametric Mann–Whitney U Test. The analysis shows a significant increase in the median number of participants per tender after the efficiency policy. This study provides empirical evidence on how fiscal efficiency policies reshape procurement competition at the regional level. The research highlights how budget efficiency policies shape SME competition in government tenders and examines the potential effects of this intensified competition for both the government and SMEs. Government efficiency policies may enhance price competitiveness but risk marginalizing small enterprises. Regulatory adjustments and tender restructuring are recommended to ensure inclusive participation

INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the 2025 fiscal year, the President of the Republic of Indonesia issued a budget efficiency policy through Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 2025. The policy mandated an expenditure reduction of more than three hundred trillion rupiah. The efficiency measures covered several areas of government spending, including operational expenditures, government assistance programs, infrastructure development, and the procurement of equipment and machinery. Furthermore, the efficiency policy also applied to central government transfers to regional governments, which implied that local governments were likewise affected and required to adjust their respective expenditure allocations.

Budget efficiency inevitably has implications for the national economy, as the government, acting as a major consumer, reduces its level of consumption. Several studies have been conducted to examine the potential effects of this policy. (Ilma & Prabandari, 2025) and (Sari et al., 2025) investigated its impact on the education sector, while (Kurniansah et al., 2025) examined its consequences for the tourism sector. Additionally, (Rizky et al., 2025) and (Yuliati, 2025) focused on the effects on public service delivery at the local government level. These

studies generally concluded that the efficiency measures affected the operational aspects of public services, although local governments were still able to make adjustments in accordance with the available budgetary resources.

Beyond financing government operations and delivering public services, the state budget also functions as an important driver of the national economy (Mulyawan, 2020). One of the key mechanisms through which government expenditure is executed is public procurement. Public procurement refers to the process of acquiring goods and services necessary for government functions (Presiden Republik Indonesia, 2021). Among the procurement methods, contracting through private suppliers is particularly significant, as it engages business actors in fulfilling government demand. For these actors, a reduction in government spending implies a corresponding decline in demand for their products and services.

One of the primary targets of the efficiency policy is infrastructure spending. This sector encompasses the development of roads, bridges, public facilities, and other strategic projects. Within the procurement system, infrastructure development is closely associated with the procurement of construction works (Lembaga Kebijakan Pengadaan Barang/Jasa Pemerintah, 2021). Consequently, the reduction in government expenditure has led to a decline in the number of infrastructure projects financed by the government, including those procured through competitive tendering mechanisms.

A decrease in the number of tenders means fewer available projects, which intensifies competition among suppliers (Beck, 2011; Nkosi & Prinsloo, 2011; Vigren, 2018). Within the concept of workable competition, competition is expected to improve the efficiency of economic resource allocation (Clark, 1940; Markham, 1950; Moroz et al., 2019). Previous studies have also shown that the number of tender participants has a negative relationship with contract prices, indicating that an increase in bidders leads to lower costs borne by the government (Johantri et al., 2022). However, the reduction in tenders may create adverse impacts on small and medium enterprises (SMEs). For SMEs, fewer tender opportunities intensify competition, which often results in many contractors being unable to secure consecutive projects—an essential condition for business growth and sustainability (Nkosi & Prinsloo, 2011). This underscores the importance of government intervention in protecting SMEs through supportive policies and incentives (Friske & Zachary, 2017; Stanton, 2014).

Against this background, the present study aims to examine whether there has been an increase in the number of tender participants following the implementation of budget efficiency measures. The analysis focuses on data from the Provincial Government of East Kalimantan. According to regional budget (APBD) data, East Kalimantan ranks second only to Jakarta in terms of infrastructure capital expenditure (DJPK, 2025). A relatively large infrastructure budget allows competition to remain active. Thus, if a province with substantial fiscal capacity already exhibits significant increases in competition, it is highly plausible that regions with smaller budgets will experience similar or even greater competitive pressures. The Province of Jakarta is not included in the analysis because its budget structure is less dependent on central government transfers. Apart from that, Jakarta is a government that has a special privilege where the budget owned by the Jakarta provincial government is used to develop infrastructure in all cities under its administration.

From an academic perspective, this research seeks to enrich the understanding of the economic implications of budget efficiency policies in Indonesia. The use of difference tests in this study is intended to support its academic objectives by identifying variations in competition

within government infrastructure tenders. The findings are expected to provide a foundation for further research on public procurement and fiscal efficiency. From a practical standpoint, the study offers valuable insights for businesses, particularly SMEs, in understanding and responding to the competitive dynamics of the construction tender market following the government's efficiency policy.

METHOD

This study adopts a quantitative research design using publicly available tender data published by the National Public Procurement Agency (Lembaga Kebijakan Pengadaan Barang/Jasa Pemerintah, LKPP) through its official platform <https://inaproc.id/satudata>. The dataset consists of construction tenders specifically designated for small enterprises within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Government of East Kalimantan, covering the period from 2024 to July 2025.

To distinguish the periods before and after the implementation of the government's budget efficiency policy, tenders conducted between January 1 and December 31, 2024, are categorized as the "Before" group. Meanwhile, tenders conducted between January 1 and July 31, 2025, are classified as the "After" group. Based on this categorization, the sampling procedure is structured as follows:

Table 1. Sample Selection

Description	2024	2025
Total population of announced construction tenders	373	142
Tender Packages open to both small and non-small enterprises	<u>38</u>	<u>18</u>
Tender Packages exclusively designated for small enterprises (sample)	335	124

Source: Data processed (2025)

The final sample consists of 335 tenders in the Before group and 124 tenders in the After group. To assess whether there are significant differences between these two independent groups, the study employs a difference test. Specifically, the nonparametric Mann–Whitney U test is applied after conducting normality tests on the data. The Mann–Whitney U test is appropriate for independent samples and is capable of comparing the median values of two groups when the assumption of normality is not met (Triola, 2016). Previous studies have also employed nonparametric methods to evaluate the impact of policy changes (Johantri & Aprilia, 2021), thereby supporting the methodological choice of this research.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The descriptive statistics of the research data are presented in Table 2. The results indicate that the number of tender participants increased following the implementation of the budget efficiency policy. Prior to the policy, the average number of participants was 47.87, with a median of 44 participants. After the policy, the average rose to 71.31, while the median increased to 67.00 participants.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics

Period	N	Mean	Median	Std Dev	Min	Max
Before	373	47.87	44.00	22.86	8	135
After	142	71.31	67.00	32.10	6	190

Source: Processed data (2025)

In addition, the variation in the number of participants also became more pronounced in the post-policy period. The standard deviation increased from 22.86 to 32.10, accompanied by a wider range of values. The minimum number of participants shifted from 6 to 190, compared to the pre-policy range of 8 to 135 participants. These figures suggest that not only did competition intensify, but the distribution of participation also became more dispersed following the efficiency measures.

From the 373 observations in the Before period and 142 observations in the After period, the distribution of data can be illustrated in Figure 1. The normality test was conducted using the Shapiro–Wilk method. The results indicate that the pre-efficiency group produced a p-value of 0.0000, while the post-efficiency group yielded a p-value of 0.0076. Since both values are below the 0.05 significance level. In line with the graphical illustration, these results confirm that the research data are not normally distributed.




Figure 1. Hystogram & Normal Curve Tender Before and Tender After

Since the data were not normally distributed, the homogeneity test was not performed. Instead, a nonparametric approach was applied using the Mann–Whitney U test to examine differences between the two independent groups. The results of this test are presented in Table 3.

Table 3. Mann-Whitney U Test

Description	Result
Significant level	0.05
Statistic test	38663.0000
p-value	0.0000

Source: Processed data (2025)

Based on the Mann–Whitney U test results, there is significant evidence that the distribution (or central tendency) of the number of tender participants is higher in the post-efficiency period compared to the pre-efficiency period. The box plot presented in Figure 3 further illustrates this finding. The visualization shows a clear difference in the concentration of median values between the two groups, confirming that tender participation increased following the implementation of budget efficiency measures.




Figure 2. Box-plot Comparison

The increase in both the mean and median values, as shown in Table 2, indicates that tenders have become more competitive, as they now involve a larger number of participants. This suggests that although the total number of tenders declined due to budget efficiency measures, the remaining tenders attracted significantly more bidders, thereby intensifying competition. The rise in standard deviation after the efficiency policy further highlights disparities in participation: while some tenders attracted a very large number of participants, others had relatively few. Nonetheless, the overall pattern supports the conclusion that the number of participants per tender increased following the government’s budget efficiency policy.

The efficiency measures also encouraged the government to be more selective in conducting construction projects. Tendered packages were allocated with more rational budgeting and focused primarily on priority needs. Statistical evidence shows that within seven months of 2025, the total number of tender packages was smaller compared to the average number of tenders throughout 2024. This reduction in available projects likely compelled suppliers to participate more aggressively in each tender, given the limited opportunities. The median values of both groups confirm this trend, showing a statistically significant increase in participation after the efficiency policy was implemented.

The increase in the number of participants in each tender may also be attributed to the ease of participation brought about by the adoption of electronic procurement systems. In East Kalimantan, e-procurement has been implemented since 2010 and continues to operate today. This system has expanded access for suppliers across different regions, eliminating geographical barriers that once restricted participation (Desai, 2016; Sunmola & Shehu, 2020; Wimalasena & Gunatilake, 2018). Tenders that previously attracted only local bidders are now open to suppliers from other provinces. Moreover, e-procurement has been shown to reduce tendering costs, particularly in terms of time and document preparation (Lindsley & Stephenson, 2008; Yutia et al., 2024). For small enterprises, the reduction of structural barriers represents an

important factor in encouraging broader participation in government tenders (Kharashvili & Lobzhanidze, 2023; Sigatova et al., 2018).

Another factor contributing to more intense competition is the limited availability of opportunities outside government projects. While this aspect requires further empirical investigation in Indonesia, existing literature suggests that when the private sector slows down or non-government projects decline, suppliers often shift their focus to government procurement, which is considered more stable and reliable in terms of payment (McDonald & Marshall, 2012). This redirection of supplier efforts toward public tenders increases concentration in government projects, resulting in more crowded participation in each tender. The present study provides initial evidence of such a shift and highlights the need for further research into the extent of supplier movement into public procurement markets.

An increase in the number of participants directly influences the intensity of competition (Eadie et al., 2013), and the findings of this study support this notion. For small businesses, however, this poses significant challenges. SMEs must now compete not only with their peers but also with larger suppliers with greater financial and technical capacity. Such competition pressures small firms to lower their bid prices to remain competitive, yet many are constrained by limited capital (Ahmed et al., 2024; Utomo et al., 2023), restricted access to raw materials, and operational inefficiencies (Adediran & Windapo, 2017). Additionally, stricter administrative and technical requirements can act as barriers, given that SMEs often lack the human resources and experience of larger firms (Winarno et al., 2016).

Intensified competition also reduces profit margins (Johantri et al., 2022). For small contractors, this increases the risk of losing bids and diminishes their chances of securing government contracts, which represent one of their primary sources of business opportunities (Cornejo-Cañamares et al., 2021; Nkosi & Prinsloo, 2011). Therefore, government intervention is crucial to safeguard SME participation. Protective mechanisms may include simplifying administrative requirements, providing training and capacity-building programs, and offering technical assistance. Affirmative policies of this kind can ensure that competition remains fair and inclusive, while still maintaining efficiency in procurement markets (J. Li et al., 2024; Sigatova et al., 2018).

From the perspective of government spending, heightened competition can lead to stronger price efficiency. The contract value is closely correlated with the number of participating bidders (Hanák & Muchová, 2015; Johantri et al., 2022). The greater the number of offers, the higher the likelihood that the government secures the most efficient contract price (Hyari & Thneibat, 2024; Johantri & Aprilia, 2021). In other words, efficiency gains increase through the difference between the initial procurement budget and the final awarded contract value.

Nevertheless, both government and businesses must be cautious of the “winner’s curse,” a phenomenon in which the winning bidder is unable to properly execute the project because the awarded price is too low to cover actual costs (Vickrey, 1961). This situation is often triggered by intense competition and irrationally low bidding (Hanák, 2018; G. Li et al., 2021). Excessive price-cutting may escalate into a “price war,” resulting in bids below reasonable cost levels, with potential consequences such as reduced work quality or even project failure (Johantri et al., 2024). For this reason, while increased competition can enhance fiscal efficiency, it is essential for the government to maintain balance through rigorous technical and administrative evaluations to safeguard procurement quality.

Since 2018, the Indonesian government has demonstrated a commitment to supporting small enterprises by allocating specific tender packages exclusively for them (Presiden Republik Indonesia, 2018). In addition, policies have encouraged larger firms to partner with SMEs in executing government contracts. However, with the implementation of budget efficiency measures, further regulatory refinements are needed. Mechanisms such as package unbundling or tailored regulations could serve as potential solutions to ensure that SMEs remain competitive and are not marginalized in the increasingly competitive tender market.

CONCLUSION

When the government implements budget efficiency measures by reducing the number of tenders, this study finds a significant increase in the median number of participants per tender. On the one hand, greater participation intensifies competition, which can lead to lower contract prices. On the other hand, small enterprises face heightened competitive pressures that may jeopardize their business sustainability.

This study is limited to data from East Kalimantan Province, and further research is needed to examine whether similar patterns occur in other regions. For businesses, increased competition requires greater internal efficiency and more careful pricing strategies when submitting bids. For policymakers, the findings highlight the importance of government intervention to safeguard the role of small enterprises in public procurement, whether through adjustments in tender regulations or by dividing large projects into smaller packages that can be more widely accessed by small firms.

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